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ABSTRACT
GOVERNMENT FRAGMENTATION AND THE ATTAINMENT OF REGIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
by
Peter Stuart Bluestone
December 2007
Committee Chair:

Dr. Laura O. Taylor

Major Department:

Economics

This dissertation investigates whether higher levels of “governmental
fragmentation” in metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) leads to worse environmental
outcomes. Fragmentation refers to the number of local governments in a given region or
MSA as defined by the census. This research contributes to two bodies of literature, that
of environmental federalism and that of urban growth and local government form. In the
area of environmental federalism this dissertation extends the collective action model to
include local governments. An empirical framework is developed that includes crosssectional and panel data. In the urban growth and local government form literature, this
dissertation comprehensively tests many existing measures of local government
fragmentation within an environmental policy framework. It also modifies and extends
some of the fragmentation variables. The results suggest that local government
fragmentation does hinder MSAs from attaining the ozone standard.
This dissertation extends the literature by examining the effect that local
government fragmentation has on regional environmental quality. Six local government
structure variables, jurisdiction count, special district dominance, central city dominance,
x

county primacy, central city growth, and metropolitan power diffusion index are
comprehensively tested to determine which might affect regional environmental quality.
In addition, this research extends the use of the computationally complex measure of
metropolitan power diffusion index to include additional local government expenditures
as well as additional years of panel data.
Two empirical estimation strategies were implemented, a cross-sectional
approach and a panel data approach. The cross-sectional approach estimates the effects
that long-term changes in local government structure have on attaining the ozone
standard by measuring differences across MSAs. The panel data model’s primary
purpose was that of a robustness check on the cross-sectional results.
Three of the six tested fragmentation variables were found to have statistically
significant effects on MSA attainment of the ozone standard in the cross-sectional model.
Higher levels of metropolitan power diffusion index and jurisdiction count were found to
hinder attainment of the ozone standard, while greater values of central city growth aided
in reaching the attainment standard. Generally, the panel data results’ supported the
results from the cross-sectional models. In addition, the panel model resolved some
important estimation issues. Metropolitan power diffusion index was found to be
correlated with unobservables in the random effects model, indicating that the crosssectional results for metropolitan power diffusion index may be biased as well. This was
not an issue for the variable jurisdiction count. Metropolitan power diffusion index and
jurisdiction count are highly correlated with each other and this relationship was used to
estimate a reasonable range for the effect metropolitan power diffusion index might have
on the attainment of the ozone standard.

xi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Clean Air Act has been in existence for over thirty years. However, many
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) continue to fail to meet the environmental quality
standards prescribed by these laws. The inability of state and local governments to tackle
the regional nature of environmental problems has been a source of frustration for policy
makers. As such, regional-level government has been cited as a cure for poor
environmental quality, fixing the mismatch between state and local government form and
the spatial nature of the environmental problems (Rusk 1999, Cieslewizc 2001). Local
government form includes not only the types of local governments such as general or
special purpose governments, but also the number of governments. Empirically, it
remains an open question whether local government form affects environmental quality
(K. Foster 2001).
This research investigates whether higher levels of “governmental fragmentation”
in MSAs leads to worse environmental outcomes. Fragmentation refers to the number of
local governments in a given region or MSA as defined by the census. This is a timely
and important topic as Environmental Regionalism is enjoying a resurgence. The
Harvard Environmental Regionalist Project was formed in 1998 to study the possibility of
improving environmental quality through the regional implementation of standards and
guidelines (See also C. Foster 2002, K. Foster 2001, Foster and Meyer 2002). While the
federal government sets environmental standards for air quality and the states determine
how those goals are to be met, individual local jurisdictional policy can still have direct
and indirect effects on outcomes. Through control of land use, budgets and municipal
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programs individual jurisdictions can help or hinder regional environmental goals.1 For
example, jurisdictional large-lot zoning policies and mandatory preservation of open
space are thought to encourage sprawl and increase vehicle miles traveled (VMT) thus,
hindering attainment of air quality standards in the MSA (Fischel 1999). Yet a
jurisdiction could state a legitimate public purpose for enacting such polices, and even
claim environmentally friendly reasons such as maintaining green space for animal
habitat.
Other hurdles might exist for jurisdictions wishing to enact regulations that
improve environmental quality. For instance, competition among jurisdictions for scarce
capital could provide incentives for keeping costs of locating in that jurisdiction low (i.e.,
to lower taxes). This type of “tax competition” reduces jurisdictional incentives to set
costly environmental regulation, hindering their ability to affect transboundary
environmental amenities (see Hoyt 1993 and Shogren and Kunce 2002).
The environmental federalism literature addresses the theoretical link between
government structure and environmental quality. The heart of the debate is whether
centralized environmental laws and standards are best or would member states enact
environmental legislation that best served the interests of their constituents and thus the
country as a whole? Theoretical arguments have been made for both schools of thought.
Cumberland (1979) was one of the earliest to suggest that states, in competition for
industry, would relax environmental standards engaging in a “race to the bottom” (See
also Oates 1972 and Break 1967). Oates and Schwab (1988) took a contrary position and
1

For example the new Regional State Implementation Plan (SIP) in Georgia for reducing ground-level ozone,
anticipates greater reductions in pollution in the future due to efficient land use planning in accordance with the
increased availability of mass transit. When asked about such planning, many municipalities refused to commit their
support either politically or fiscally to the plan. (SELC 2001)
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developed a model suggesting that when states set taxes on mobile capital as well as
environmental standards, they would set efficient levels of taxes and environmental
quality. However, little empirical work has been done to support either position.
While the environmental federalism debate can be extended to the local
government level, there are two aspects of the models used in this literature that are not
appropriate for the question I wish to explore. First, the environmental federalism
literature focuses on jurisdictions as environmental standard-setting entities (i.e., state
governments as the jurisdiction setting the environmental standards for air and water
quality). In this context environmental goals are endogenous for the decision-making
agents. However, the issue I wish to explore is how the number of local jurisdictions
within the borders of the MSA affect its ability to meet exogenously set air and water
quality standards. Another usual assumption in the environmental federalism literature is
that decisions made by one jurisdiction do not affect the environmental quality of another
jurisdiction. In particular, it is assumed that pollution does not spillover across borders.
The tax competition literature does not generally incorporate spillovers into its analysis
either. But in the context of an MSA consisting of many jurisdictions in close geographic
proximity, it is clear that decisions made by one jurisdiction will have an effect on its
neighbor. Thus, the effects of border spillovers will be important to incorporate into a
model of the effects of local government fragmentation on environmental quality.
The collective action model is better suited for modeling why environmental
quality may be under-provided in a MSA composed of many jurisdictions when
spillovers are present. Collective action models seek to explain why individual rationality
does not guarantee an outcome that is rational for the group (Olson 1965). In some cases,
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such as the provision of public goods, individual rationality predicts an outcome that is
clearly at odds with the Pareto efficient outcome for the group.2 This notion is embodied
in the Samuelson social welfare function (Samuelson 1954). Samuelson showed that the
Pareto optimal level of public good provision requires the vertical summation of marginal
benefits be set equal to marginal cost.
This contrasts with when private markets provide public goods. In this case the
problem associated with the provision of public goods is one of excludability or free
riding. Individuals cannot be kept from enjoying the benefit of a public good, say
environmental quality, once provided even if they did not contribute to its provision.
Without some type of coordinating authority or social planner, incentives exist for
individuals to hide their preference for the public good and thus give too little towards its
provision (Hanley, Shogren, and White 1997).
The collective action model is best suited to explain the behavior of individual
jurisdictions in an MSA faced with exogenously set environmental quality standards. The
MSA is required by federal and state law to meet certain environmental standards. The
federal and state governments also prohibit certain activities that directly lead to
environmental degradation. If the MSA fails to meet these standards it can be sanctioned
or prohibited from participation in certain lucrative federal programs. Thus, it would
seem to be in the best interest of all jurisdictions in an MSA to do what it takes to meet
these standards.

2

Public goods are defined as goods that are nonrival in consumption and nonexcludable. An example is air quality. In
general an individual enjoying the benefits of clean air does not preclude another individual from enjoying those
benefits, thus it is nonrival. Nor can an individual be kept from enjoying the benefits of clean air once it is provided,
thus it is nonexcludable (Hanley, Shogren, and White 1997).
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However, many activities under local jurisdictional control which affect
environmental quality are not directly regulated by federal or state statutes. Land use
planning, zoning and the local budgetary process can have an effect on environmental
quality and are regulated at the local jurisdiction level. Thus the problem of attaining
exogenously set environmental standards can be framed as one of voluntary contributions
to the provision of a public good by the jurisdictions within the MSA. Jurisdictions could
choose to contribute a larger amount to providing environmental quality (the public good)
through zoning and planning or funding public transportation. However such measures
are costly to the jurisdiction. Furthermore, if other jurisdictions contribute to the
provision of environmental quality and the standard is achieved, the noncontributing
jurisdictions cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of better MSA wide
environmental quality as well as the accompanying federal government benefits. Thus the
incentives of jurisdictions are parallel to those described in the collective action literature
where decision makers are individuals rather than government units.
The manner in which environmental standards are set and implemented has
implications on the ability of jurisdictions within the MSA to influence attaining such
standards. The Clean Air Act standards for air quality are determined at the federal level.
The 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act set up the national standards for six criteria
pollutants: Ozone, Carbon Monoxide, Nitrogen Dioxide, Sulfur Dioxide, Particulate
Matter and Lead.
States were instructed to designate air control regions in order to monitor these
standards. Each region is called an air shed. Progress has been made in cleaning the
nation's air, however many urban areas still cannot meet air quality standards for ozone
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and carbon monoxide. This is due to the high correlation between these pollutants and
vehicle miles traveled (VMT). While automobiles pollute less than they did in 1970,
VMT has increased by 400 percent since that time. At present in the United States motor
vehicles emit up to half of the smog-forming Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) and
Nitrogen Oxides (NOX); emit more than 50 percent of the hazardous air pollutants; and
emit up to 90 percent of the carbon monoxide found in urban air. (EPA Plain facts, 1998)
Federal and state statutes impose limits on point source pollution such as power plants
and factories and require technology standards for automobile emissions and fuel
mileage. However local jurisdictions can directly and indirectly affect transportation
policy, thus VMT, through zoning, land use planning, public transit development and
budget control for programs that could affect environmental quality.
Congress and the EPA were aware of the potential effect “indirect causes of
pollution” could have on air quality and tried to regulate these in the 1974 Clean Air Act
Amendments.3 However such measures were attacked by state and local governments as
infringing on traditional areas of autonomy. The federal government backed down in
subsequent amendments and rulemaking decisions. It wasn’t until the 1990 amendments
to the Clear Air Act that Congress attempted to again control indirect sources of air
pollution.
Thus, for MSAs that do not meet air quality standards, it is necessary that they
control VMT, a current leading cause of poor urban air quality. Currently it is local

3

In addition to direct transportation controls, such as restricting on-street parking, curtailing heavy-duty commercial
vehicle use, and instituting mandatory parking fees, preferential bus/car pool lanes, computer car pool matching, bike
paths, mass transit projects, and even gasoline rationing, the EPA also required implementation plans to include permit
requirements for indirect sources of pollution, such as shopping centers, sports facilities, major roads, and airports,
which attracted heavy automobile traffic (see Garret and Wachs 1996).
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jurisdictions that control land use planning, zoning and access to public transportation all
of which affect VMT.
This research investigates, theoretically and empirically, the relationship between
the number of jurisdictions in an MSA, and the MSA’s environmental quality. In
particular, I will focus on air quality within the MSA. In Chapter 2 the theoretical model
will be developed. Why local jurisdictions might fail to institute costly policies that
would improve environmental quality in their jurisdiction and the MSA as a whole will
be analyzed in this chapter. Various theoretical frameworks that have explored similar
issues in the past will also be discussed. Chapter 3 will develop the fragmentation
measures used in the analysis. Chapter 4 discusses the data and develops the empirical
model to be tested. Chapter 5 presents the results and discusses their policy implications.

CHAPTER 2
THEORY

There are several frameworks available to analyze inter-jurisdictional relations
and their effects on environmental quality: the tax competition model,
fiscal/environmental federalism and collective action models. While each approach has
unique features, they share a common intellectual thread. Olson, in his 1965 book, The
Logic of Collective Action, theorized that as the number of contributors to a public good
increased the level of contribution as well as the level of provision would decrease. This
would also lead to a greater gap between the efficient level of provision and actual level
of provision. This has become known as the “Olson collective action paradox.” To
combat the declines in efficiency and provision of public goods, associated with this
paradox, Olson suggested that there should be a separate level of government which
insures that those who receive the benefits of a collective good, within a geographical
boundary, pay for that good. This idea has been incorporated into discussions of fiscal
and environmental federalism.
In the following sub-sections, an overview of the environmental federalism and
tax competition models and discuss the shortcomings of these frameworks for this
research is presented. The collective action model will then be discussed. We next
illustrate why it is the appropriate model to be applied here.
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Environmental Federalism
Environmental federalism refers to the notion that environmental standards should
be set at an appropriate level of government (generally thought to be the federal level) in
order to avoid free riding and negative pollution spillovers by smaller jurisdictions.
Improper implementation of environmental federalism has been theorized to lead to “a
race to the bottom.” The idea is that if states or local jurisdictions were left to set their
own levels for pollution control, inter- jurisdictional competition for scarce capital would
lead jurisdictions to set inefficiently low levels of environmental quality.
Environmental federalism grew out of the earlier fiscal federalism and public
choice doctrines. One of the earliest public choice theories put forward by Tiebout
(1956), states that multiple jurisdictions benefit residents by allowing them to “vote with
their feet.” People will move to areas that provide the bundle of public services they
desire for the price they are willing to pay. This is referred to as Tiebout sorting. This
sorting mechanism theoretically ensures that each jurisdiction will provide optimal levels
of public services for its residents. Additional support for the benefits of multiple
jurisdictions came from Brennan and Buchanan (1980) who proposed the state as
leviathan doctrine. This doctrine contends that government attempts to maximize revenue
and that inter-jurisdictional competition acts to constrain such behavior and leads to a
Pareto improved outcome for the provision of taxes and public services.
The opposing view, as espoused by Cumberland (1979, 1981), Oates (1972), and
Break (1967), is that inter-jurisdictional competition to attract business will result in
inefficiently low tax rates. Thus public services will be under provided, including
environmental quality. Cumberland (1979) suggested that such competing jurisdictions
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would engage in a “race to the bottom” to attract industry by relaxing environmental
standards. 4
Oates and Schwab (1988) provide the seminal theoretical model describing
environmental federalism. They attempted to bridge the gap between the two competing
ideas in the literature; competition between jurisdictions leading to an efficient provision
of public goods and competition between jurisdictions leading to an inefficiently low
provision of public goods. The model examines how jurisdictions set two variables, one
a tax or subsidy on mobile capital and the second a jurisdictional standard for
environmental quality. The model assumes the following:
1. There are a large number of jurisdictions.
2. Individuals live and work in the same jurisdiction.
3. Pollution generated in one jurisdiction does not spill over into other
jurisdictions.
4. Labor is immobile.
5. The labor market is perfectly competitive.
6. The median voter decision rule is used by jurisdictions to decide on the level of
environmental quality and the tax rate.
Under this set of six assumptions, Oates and Schwab find that jurisdictions will set
optimal levels of environmental standards such that the marginal willingness to pay for
higher environmental quality equals marginal social costs of higher environmental
quality, if no taxes on mobile capital are put in place. However with the introduction of
distortionary taxes on mobile capital or heterogeneous jurisdictions, sub-optimal levels of
environmental quality are set.
The Oates and Schwab analysis deals with the “competitive” case, when there
exists a larger number of jurisdictions without market power that are able to set
4

Glazer (1999) develops a framework in which jurisdictions won’t race to the bottom if benefits from attracting
industry are small. Shogren and Kunce (2002) generalizes the Glazer result. He argues that the Glazer assumptions
overly constrains the analysis. If the benefits of industry were small than why would jurisdictions compete? He shows
that the occurrence of a race to the bottom depends on the number of jurisdictions competing for limited industry.
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environmental quality standards as well as a tax on mobile capital. They also examine the
result on environmental standard setting if heterogeneous jurisdictions are introduced.
However they do not examine the effects on environmental standards based on the
number of jurisdictions present in the economy.
The work of Hoyt (1993) continues the basic analytical framework of Oates and
Schwab but examines how the number of jurisdictions affects the provision levels of a
public good. While Hoyt works in the area of tax competition, the provision of public
services in his model could be equated to setting of environmental standards as modeled
in Oates and Schwab. Either a higher environmental standard or a higher level of public
good provision will result in higher costs to the home jurisdiction. Because Hoyt
incorporates how the number of jurisdictions in the economy affects public good
provision, his model is reviewed in more detail below.

Tax Competition Literature
The result that inter-jurisdictional competition leads to a “race to the bottom” is
supported by Hoyt’s (1993) tax competition model. This model indicates that an increase
in the number of jurisdictions playing a Nash game in the tax rate would lead to
inefficiently low levels of public goods and taxes as the number of jurisdictions grow.
Shogren (2001) has used a similar framework to establish that such a result will hold if
jurisdictions are left to set environmental quality standards while competing for scarce
capital.
Hoyt, building on work by Wildasin (1988), developed a model that indicates in a
given metro area, welfare improves and tax rates increase with fewer jurisdictions.
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Hoyt's model assumes the following:
1. A single private good is produced in each jurisdiction using capital and labor.
2. Capital is completely mobile.
3. Land and labor are fixed in each jurisdiction.
4. Jurisdictions have a single resident.
5. Production of a private good is a function of capital, F(Kj), were Kj is the
amount of capital in the jurisdiction.
6. Jurisdictions all have the same production process, F(K), were F ′ > 0 > F ′′ .
7. All jurisdictions are identical.
8. One unit of the private good can produce one unit of the public service.
9. The public service in each jurisdiction is financed with a tax on capital, τ j.
Given the previous assumptions, the government budget constraint, gj, for jurisdiction j
is:

τjKj = gj .

(1.1)

Assume the supply of capital in the economy is fixed:

∑K

j

=K,

(1.2)

where K equals the supply of capital to the whole economy. Because capital is mobile
the after tax rate of return on capital, ρ , must be equal across all jurisdictions:

F ′( Kj ) − τj = ρ ,

j=1,…,J,

(1.3)
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where F´(Kj) is the marginal product of capital. The allocation of capital is determined by
equations (1.2) and (1.3) and the rate of return, ρ on capital. Hoyt then differentiates
(1.2) with respect to the tax rate in jurisdiction one. This gives:

J

K1' + ∑ K 'j
j =1

dρ
= 0,
dτ 1

(1.4)

where K'j is the derivative of the demand for capital in jurisdiction j with respect to its
price. Hoyt considers only the case when all jurisdictions are identical. Thus all
jurisdictions set the same tax rate. In equation (1.4) K'i=K'j for all i and j thus equation
(1.4) simplifies to:

dρ
= − m,
dτ 1

(1.5)

where m represents the market share of capital of jurisdiction j and equals 1/J when
jurisdictions are identical. Using equation (1.5) it can be shown how a tax increase affects
the movement of capital throughout the metropolis:

dK 1
= (1 − m) K 1' ,
dτ 1

(1.6)

dK 2
= − mK 2' .
dτ 1

(1.7)
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Capital flows out of jurisdiction 1 due to the tax increase and into all other jurisdictions.
Capital is equally allocated between all other jurisdictions not raising taxes, so as to
satisfy the condition that ρ remain equal across jurisdictions. Equations (1.6) and (1.7)
show that the amount of capital moving out of the jurisdiction raising its taxes is directly
proportional to the total number of jurisdictions.
Each resident has the utility function U(xi, gi) with the following properties:

∂U
> 0;
∂xi

∂U
> 0;
∂gi

∂ 2U
< 0;
∂xi2

∂ 2U
< 0.
∂g i2

The amount of private good xi that a resident in jurisdiction i will be able to consume is
determined by the local rents plus capital income he receives:

xi = F ( Ki ) − ( ρ + τi ) Ki + θiρK ,

(1.8)

where θi is the share of capital for jurisdiction i. Hoyt assumes all residents receive the
same endowment of capital thus θi =m for all jurisdictions, where m=1/J
To solve for the optimal tax policy and public service level in a jurisdiction Hoyt
first determines the response of consumption of the private and public service to a tax
change. Given θi = m and F ' ( K 1) = ρ + τ 1 and differentiating (1.6) and (1.7) for i=1
with respect to τ1 gives:

dx1
= −K1 ,
dτ 1

(1.9)
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Differentiating the government’s budget constraint (1.1) with respect to τ1 gives:

 (1 − m)τε 
dg 1
,
= K 11 +
( ρ + τ ) 
dτ 1


(1.10)

where ε = K ' K ⋅ ( ρ + τ ) is the elasticity of demand for capital in jurisdiction i. The
subscripts for equation (1.10) and the expression for ε are suppressed because (1.10) is
derived assuming that all jurisdictions tax rates are equal. Hoyt assumes that other
jurisdictions do not adjust their tax rate in response to jurisdiction one’s change in the tax
rate. Rather the other jurisdictions adjust their level of public service, given their higher
levels of capital and therefore revenue.
Jurisdiction one chooses a tax rate and public service level to maximize the utility
of its resident. The jurisdiction assumes that other jurisdictions won’t change their tax
rates due to its policy choice. Thus the maximization problem for jurisdiction one is:

Max U ( x1(τ 1), g 1(τ 1)),
τ1

(1.11)

Hoyt shows that x1 is a function of τ1 and equal to equation (1.9). The public service
level as a function of the tax rate as defined by equation (1.10). The Nash equilibrium tax
rate τ* is such that it solves (1.11) when the tax rate in the remaining jurisdictions τ2
equals τ*. This first order condition for maximization of (1.11) is:
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∂U dx1 ∂U dg 1
⋅
+
⋅
= 0.
∂x1 dτ 1 ∂g 1 dτ 1

(1.12)

Substituting for dx1/dτ1 and dg1/dτ1 and using equations (1.9) and (1.10) equation (1.12)
becomes:

MRS 1 = 1 −

(1 − m)τε
.
[ ρ + τ (1 + (1 − m)ε )]

(1.13)

Where MRS 1 = (∂U / ∂g 1 ∂U / ∂x1) is the marginal rate of substitution between the public
service and the private good. Tau (τ) is defined by equation (1.13) to be the Nash
equilibrium tax rate when all jurisdictions have identical production, endowments, and
objectives. The marginal rate of substitution between the public service and the private
good is greater than one, because the term being subtracted from one in equation (1.13) is
negative. This makes the MRS1 greater than the marginal rate of transformation which is
stated earlier in the article to be one. This implies the public good is inefficiently
provided. This low level of public good provision is due to the loss of capital the
jurisdiction suffers when it raises its tax rate and losses tax revenue.
The models put forth by Oates and Schwab, and Hoyt do not allow for spillovers
between jurisdictions. This assumption may be appropriate when considering states as a
“jurisdiction,” but is not appropriate for modeling spatially smaller jurisdiction behavior,
such as townships within an MSA. Furthermore, these models attempt to describe how
standards are set, not how an exogenously imposed standard is to be met by a group of
jurisdictions.
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In the case of MSAs and municipalities environmental standards for air and water
quality are already set. Federal and state permit programs are in place to determine the
levels of point source pollution for air criteria pollutants. The federal government sets
standards for factory point source emissions, auto fuel efficiency and tailpipe emissions
and the states implement an inspection and maintenance program for cars.
However local governments are in charge of many factors that can directly or
indirectly affect environmental quality. In almost all jurisdictions land use planning is
strictly a local decision making process.5 The decision to allow or create public
transportation in the jurisdiction is also made by the local authority. Other programs such
as encouraging car-pooling, establishing parking fees and increased pedestrian access are
all under local control (Southworth 2001). While none of the above policies individually
may have a large impact on environment quality, when used in concert the effect can be
substantial. For example, a recent empirical model by Bento et. al. (2003) indicated that if
Atlanta had the transportation infrastructure, road system and land use density of Boston,
VMT would decline by 25 percent.
Thus, local jurisdictions could do more to improve air quality. However many
actions would be undertaken “voluntarily” (i.e., decided upon by jurisdictions but not
compelled by the state or federal governments). Thus, the most appropriate model for this
scenario is the collective action framework that takes into account both the voluntary
nature of contributions to a pure public good and the spillovers involved in public good
provision.

5

Exceptions exist in Portland, Oregon, Minneapolis Saint Paul, Minnesota and Atlanta, Georgia were regional
commissions have authority over some land use decisions. State Governments that are involved in land use planning
include Tennessee, Maryland, Florida and New Jersey (see McKinney 2002).
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Collective Action Model
The last class of models we explore are those describing collective action. The
collective action model seeks to explain how groups arrive at the provision levels of
goods and services for their members. The underlying concern is that, individual
rationality will not always insure actions and outcomes that are rational for the group
(Olson 1965). This result is often the case when dealing with the provision of public
goods. This idea can be extended to include a group of municipal governments that form
an MSA trying to maximize the welfare of its residents. If residents in a jurisdiction are
assumed identical then a benevolent social planer in the municipal government would
only need to maximize the utility of a representative agent to maximize the utility of the
jurisdiction. However if social planners do not coordinate and only seek to maximize the
utility of their own jurisdiction then the result will not be Pareto optimal as Olson
predicted.
Olson (1965) predicted that as the number of contributors to a public good (N)
increased the provision level of the public good would decrease. Furthermore as N
increased the gap between the provision level of the public good and the Pareto optimal
level would increase. Olson developed a limited formal mathematical model for provision
of a public good in a collective action setting. He goes on to show that in such a setting,
the Nash provision level of the public good is less than the Pareto optimal level.
The model has several shortcomings: It does not specify the form of the utility
function of the group members, nor does it account for the provision technology of the
public good. Olson assumes a value function for individuals that indicates the benefit
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received from the provision of the public good. While Olson shows that in a group, the
Nash provision level of the public good will be less than the Pareto optimal, it cannot be
determined from the model how increasing group size will affect the outcomes. Olson
conjectures that the larger the group the greater the gap will be between the Nash
provision level and the Pareto optimal provision level. Olson also states that absolute
provision levels will decrease as group size increases. (Olson 1965, 44)
However others have shown the opposite. Chamberlin (1974) and McGuire
(1974) proved that total provision of a public good could increase with increasing group
size. The public and private goods are assumed to be normal and supplied with
summation technology.6 Group members are assumed identical and the equilibrium is
symmetric, meaning all members contribute an equal amount.
Chamberlin (1974, 712) and McGuire (1974, 112) show that while individual
contributions decline as group size increases, these declines are offset by contributions
from the new members. Thus, average contributions fall while total provision increases.
Their result is demonstrated by summing individual reaction or expenditure functions of
the group membership and generating an expression for total contributions. This
expression contains an aggregate term that quantifies the spillovers/spillins from the
additional new group members. Spillins are similar to positive externalities. They are
benefits that accrue to individuals through the additional provision level of the public
good. It is these spillovers/spillins that generate income effects that increase absolute
provision levels.

6

Summation technology ensures that all group members contributions to the public good are equally valuable and
costly.
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However Mueller (1989) showed that for Cobb Douglas utility functions that
Olson's notion that increased N would lead to larger departures from an efficiency
standard was true. Mueller assumes that the public good will be provided by summation
technology and that contributions are voluntary. There are only two goods, a public good
and a private good. He also assumes that individuals will not take into account the level
of provision of others when choosing the amount to provide (i.e., assume other
contributions are fixed).
Mueller shows the fairly standard result that individuals in a group will choose to
provide a level of public good only up to the point where the individual’s marginal rate of
substitution equals the price ratio of the two goods. He calls this level of provision the
Nash/Cournot level.7 He shows that this is not the Pareto optimal level. Rather if the
individuals coordinated and maximized their utility subject to the aggregate budget
constraint they would set provision levels of public goods so that the sum of marginal
benefits equal the ratio of the prices of the public and private good. This is similar to the
familiar Samuelson (1954) result that states that for the Pareto optimal level of public
goods the sum of marginal benefits should equal the marginal cost.
Mueller also adds some additional conditions to the model. He assumes Cobb
Douglas utility functions and that all individuals have identical income. He is then able to
derive that as the number of individuals increase, the gap grows between the
Nash/Cournot provision and the Pareto optimal. Cornes and Sandler, (1986, ch. 5) extend
this conclusion to include quasi-linear and Leontif utility functions. It is interesting to

7

Mueller claims that this is frequently referred to as the Nash or Cournot provision level as it is very similar to the
behavioral assumption Cournot made concerning the supply of a homogeneous private good in an oligopolistic market
(Mueller 1989, 18).
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note that because of the many possible forms of collective action models, the inverse
relationship between group size and Pareto efficiency cannot be established generally
(Sandler 1992).

Collective Action Model For an MSA with Multiple Jurisdictions
In this section we adapt the Mueller framework to describe jurisdictional choice
over voluntary decisions to increase levels of environmental quality by taking costly
actions. Summation technology for public good provision is assumed by Mueller. An
alternative to summation technology is weakest-link technology.
In the weakest-link formulation of public good provision, the level of public good
is determined by the minimum contributor. The classic example of weakest-link
technology in public good provision is a dam. If each agent builds a section of the dam, it
will only be as strong as the weakest section. Efforts to keep a disease or pest from
spreading are other examples of weakest-link public good provision technology (Sandler
and Vicary 2002). A potential example of weakest-link technology in ozone formation
might be a point source that emits large amounts of precursor pollutants.
However, most of the precursor pollutants that contribute to ozone formation
come from many lower emitting nonpoint and mobile sources. Thus, to increase the level
of public good, clean air, it is the emissions from these smaller nonpoint and mobile
sources that must be curtailed, rather than a few large point source emitters. Summation
technology provides a more accurate description of ozone pollution because it requires
that all inputs be added together and the sum is the level of public good provision.
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Ozone pollution and its precursor emissions also mix relatively homogenously
through the air shed. Due to inter-jurisdictional spillovers of ozone as well as precursor
pollutants, it is highly unlikely that one jurisdiction acting alone could solve an MSA’s
ozone problem. Nor is it likely that a single jurisdiction is solely responsible for creating
an MSA’s ozone pollution problem. Therefore, the assumption of summation
technology and the formation of ozone also fit more closely into the collective action
framework. Thus, summation technology is the more appropriate assumption for ozone
formation than weakest-link.
Suppose an MSA is composed of a number of different jurisdictions, j, where j =
1….J. Each jurisdiction has a social planner who decides how much that jurisdiction will
contribute to an MSA wide public good, G. Assume summation technology is used to
supply the public good in the MSA thus:

G = G1 + G2+ G3+ …+ GJ.

(1.14)

Let residents of jurisdiction j be identical and have the utility function Uij(Xij, G),
where Xij is the quantity of private good resident i of jurisdiction j consumes.8 The
budget constraint for resident i of jurisdiction j is Yij = PxXij + PgGj/Rj, where Yij is her
income and Px, and Pg are the prices of the private and public goods, respectively. Rj is
the number of residents in jurisdiction j. Since all residents of jurisdiction j are identical,
we drop the subscript i for ease of notation. Without any coordination method between
jurisdictions in the MSA, each social planner will set the level of public good
contribution treating what is given by all other jurisdictions in the MSA as fixed. By
8

Residents are assumed immobile.
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fixed it is meant that other jurisdictions will not change the amount contributed based on
what jurisdiction j contributes. The social planner of each jurisdiction will seek to
maximize the utility of the representative resident of jurisdiction j using a jurisdiction
wide budget constraint, RjYj = RjPxXj + PgGj . The social planner from jurisdiction j will
then maximize the objective function for that jurisdiction:

O j = R jU j ( X j , G ) + λ j (Yj − P xX j − P gG j / R j ) .

(1.15)

Maximizing (1.15) with respect to Gj and Xj yields:

∂Uj
Rj − λjPg / Rj = 0 ,
∂G

(1.16)

∂Uj
Rj − λjPx = 0 ,
∂Xj

(1.17)

∂Uj ∂G
Pg
=
,
∂Uj ∂Xj RjPx

(1.18)

from which we obtain:

as the condition for utility maximization. The left hand side of equation (1.18) represents
the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and the private good. It tells us
how many units of the private good a representative individual in jurisdiction j would be
willing to give up to get an additional unit of the public good. The right hand side of
equation (1.18) represents the relative price of the public good per unit of the private
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good per person in jurisdiction j. In this case the social planner treats the MSA wide
public good as a private good, equating the marginal rate of substitution to the price ratio
of the two goods. Per the convention in Mueller (1998), we will call this the
Nash/Cournot level.
To determine the Pareto optimal solution the following welfare function is
maximized. Here φj is a positive weight on all individual utility functions and γj
represents the positive weight on utility at the jurisdictional level:

φj > 0 ,
γj = φjRj ,
W = γ 1U 1 + γ 2U 2 + .... + γJUJ .

(1.19)

Thus (1.19) must be maximized subject to the aggregate budget constraint of all
jurisdictions in the MSA:

J

J

j =1

j =1

∑ RjYj = Px∑ RjXj + PgG,

(1.20)

we obtain the first-order conditions:

J

∑γ

j

j =1

∂Uj
− λPg = 0 ,
∂G

(1.21)

25
and

γj

∂Uj
− λPxRj = 0
∂Xj

j=1 to J ,

(1.22)

where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint. Using the J equations in
(1.22) to eliminate the γj in (1.21), we obtain:

λPxRj

∑ ∂U

(1.23)

∂Uj ∂G Pg
=
.
Px
j ∂Xj

(1.24)

j

j

∂Uj
= λPg ,
∂Xj ∂G
⋅

which after rearranging yields:

∑ R ∂U
j

j

This is similar to the Samuelson social welfare function optimization involving public
goods. Here the summation of all jurisdictions marginal rates of substitution (MRS) must
be set equal to the price ratio of the two goods in the economy. As residents within a
jurisdiction are identical the MRS is multiplied by the number of residents Rj to make it a
jurisdictional measure.
If G and X are normal goods then the quantity of public good provided under the
Nash/Cournot solution will be less than under the Pareto solution. See (1.25) below.
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Rj

∂Uj ∂G Pg
∂Ul ∂G
=
− ∑ Rj
,
∂Uj ∂Xj Px l ≠ j ∂Ul ∂Xl

where the term

∂Ul ∂G
> 0,
l ∂Xl

∑ R ∂U
j

l≠ j

(1.25)

The right hand side of (1.25) equals the marginal rate of substitution for jurisdiction j
under Pareto optimality. It is clear from equation (1.25) that this is smaller than the Nash
/Cournot solution for the MRS in equation (1.18). This implies that under the Pareto
formulation the residents of jurisdiction j consume more G and thus it is less valuable
than under the Nash/Cournot formulation. Thus under Pareto optimality the level of G
provided in jurisdictions j is greater than under the Nash/Cournot conditions.
To show that as increasing the number of jurisdictions widens the gap between
the Pareto optimum and the Nash provision, it is helpful to use the assumption of CobbDouglas utility functions. Where Ui = X iα G β , 0<α<1, and 0<β<1. Under this
assumption (1.18) becomes:

RjβX αj G β −1
α −1

αX j G

β

=

Pg
,
Px

(1.26)

rearranging (1.26) yields:
G=

Pxβ
XjRj .
Pgα

(1.27)

Substituting the right hand side of equation (1.14) for G and inserting the jurisdictional
budget constraint for XjRj yields:
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∑G

j

=

j

Px β  RjYj Pg 
− Gj ,

Pg α  Px
Px 

(1.28)

rearranging we obtain:

Gj = −

α

β

RjYj
.
Pg

∑G + α + β
α +β
l

l≠ j

(1.29)

Equation (1.29) implies the social planner in jurisdiction j will reduce Gj as other
jurisdictions increase their provision level of G. This is so because in equation (1.29)
∂Gj ∂Gl < 0 .

To illustrate how increasing the number of jurisdictions in the MSA affects the
equilibrium level of G additional structure must be added to the model. All jurisdictions
are assumed to have the same number of residents, R. All residents of the MSA are
identical and have the same income, Y. When this is the case the level of Gj set by all
jurisdictions in the MSA will be equal. Therefore (1.29) can be used to find the
contribution in equilibrium of a single jurisdiction:

Gj = −

α
α +β

( J − 1)Gj +

β

RY
,
α + β Pg

(1.30)

from which we obtain:

Gj =

β

RY
.
αJ + β Pg

(1.31)
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The amount of the public good provided by all jurisdictions, acting independently, then
becomes:

G = JGj =

Jβ RY
.
αJ + β Pg

(1.32)

These quantities can be compared to the Pareto-optimal quantities. When all individuals
are identical with the same income, all residents of jurisdiction j will contribute the same
amount to Gj, and have the same X, left over, so that (1.24) becomes:

RJ β X α G β −1 Pg
=
.
Px
α X α −1G β

(1.33)

Using the budget constraint to eliminate the X and rearranging yields for the Paretooptimal contribution of a single jurisdiction:

Gj =

β

RY
,
α + β Pg

(1.34)

and

G = JGj =

Jβ RY
.
α + β Pg

(1.35)

Calling the Pareto-optimal quantity of public good defined by (1.35), Gpo,
and the quantity under the Cournot/Nash equilibrium determined by equation (1.32), Gcn.
Their ratio is then
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cn

G
G po

Jβ RY
α+β
αJ + β Pg
=
.
=
Jβ RY
αJ + β
α + β Pg

(1.36)

Thus, if the number of jurisdictions in an MSA is greater than 1, the provision of the
public good will be less than the Pareto optimum. This gap grows as J increases.

Model Summary
To capture the relevant issues for the problem of how MSA government
fragmentation affects environmental quality, a model must account for, spillovers
between jurisdictions and be able to describe how the private maximization solution
compares to the Pareto optimal solution as the number of jurisdictions in an MSA
increases. The three models discussed in this chapter, environmental federalism (Oates
and Schwab), tax competition (Hoyt) and collective action (Mueller) models are all able
to demonstrate a Pareto in-efficient outcome arises when multiple jurisdictions set
uncoordinated tax rates or contributions to a public good, such as environmental quality.
However both the Oates and Schwab model and the Hoyt model do not incorporate the
effects of either spillovers or increasing jurisdictions.
The Oates and Schwab model shows that jurisdictions will set sub-optimal levels
of environmental standards when distortionary taxes on mobile capital or heterogeneous
jurisdictions are introduced. However the effect of increasing the number of jurisdictions
on the level of provision relative to the Pareto standard is not shown. In addition public
good spillover is assumed away.
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Hoyt’s (1993) tax competition model shows that an increase in the number of
jurisdictions playing a Nash game in the tax rate would lead to inefficiently low levels of
public goods and taxes as the number of jurisdictions grow. However public good
spillovers are not explicitly modeled.
In the Mueller model spillovers are taken into account and the model can also
show how changing the number of individuals in the group can affect the provision
choices of individuals. The Mueller model framework can be extended to jurisdictions
providing public goods within an MSA.
The model shows that jurisdictions within an MSA acting independently will
choose to provide a level of public good only up to the point where the individual
residents’ marginal rate of substitution equals the price ratio of the two goods. The model
shows the fairly standard result that this is not the Pareto optimal level. Rather if the
individual jurisdictions coordinated and maximized their utility subject to the aggregate
MSA budget constraint they would set provision levels of public goods so that the sum of
marginal benefits equal the ratio of the prices of the public and private good. Mueller
showed by adding some additional conditions to the model such as: Cobb Douglas utility
functions and that all individual residents have identical income, it is possible to derive
that as the number of jurisdictions increases, the gap grows between the uncoordinated
provision level and the Pareto optimal. In chapter four the modified Mueller model will
be developed into a form that can be tested empirically. In the next chapter we discuss the
government fragmentation measures that will be used in this analysis.

CHAPTER 3
GOVERNMENT FRAGMENTATION MEASURES

In order to compare government structure across MSAs, standardized measures of
fragmentation must be used. A fragmentation measure should be an index of the level of
fractured governmental authority and decision-making at the MSA level. Traditionally,
simple measures of fragmentation were used such as the total number of governments in
an MSA. However these measurers can fail to capture the ways in which special purpose
districts or location of the population relative to the central city can affect decisionmaking. New measures of fragmentation suggested by Foster (1993) try to account for
these shortcomings. Additional measures such as the presence of Regional Authorities,
Central City Elasticity and the Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index will also be
examined. In the following section we will describe how fragmentation has been
measured in the literature.

Early Measures of Fragmentation
Early literature uses simple measures of fragmentation that focused on either
absolute or relative levels of fragmentation. One absolute measure of fragmentation is the
number of governments within a given area (Zeigler and Brunn 1980). Governments
include counties, municipalities, townships, special districts and school districts. This is
the simplest method and embodies the idea that the more governments in a region, the
more fragmented the decision making in the region. This method follows the logic of
Olson’s collective action model. The more decision makers, the less likely they are

31

32
to come to an agreement that optimizes the welfare of the group (Olson 1965). This
measure is a good starting point, however it is limited in its ability to deal with the subtler
distinctions in local government fragmentation, as we will discuss later.
Relative fragmentation is another aggregate measure; this measures the number of
governments for some increment of the population (Dye and Hawkins 1971, Razin and
Rosentraub 2000, Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2002). Relative fragmentation takes into
account the population of an MSA when determining fragmentation levels. It stands to
reason that more populous MSAs should have more governments. Thus an MSA with one
government and a population of 100,000 is equally as fragmented as an MSA with 10
governments and 1,000,000 people. Smaller midwestern MSAs tend to confound the
effectiveness of this measure. In midwestern MSAs many small township governments
are still counted by the census even though the town has essentially vanished.9

Local Government Characteristics
Foster (1993) criticizes these traditional measures and suggests ways to broaden
them. The size, scope and type of local governing bodies within an MSA could mitigate
the degree of fragmentation. These are not considered by traditional aggregate measures
of fragmentation. Foster focused on three particular factors that could serve to offset the
effect of an additional government on MSA fragmentation. The first is inclusiveness of
local governments, second is local government scale, and third is the primacy of county
government. She developed six fragmentation variables to try to capture the three
different aspects of fragmentation: Central City Dominance, Suburban Un-incorporation,
9

There are more than 1000 towns with a population of less than 100 in the country. Some towns have zero
population. Almost all of these are located in the midwest.

33
Suburban Municipal Fragmentation, School District Decentralization, Special District
Dominance and Special District Overlap. In the following sections we will describe the
variables relevant to this analysis and their relationship to each of the three aspects of
fragmentation Foster developed.

Inclusiveness
Inclusiveness of local governments tries to separate how various local forms of
government, general purpose or special district, can affect fragmentation. There are two
competing ideas about how the presence of special districts might affect fragmentation.
They could either act as consolidating agents reducing fragmentation or they just add
another layer of governance, increasing fragmentation.
First, it is possible that special districts might decrease fragmentation. While
municipal governments have mutually exclusive boundaries, special districts can overlap
individual municipalities and serve to integrate government function. The case of several
small municipalities within an MSA might benefit from a special district that integrates
the water and sewer systems. While the special district represents an additional
government unit in the MSA, it is actually acting to coordinate the area rather than
increase its fragmentation (Foster 1993). The second competing idea is that special
districts are merely another layer of local governance and increase the level of
fragmentation in the MSA (Foster 1993, Nelson and Foster 1999).
Foster (1993) suggests several ways to measure inclusiveness. The first is the
number of special districts divided by the number of general purpose governments,
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towns, cities and county governments. This is referred to as special district dominance
(SDD):

SDD =

SD
,
GOVs

(2.1)

where SD is defined as the number of special districts and GOVs is the number of general
purpose governments. Based on equation (2.1), lower values of SDD imply a less
fragmented MSA.
The second measure of inclusiveness is the number of “overlapping” special
districts divided by the number of nonschool district governments. Overlapping is defined
as a special district that serves more than one municipality, township or county
government. Thus for this measure nonoverlapping special districts are counted in the
denominator. The equation for overlapping special district dominance (OSDD) is:

OSDD =

OSD
,
GPG

(2.2)

where OSD is the number of “overlapping” special districts and GPG is the number of
nonschool district governments, including nonoverlapping special districts. Equation
(2.2) indicates that higher values of OSDD represent a less fragmented area. Foster found
that OSDD was highly correlated with SDD and so did not include it in her analysis. This
makes sense as 97 percent of all special districts only have one function (Miller 2001).
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Overlapping special district dominance is also difficult to calculate for all MSAs.
For the 1997 census of governments, data for OSD is incomplete. 10 Due to its
correlation with SDD and the shortcomings in data availability for all MSAs, we will not
be including OSDD in my fragmentation variable set.

Scale
Local government scale is of particular interest due to the potential effect of
central city dominance. Foster states that an area with a dominant central city in which
most of the population lives, will have a mitigating effect on fragmentation, because the
majority of the people in the MSA are served by one general-purpose government. Foster
suggests measuring central city dominance by dividing the number of people living in
cities with a population greater than 50,000 by the total metropolitan population. Other
measures similar to Foster’s are proportion of population in cities with at least 100,000
residents and proportion of population in the largest city (Razin and Rosentraub 2000).
Foster’s measure is defined by equation (2.3):

CCD =

POP50
,
MSAPOP

(2.3)

where POP50 is the total number of people living in cities with a population greater than
50,000 and MSAPOP is the total metropolitan population. A larger number for the central
city dominance measure would indicate a less fragmented MSA.
10

For every state and county some have service area designated as overlapping while other special districts
report no designation. Thus it is not possible to select out only complete MSAs because almost all have
special districts that don’t report service area. This data constraint was confirmed via email from the
census.
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Values for CCD can range from zero to one. A value of zero means no central city
has a population of over 50,000. While a value of one means all people in the MSA live
in the central city. Many smaller MSAs have no city with over 50,000 people. Most of
these MSAs have populations of less than 100,000. At the top of the CCD list is
Anchorage and Honolulu with values of one. Both these cities have only one city and it
covers the entire geographic area of the MSA, However neither of these MSAs is
included in the sample.
Primacy
The primacy of county government is important in dealing with areas of an MSA
that are unincorporated. If a significant portion of the population lives in unincorporated
areas, general-purpose county governments may act as consolidating agents for decisionmaking. County primacy is empirically somewhat the opposite of Central City
Dominance. However both measures attempt to quantify the affect of a dominant form of
local government on the MSA. County primacy may be more of a factor for MSAs with
lower populations or for those MSAs out west which consist of only several large
counties. Foster measures county government primacy as, the population in
unincorporated area divided by noncentral city population:

CP =

POPUN
,
POPNCC

(2.4)
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where CP is county primacy, POPUN is population in the unincorporated area and
POPNCC is the noncentral city population. The larger the number for CP the less
fragmented the MSA.
Nelson and Foster (1999) use percent of population of the MSA living in
unincorporated areas, which on its face seems similar to the primacy of county
government measure. For this measure Nelson and Foster assert that higher percentages
of the population living in unincorporated areas signify a higher level of fragmentation.
This assertion is based on the increased number of special districts in unincorporated
parts of counties. The more people that live in unincorporated areas, the more people who
are served by these districts. Thus this measure is actually more of a special district
dominance indicator than a measure of county primacy.
The key local government characteristic measures as defined by Foster (1993) fall
into three categories: the inclusiveness of local governments, local government scale, and
the primacy of county government. For my analysis three variables were deemed relevant
for measuring these characteristics. Under the inclusiveness category is Special District
Dominance. The more special districts in the MSA the less inclusive and the higher the
level of fragmentation. To capture local government scale, we use the variable Central
City Dominance. The more dominant the central city in terms of population the less
fragmented the MSA. The primacy of county governments is measured by the variable
called County Primacy. If a large portion of the population lives in unincorporated areas,
a dominant county will indicate a lower level of fragmentation in the MSA. In the
following sections we will discuss three additional fragmentation measures that are found

38
in the literature, regional authorities, central city elasticity and metropolitan power
diffusion index.

Regional Authorities
The presence of regional authorities can also be used to determine the degree of
fragmentation of an MSA. These types of governments can serve to integrate an entire
MSA. However the form and powers of the regional body will greatly determine its
effectiveness. In general there are several different types of regional governments,
general purpose, city-county consolidation, special purpose regional districts, and
regional multipurpose districts.
City-county consolidations merge central cities with mostly unincorporated
county populations. In the single-county two-tiered federations of government a
countywide entity establishes the framework for decision-making that is implemented by
subordinate local governments (such as Metropolitan Dade County, Florida [Miami]).
Regional single-purpose districts are based on the economies of scale associated with
large-scale infrastructure provision such as water and wastewater systems, which
typically deliver their services over large areas and to large numbers of customers.
Regional multipurpose governments include such examples as Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN
Portland, OR and Seattle, WA.
The problem with using regional authorities as indicators of fragmentation is that
not many authorities are officially governments. As of 2001 only nine were in existence
that were considered governmental entities by the United States Census of Governments
(Foster 2001). The Census recognizes five basic types of local governments: county

39
governments, municipal governments, township governments, special districts and school
districts. A government entity is defined for Census Bureau reporting as follows:

A government is an organized entity, which, in addition to having governmental
character, has sufficient discretion in the management of its own affairs to
distinguish it as separate from the administrative structure of any other
governmental unit.
Thus, to be regarded as a government for Census Bureau purposes, an entity must possess
all three of these critical attributes: existence as an organized entity, governmental
character, and substantial autonomy. Substantial autonomy is often translated into an
ability to raise revenue. There are over 450 regional councils in the country that are not
counted as local governments because they fail to meet at least one of the above three
attributes. Often they lack substantial autonomy and merely serve in an advisory capacity.
Because of these issues, we will control for the presence of a regional government in an
MSA in my analysis but we will not include them in the more formal fragmentation
measures.

Central City Elasticity
A central city that is able to accommodate growth through annexation of
additional urban area should help to limit the amount of fragmentation of an MSA. If the
central city has historically been limited in its ability to annex or expand its boundaries,
the new urban areas that surround it will form their own governments and likely add to
the fragmentation of the MSA.
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Central city elasticity has been defined several different ways in the literature.
Nelson and Foster (1999) use the ratio of central-city population in 1980 to 1960 divided
by the ratio of land area in 1980 to that in 1960. The authors suggest that an inelastic city
will have a low elasticity score that is perhaps negative but usually around 0. San
Francisco is given as an example of an inelastic city. Its population has declined and its
central city has the same area as it did nearly a century ago (Nelson and Foster 1999).
An example of an elastic city would be one that adds population but does not
increase its land area. The authors use Oklahoma City as an example here with over
1500 square miles of incorporated largely undeveloped land, thus it can easily
accommodate any added population without increasing its borders. Other similar cities
include Kansas City, Missouri, and Denver, Colorado (Nelson and Foster 1999).
Rusk (1995) uses a ranking system to define central city elasticity. He first takes
the ratio of population in 1950 to the land area of the central city in 1950. This is score A.
He then computes the expansion of the central city area from 1950 to 1990 as a
percentage change from the initial area. This is score B. Each city is then ranked by
scores A and B and ordered by decile. The final elasticity number is determined by
adding each decile ranking for a city with three times score B. For example New York
City (NYC) in 1950 had the highest population density so it was in the first decile. It also
did not expand its borders from 1950 to 1990 thus it was also in the first decile for
elasticity. (Lower rankings mean less elastic.) Thus NYC’s overall ranking would be 1+
(1 x 3) = 4.
Rusk suggests in his appendix that this rating system is as much art as science.
This is reflected by the fact that Rusk groups central cities by population and size of the
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MSA they are located in before he orders them. Rusk doesn’t use population in his
elasticity measure because one of his contentions is that cities that can expand their
borders will gain population faster than cities that can’t. Thus, two central cities can have
the same final elasticity number assigned to them, but in fact be very different based on
population and location within a particular MSA. Furthermore due to the grouping by
population it is not possible to compare elasticity across cities in different population
groups.11 In the empirical model section we will describe how Rusk’s measure can be
modified so as to be practical to use in my analysis.
Elasticity is an important fragmentation measure as it is a good proxy for cities
ability to expand. Annexation laws are myriad and complex and not easily categorized.
A central city that has been able to expand its borders over time should have a
consolidating effect on the MSA. Another important area to consider for fragmentation is
the effect of the number of jurisdictions and the size of their budgets on an MSA’s ability
to meet environmental quality standards. This will be discussed next.

Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index
In an effort to measure the political effects of fragmentation based on
jurisdictional fiscal power, Miller (2002) has developed the Metropolitan Power
Diffusion Index (MPDI). The index is similar to the Hershman Herfandahl Index (HHI).
To compute the HHI one takes the percentage that a corporation’s revenue contributes to
total market sales and squares it, these numbers are then summed. Squaring the
percentages emphasizes the fact that larger corporations will tend to dominate the

11
Blair, Staley, and Zhang (1996) do find support for using the elasticity measure to predict economic gain. However they only
empirically test the central cites located in MSAs with populations over 250,000.
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marketplace. Unlike corporations, in the political process small jurisdictions can serve to
impede the will of larger jurisdictions in the same geographical area. It is due to this
potential to impede that Miller uses the square root of revenue contribution to the whole
to accentuate the power of the smaller jurisdictions as seen in equation (2.5).

MPDI = ∑

i

EXPJDi MSAEXP ,

(2.5)

where EXPJDi equals the expenditures of individual jurisdictions and MSAEXP is the
total expenditure of the MSA. Thus for the MPDI, higher numbers mean greater diffusion
of power or fragmentation in the MSA.
Here is an example that Miller developed to illustrate the MPDI. Suppose in
Region A there are six governments; in Region B, twelve. Total local government
expenditures in both regions are $1,000,000, of which $900,000 (or 90 percent) is spent
by the largest government in the each region. In Region A, there are five smaller
governments that each spends $20,000 while in Region B there are 11 smaller
governments that each spends $9,091. If one is just counting jurisdictions, Region B
would appear to be twice as fragmented as region A. However, with each region
possessing an equally dominant jurisdiction, in which 90 percent of the regions
expenditures are made, the characterization that region B is twice as fragmented as
Region A seems excessive to Miller. Using the MPDI however, indicates that region B is
roughly 20 percent more fragmented than Region A. This result is more acceptable to
Miller based on the dominance of a single jurisdiction in both regions. Table C1 in
appendix C shows the details of how the MPDI is calculated. Table C2 lists the
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expenditures included in the MPDI measure used by Miller. It also includes additional
expenditures that we include in an alternate measure of MPDI, discussed in chapter 4.
Fragmentation measures have developed substantially from the early aggregate
measures used in the older literature that simply counted the number of local
governments in a metropolitan area. Recent measures take into account local government
characteristics and their relation to that of the greater metropolitan area. These traits are
summarized as the inclusiveness of local governments, local government scale, and the
primacy of county government (Foster 1993). Regional governments are also taken into
consideration when measuring a metropolitan areas’ level of fragmentation (Nelson and
Foster 1999). The ability of central cities to expand and annex neighboring jurisdictions,
often called central city elasticity, is now also taken into account when measuring
fragmentation (Rusk 1995, Nelson and Foster 1999). Finally the fiscal power of the local
government relative to the region as a whole is considered by the MPDI (Miller 2000).
The development of measure that accurately reflect governmental fragmentation
is a key element of any empirical test of fragmentation’s effects on urban quality of life,
in the next section, we review the performance of the fragmentation measures presented
in the previous analysis.

Empirical Results from the Literature
The empirical literature on fragmentation is predominantly concerned with
growth and development of a region. In particular, researchers examine whether
fragmentation measures can explain observed growth patterns in metropolitan areas. This
literature attempts to resolve the question of whether fewer larger centralized local
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governments or many smaller decentralized local governments are the most conducive to
growth and development. The first two papers discussed below, Razin and Rosentraub
(2000) and Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2002), use the more traditional simple measures of
fragmentation, while the later papers, Foster (1993), Nelson and Foster (1999), use the
more recently developed measures. Once again, the empirical literature is not conclusive
as to what form of local government encourages growth.
Razin and Rosentraub (2000) examine the link between urban sprawl and
fragmentation in the United States and Canada. They include all MSAs with over
500,000 people in both countries in a cross-sectional analysis. They utilized five
measures of fragmentation that include both aggregate measures and broader Foster-type
measures. The list includes:
1. Total number of governments per 10,000 residents (including school and
special districts);
2. General purpose governments per 10,000 residents;
3. Existence of multipurpose metropolitan level government;
4. Proportion of population in the largest city; and
5. Proportion of population in cities with at least 100,000 residents.
Most of these measures are very similar to measures used in this analysis. The
first measure, total number of governments per 10,000 residents, is similar to the relative
fragmentation measure. However, this measure includes school districts while the
relative fragmentation measure we use does not. The second measure, general purpose
governments per 10,000 residents, is also similar to the relative fragmentation measure
we use, but does not include special districts. The third measure, existence of
multipurpose metropolitan level government, is computed as a dummy variable for my
analysis. The fourth measure, proportion of population in the largest city, is also used in
my analysis. Lastly , the proportion of the population in cities with at least 100,000
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residents is similar to central city dominance, which uses the proportion of population in
cities of over 50,000.
Razin and Rosentraub assess the relationship between fragmentation and sprawl
in several steps. First they construct fragmentation and sprawl indices. The fragmentation
index is based on the variables listed above. The sprawl index is based on various
population and housing density measures. They next conduct a simple correlation test
between the two indices. Razin and Rosentraub’s results reveal that there is a weak but
statistically significant association between sprawl and fragmentation. This result
remained even when the less fragmented and more compact Canadian metropolitan areas
were not included in the analysis.
Next they conduct several different regressions using either the fragmentation
index or the sprawl index as the dependent variable. In both regressions they use the
control variables, age of housing stock, and country of location for the MSA and percent
of population in poverty. The fragmentation index is the dependent variable in the first
regression, with the independent sprawl variable being the population per square
kilometer. They find that the coefficient for population per square kilometer is positive
and statistically significant. Thus they conclude that greater values of residential sprawl
are linked to higher levels of government fragmentation.
Next they use the sprawl index as the dependent variable. Here the independent
fragmentation variable is general purpose governments per capita. They find the
fragmentation variable is not statistically significant. Thus, they conclude that
fragmentation may not necessarily predict sprawl.
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Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2002) examine how local government structure affect
four measures of MSA development; population density, urbanized land area, property
values and public expenditures on infrastructure. Their data include MSAs in 14 states
covering 283 counties. They utilized time series data from the years 1982, 1987 and
1992. While acknowledging the benefits of the fragmentation measures developed by
Foster (1993) the authors choose to use aggregate measures of fragmentation, citing ease
of econometrics and consistency with other variables in the model. They use the number
of municipalities per capita and number of special districts per capita. They found
fragmentation is associated with lower population densities and higher property values.
No direct effect on public service expenditures was found. Less fragmented metropolitan
areas tended to cover more land. The authors suggest this is due to the extensive
annexation needed to bring new development under the control of a central municipality.
They claim that their findings support efforts by state and regional planning bodies aimed
at increasing cooperation among local governments.
Foster (1993) examines the link between local political structure and metropolitan
population growth. In particular Foster attempts to determine empirically whether public
choice or regionalist local government policies can best explain population growth in
MSAs. Foster examined data for 129 large U.S. metropolitan areas between 1962 and
1982.
Foster tested two linear models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In the first
model metropolitan population growth is stipulated to be a function of local government
structure variables and environmental factors. The local governmental structure variables
are the six previously discussed, Central City Dominance, Suburban Un-incorporation,
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Suburban Municipal Fragmentation, School District Decentralization, Special District
Dominance and Special District Overlap. The value of the local government structure
variable for the first year of the period is used. The environmental factors are:
metropolitan age, population density, and location by region. The second model is the
same as the first however, lagged values of the changes in the six local government
structure variables are added. The second model attempts to measure how changes in
local government structure over time affect population growth.
The results from the models were mixed and not easily interpreted. The first
model only provided two significant coefficients for government structure. They were
suburban unincorporation and school district decentralization. The result for suburban
unincorporation supported that public choice perspective.
In the second model, several more variables were significant. The variables from
the second model, controlling for change in governing structures over time, tended to
support the regionalist perspective. However the results were equivocal, three of the six
variables supported the regionalist perspective. They were suburban unincorporation,
suburban municipal fragmentation, and special district dominance. The result for the
suburban unincorporation in the second model was not consistent to the result in the first
model. While one, school district decentralization, supported the public choice position
that greater fragmentation induces local government competition and thus encourages
population growth. Foster concluded that the six local governmental structure variables
used interact in different ways with population growth for MSAs. The result may explain
the inability of simple measures of government structure to predict population growth in
MSAs in previous work (Foster 1993).
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In an effort to build on the work of Foster (1993) and try to further explain the
role of government structure and growth, Nelson and Foster (1999) develop a model that
includes local and regional government structure variables. This time the goal was to test
empirically whether public choice or regionalist theory could explain observed MSA
economic growth. They examine the link between local government structure
(fragmentation) and per capita personal income growth in MSAs from 1976 to 1996.
Their sample was made up of 287 of the largest metropolitan statistical areas in the
United States.
In order to compare government structure across MSAs, Nelson and Foster adopt
measures very similar to those used by Foster (1993) described above. They compiled
two broad measurers of government structure based on local governance and regional
governance criteria. After controlling for many baseline income and demographic factors,
they found some empirical support for the regionalist school of thought that consolidated
government promotes growth. They found that central city dominance and suburban city
average population had statistically significant effects on MSA income growth, while
special district dominance was statistically significant at the ten percent level. However,
there were also some insignificant fragmentation measures, such as percent of population
in unincorporated areas, school district density and general purpose elected official
density. The regional measures were hard to interpret because of some implausibly large
coefficients. Also, some of the findings did weakly support the public choice school of
thought.
In an attempt to extend the literature, Foster (1993) and Nelson and Foster (1999)
had limited successes in showing empirically that these new measures offer improved
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explanatory power over the old aggregate measures. Foster only found three of the six to
be significant and Nelson and Foster (1999) only used four measures and only two of
these were significant at the five percent level. Two other promising measures of
fragmentation are explored below.
An alternative measure of fragmentation is the Municipal Government Power
Diffusion Index (MPDI) used by Miller (2000) in his analysis of MSA economic growth.
Miller collected data on 311 MSAs for two periods 1972 and 1992 and calculated the
MPDI for all MSAs for both periods. Miller focused on the trends in MPDI as well as
how it related to economic growth over the period. His results were that the 311 MSAs
have become more diffuse overtime with the average score going from 3.83 to 4.16.
Eighty percent of the 311 MSAs had increased their score. Miller found that these
increases in MPDI were uncorrelated with population growth; However the MPDI was
correlated with the absolute number of municipal governments. He concluded that this
was most likely due to the increased financial role suburban jurisdictions played in
providing services. Miller also examined certain areas of Pittsburgh to illustrate,
anecdotally, that increasing diffusion may lead to urban decline.
The final measure we adopt in my analysis is a modification of Central City
Elasticity, first used in this context by Rusk (1995). Rusk is interested in the way that
elasticity affects people’s lives through economic development and segregation. His basic
premise is that elastic central cities and metropolitan areas thrive by capturing more
revenue from wealthier outlying areas. Rusk used census data for 522 central cities
located in 320 metropolitan areas from 1950 and 1990. Rusk does many comparisons
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using economic growth and housing statistics among pairs of cities. Through these
comparisons Rusk finds support for his hypotheses.
Rusk also compares cities based on government fragmentation measures, using
the number of suburban jurisdictions and percent of MSA population living in the central
city. Using these two measures he makes additional comparisons between cities. He
found that fragmented areas, as defined by the number of suburban governments, have a
higher segregation index for the selected cities.12

Summary
Economists and planners have had limited success trying to explain the role MSA
government fragmentation has in regional development. Regional development has been
proxied several ways including growth in population and growth in personal income (See
Foster 1993, Carruthers and Ulfarrson 2002 and Nelson and Foster 1999). The
fragmentation literature tries to attribute the reasons for growth to a decentralized local
government structure or a consolidated local government structure. However growth is
driven by many factors some of which arguably confound each other when analyzed.
Larger regional entities may better serve some government functions such as planning,
public transportation, and public utilities (Nelson and Foster 1999). However local
governments may in general operate more efficiently due to competition under a more
decentralized system. Decentralized local government structure is often associated with
the doctrine of public choice. While a more consolidated local government structure is

12

For a more detailed analysis of fragmentation and racial segregation see Dawkins (2005).
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associated with regionalism. Isolating the effect of public choice or regionalism on
MSA growth is still an area of ongoing research.
However maintaining appropriate levels of regional environmental quality
requires controlling pollution. With air quality, the affected region is the entire air-shed
which generally encompasses the MSA boundary. If no single government exists to
internalize the externalities generated by each jurisdiction within the affected geographic
region, air quality is expected to be less than the optimum. Thus, the level of
fragmentation of the MSA should directly affect its ability to comply with air-quality
standards. In the next chapter we will develop the empirical model and discuss other
important control variables such as MSA demographic characteristics and the price of
public good provision.

CHAPTER 4
DATA AND EMPERICAL IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter develops the data and the empirical model used to test the role of
local government structure on the level of urban environmental quality observed in large
United States MSAs. The data used comes from the subset of MSAs in the United States
with populations over 200,000. Three panels of data were collected for the years, 1992,
1997, and 2002. Two approaches will be used to test the hypothesis that government
fragmentation hinders the ability to attain environmental quality standards. The first will
be a cross-sectional approach using the 1997 panel. This year is chosen because the
richest set of covariates is available.13 The second approach will utilize panel data
models that include all three years of data. The empirical model will attempt to extend the
current governmental fragmentation literature into the environmental arena. In addition,
this model will comprehensively test all relevant fragmentation measures used in the
literature. we will also test modifications to existing fragmentation measures that we
discussed in the earlier fragmentation chapter.
This chapter is laid out as follows. The conceptual framework for the empirical
model is developed in the first section. The second section will discuss the data elements
needed to implement the empirical model. In the third section, some data trends and
patterns will be analyzed. The results of the empirical estimation will be presented in the
succeeding chapter.

13

These include a fragmentation variable for central city elasticity as well as transit variables.
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Context for the Empirical Model
In Chapter 2, we extended a model by Mueller to show that under certain
assumptions the amount of public good provided by an individual jurisdiction within the
MSA is given by the following equation.

Gj =

β

RY
,
αJ + β Pg

(4.1)

where Gj is the level of public good provision selected by the social planner in the
jurisdiction j. All jurisdictions are assumed to have the same number of residents, R. All
residents of the MSA are identical and have the same income, Y. Under these
assumptions the level of public good, Gj, set by all jurisdictions in the MSA will be equal.
Equation (4.1) illustrates the level of public good provided by a given jurisdiction when
all jurisdictions act independently. In Chapter 2 it was shown that an MSA, with only one
jurisdiction acting independently, provides the Pareto optimal level of public good.
However, as the number of jurisdictions increased, the gap between the optimal level of
public good provision and the level provided by jurisdictions acting independently,
increased.
The level of public good provision selected by individual jurisdictions within the
MSA is difficult to observe. It is usually not possible to separate out county-level
provision from city-level provision for most MSAs. Counties, cities and towns are the
general purpose government sub-units that makeup an MSA. While environmental
quality measurements exist at the county level they often do not at the city level. Thus to
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aggregate equation (4.1) to the MSA level requires multiplying the level of public good
provided by each jurisdiction. Restating equation (2-32) we see that:

G = JGj =

J β RY
β
JRY
=
,
α J + β Pg (α J + β ) Pg

(4.2)

where the total level of the public good in an MSA, G is a function of total MSA income
(= JRY), the price of providing the public good, the number of jurisdictions, and taste
parameters.
The relationship in (4.2) provides a basis for the empirical hypothesis of interest:
do higher levels of governmental fragmentation in MSAs lead to worse environmental
outcomes? In other words, our stylized theory gives rise to a general empirical model of
the following form:

Air quality = f (Governmental Fragmentation, MSA Total Income, Taste Parameters,
Price of Public Good Provision)

(4.3)

In equation(4.2), G is the level of public good provided in the MSA. In my
application, G refers to MSA air quality, which can be measured in three ways: a binary
variable indicating ozone standard attainment, measured ozone levels, or measured
emission levels. Governmental fragmentation, J, is my explanatory variable of interest in
equation (4.3). While J in equation (4.2) represents a simple count of governments, the
concept of government fragmentation is considerably more nuanced, as discussed in
chapter three. The empirical model will test all the relevant measures of fragmentation
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developed in chapter three, which are listed in Table C3. Additional explanatory
variables in (4.3) include the MSA total income and taste parameters for public and
private goods. MSA total income will be proxied by MSA level gross metropolitan
product (GMP). Taste parameters of individual residents for environmental quality are
unobservable and the percent of the MSA that voted for a democratic candidate in
elections held between the years 1997-1999 will be used as a proxy variable.14 In
addition several demographic variables are included as well, such as MSA population age
distribution, racial composition, and educational attainment.
The last explanatory variable in (4.3), price of the public good (Pg), requires
careful consideration. Pg represents the price to a jurisdiction for providing the public
good, which we do not observe directly. What we can observe are the policies that
jurisdictions can take and the characteristics of the MSA that may make those policies
more or less effective. Thus, the price of incrementing the public good is ultimately the
opportunity cost associated with a vector of activities designed to improve air quality
together with the effectiveness of the policies.
To develop proxy variables for the price of the public good, we must consider
how ozone is formed. Ozone formation is driven by a complex relationship between
emissions levels, geography, and weather, as discussed earlier. Thus, observable
variables that describe emissions levels, geography, and weather can serve as proxy
variables for the price of the public good. Jurisdictions can implement policies to reduce
emissions (and thus improve air quality). These policies imply certain costs per ton of
emissions reduced. But the effectiveness of these policies depends on the existing level of

14

Improving environmental quality is an issue that is often associated with democrats rather than
republicans (O’Conner et. al. 2002).
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emissions, urban form, geography, and weather. Thus, the cost of a policy per unit of
ozone reduced depends critically on the above listed four factors. As such, we use
variables that capture existing emissions, urban form, geography, and weather as our
proxy variables for the price of the public good.
Consider the following example, which illustrates how the policy cost per unit of
emissions reduced is affected by urban form. A jurisdiction may seek to decrease
emissions from automobiles by decreasing VMT through the provision of more public
transit for its residents. Public expenditures to encourage transit ridership and thus
decrease vehicle miles traveled is more likely to succeed in an area with extensive public
transit (Cervero 1994). Thus, areas with more extensive public transit systems may face a
lower price per unit of emissions reduced from this type of policy as compared to an
MSA with limited public transit system, all else equal.
The variables used to capture urban form are listed in Table C3. Urban form
incorporates the spatial features and built environment of the MSA. The urban form
variables affect air quality through their impact on automobile emissions and other
nonpoint source emissions. Primarily, urban form can affect the nature of automobile
trips. Controlling for VMT isolates a large portion of urban form pollution. However, the
nature of the vehicle, the length of the trip, and the number of trips also can have an
effect on pollution. Many short trips emit more ozone causing pollutants, due to frequent
cold starts of a car, than the equivalent amount of mileage in one long trip (Safety
Council 2006). More pollutants are also emitted in stop and go traffic, common at rush
hours (Safety Council 2006). Thus, controlling for just VMT is not sufficient; a given
level of VMT has a different impact on air quality depending on the nature of the
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underlying trips and thus additional urban form variables are used to capture these
additional elements.
For a given level of VMT, public transit can affect the frequency of trips and the
mode of vehicle taken. Thus, the availability of public transit should lower the price of
public good provision. Public transit could affect emissions for a given level of VMT in
several ways. First, transit availability could help the MSA’s low-income residents to
substitute transit for driving older vehicles with poor pollution control technology. Also
residents might be able to use transit to commute to work, alleviating some of the
pollution associated with stop and go rush hour traffic.
There is also a link between VMT, transit usage, and population density. The
more dense an MSA the more likely residents are to not own cars (Bento et al. 2003).
Denser areas also have higher rates of transit usage (Cervero 1994). Thus, MSAs with
higher population densities should have a lower price for emissions reduction.
Controlling for vehicle miles traveled and the availability and usage of public transit
mitigates much of the effect the style of development in the MSA might have on air
quality. However, it is possible that two MSAs with the same population density per
square mile but different styles of development can lead to different levels emissions.
Suppose MSA A and B has the same population and the same land area. Suppose
MSA A has clustered mixed use residential and commercial development surrounded by
green space. MSA B has traditional zoning with single family homes and separated
commercial space, without any green space. The development style in MSA B suggests
the need for more automobile trips. While it is difficult to measure the zoning practices of
all jurisdictions within an MSA, it is possible to measure the percent of single family
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housing within the MSA. More single family homes suggest a need for more automobile
trips. It is estimated that a large portion of automobile emissions are generated in the first
five minutes of operation due to cold starts (Safety Council 2006). Thus, more frequent
automobile trips generate more emissions for a given level of VMT.
Whether an MSA is part of a CMSA or not might also affect the price of the
public good. CMSAs are urban areas with more than one million people made of distinct
component MSAs in close proximity. This close proximity might allow for policy
decisions made in one MSA to affect the air quality of a given MSA within the CMSA. If
neighboring MSAs make policy decisions that increase air quality, positive spillovers
may decrease the price of providing better air quality. If neighboring MSAs make
decisions that decrease air quality, negative spillovers may increase the cost of providing
better air quality.
Existing types of economic activity within an MSA also impacts policy costs.
Observable economic activity that directly results in emissions includes point source
emissions from factories and utilities.15 Changes in the existing levels and mix of point
sources can affect the cost of decreasing emissions from these sources. For example,
jurisdictions located in an MSA with a few large utilities creating emissions are likely to
have different costs of decreasing emissions than those located in MSAs that have
primarily diffuse point source emissions such as small industry and manufacturing.
Large polluting industries create several problems for MSAs. First, large
industries or utilities are likely to have political clout and use it to defeat costly emissions
control initiatives. Second, large amounts of point source emissions increase the cost of
15

The major source of emissions is area source, primarily motor vehicles. The costs of changing these
emissions were discussed as relating to urban form.
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implementing an emissions policy. Third, if a significant portion of the jurisdiction
economy relies on industry that contributes significantly to emissions, residents may not
support emissions reducing initiatives.
General economic activity and growth could also affect the price of public good
provision, for those activities that are not covered under point source emissions. Higher
levels of employment could increase the price of public good provision, if it leads to
greater area source emissions. To control for MSA economic activity, data has been
collected on point source emissions, employment, manufacturing employment, presence
of dirty industry and utilities. These variables and the data sources are all listed in Table
C3.
While urban form, such as existing transit availability, and economic activity,
such as point source emissions, affects the ultimate cost per unit of emissions reduced,
weather and geography affect the ultimate cost per unit of ozone reduced. Recall ozone is
formed by a complex atmospheric interaction between Nitrogen oxides (NOX), Volatile
organic compounds (VOC), and sunlight. As such, the efficacy of emissions reduction
activities and thus the price of increasing air quality (decreasing ozone) through any
action depend on geography and weather. Summer temperatures, rainfall, and wind speed
all are key determinants in ozone formation. For instance, suppose two MSAs, are
identical in all respects except their weather and geography. Both jurisdictions take the
same actions at the same cost, and reduce their emissions to the same level. For the
jurisdiction located in a hot, dry, low altitude MSA, these actions might be less effective
in reducing ozone levels than the jurisdiction located in an MSA with greater rainfall and
wind. Thus, the effective price of incrementing air quality differs in these two MSAs
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because of weather and geography. Weather variables used in my analyses are ozone
season average temperature, total rainfall and average wind speed, and are listed in Table
C3 along with the source of the data.
Regional geographical features such as mountains and coastlines can also affect
ozone formation and thus the price of the public good. Mountains which might trap
emissions over an air shed, such as in Los Angeles, will make actions to reduce ozone
less effective and thus increase the cost of incrementing air quality. In the cross-section
model, the region in which the MSA is located is controlled for. However, each MSA has
unique geographical characteristics that are difficult to control for in a cross section, and
as such, we will also explore panel models to control for MSA-specific geography.
The above discussion provides a broad overview of the data elements needed to
test our hypothesis of interest. In the next section we discuss the data in more detail. In
particular we discuses broad trends in key variables over time and relate them to each
other.

Data Description
The unit of observation is the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as defined in
2000. Since metropolitan areas in New England are not always consistent with county
borders, New England County Metropolitan Area (NECMA) definitions for these periods
were used when appropriate. Only MSAs with populations over 200,000 were included in
the sample in an effort to keep comparisons across MSAs as consistent as possible. It
seems inappropriate to compare the government structure of Enid, Oklahoma, with a
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population of 50,103, to the government structure of Chicago Illinois, with a population
over 8 million.
There are 17 Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical areas (CMSAs) in the sample.
A CMSA is a group of neighboring MSAs with a total population of over 1 million (See
Appendix A for a full definition). These CMSAs contain 53 MSAs. Data are collected at
the county level whenever possible and aggregated to the MSA level. Some data are only
available by census urbanized area. In that case the value is assigned to all MSAs within
the urbanized area. For large MSAs, the urbanized area is often similar to the CMSA
definition. Table C4 lists MSAs and CMSAs by region.
Honolulu, Hawaii and Anchorage, Alaska are also dropped, as they are not in the
continental United States. Their unique geography and weather patterns make them
unsuitable for comparisons with the continental MSAs. The final sample includes the
remaining 187 MSAs in the United States. Table C5 presents the summary statistics from
the 1997 cross-section. Table C6 presents the correlation coefficients of the three
dependent variables and the relevant independent variables. These data are discussed in
the following sections in the order in which they are presented in the table.

Air Quality Variables
The empirical model will be tested using two different dependent variables,
measured ozone levels and the attainment status of the MSA for a given year. Area total
VOC and NOX emissions will also be analyzed. By using two different dependent
variables, we attempt to resolve the regulatory inconsistencies and the complexities of
ozone formation. Regulatory inconsistencies arise in the following three scenarios. First,
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it is possible to attain the ozone standard and yet remain in nonattainment. Second, some
MSAs have significantly above average emissions of precursor pollutants yet remain in
attainment. Third, other MSAs have below average emissions yet are in violation. The
Trends in the Variables section discusses the above MSAs in greater detail as well as the
problem of ozone levels and attainment status inconsistencies. The complexity problem
arises because ozone formation is a nonlinear process that is dependent on daily weather
patterns, emissions, and geography. Thus, the two dependent variables as well as
emissions data are used to ascertain the relationship between government fragmentation
and environmental quality.
The EPA and the states collect air quality data at the county level, throughout the
United States. The counties of interest here are those that lie within MSA boundaries. The
reported ozone value, MAXEPA, is calculated by the same method as set out by the
EPA’s Laxton memo.16 This method is used by the EPA to determine the design values
for the one-hour ozone standard for each county. For each monitoring station in a county,
the fourth highest value is selected over a three year period. These values are then
aggregated by MSA. The highest monitor value in the MSA is then selected and this is
the design value for the MSA. Ozone value summary statistics are reported in Table C5.
These variables are most interesting in the context of attainment status, and are discussed
in detail in the next section.
Although Ozone formulation and emissions levels of precursor pollutants, VOCs
NOX, are not linked in a linear fashion, emissions levels can help to get a clearer picture
of an MSA’s efforts at achieving the ozone standard. For nonattaining MSAs, a
16

The Laxton memo was put out by the Director of the Technical Support Division of the EPA, William G.
Laxton in June 1990. It specified the methods of calculating new design values after the 1990 Clean Air
Act amendments.
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preliminary step in reaching attainment is usually to reduce its emissions of precursor
pollutants. Also for those MSAs in attainment, maintaining a constant or declining level
of emissions is likely to ensure that the MSA stays in attainment. Thus the relationship
between fragmentation and these precursor emissions is of interest. The variation in
emissions levels over time will be even more important when implementing the panel
data model.
The EPA collects data on all criteria pollutants as well as ozone precursor
pollutants, VOC and NOX. The data are broken down into point source emissions and
area source emissions. Point source emissions were described previously in the section on
economic activity. Area source emissions include all nonpoint sources as well as mobile
sources. Nonpoint sources can be small factories or businesses that emit criteria
pollutants below the threshold for point sources. A common example is a dry cleaner.
Area sources are also inventoried by state agencies and reported to the EPA. Mobile
sources are considered any vehicle with a gasoline or diesel engine. Cars, trucks,
airplanes, trains, and boats are all included in mobile source emissions. The EPA uses a
computer model, called MOBILE, to estimate the emissions generated by mobile sources
within a given area. Area emissions make up the majority of emissions for almost all
MSAs. The emissions data come from the EPA’s National Emissions Inventory (EPA
2006). All years are not available, so we used the closest years to the other data. The
emissions data are for the years 1990, 1997, and 2001.17
The EPA designates each county as in attainment or nonattainment for each of the
six criteria air pollutants. For the one-hour ozone standard the EPA compares the design

17

The point source emissions data for these years is all correlated with correlation coefficients for all three
years, 1990, 1997, and 2001 of 0.9 or higher.
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value to the standard, which is 0.12 ppm. If a counties design value is greater than the
standard, the county is deemed to be in nonattainment. To determine whether an MSA is
in attainment, we examine all the county designations within the MSA boundary. Per
EPA rules, if an MSA has at least one county in nonattainment it is considered in
nonattainment for the period (EPA 2006b).

Government Fragmentation Variables
Chapter 3 describes the different ways in which government fragmentation may
be measured. The computation of each of these measures is described below.
Two simple measures of fragmentation are absolute and relative fragmentation.
The first absolute measure of fragmentation is the number of governments within a given
area (Zeigler and Brunn 1980). Governments include counties, municipalities, townships,
and special districts. This is the simplest method and embodies the idea that the more
governments in a region, the more fragmented the decision making in the region. Thus
the more jurisdictions in the MSA, the lower the level of environmental quality expected.
Chicago Illinois has the highest jurisdiction count at 1103, while Fayetteville, North
Carolina has the fewest jurisdictions with only 10. The mean number of jurisdictions is
121 (see Table C5, “JDCNT”).
Relative fragmentation is the second aggregate measure; this measures the
number of governments for some increment of the population (Dye and Hawkins 1971,
Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2002). Relative fragmentation takes into account the population
of an MSA when determining fragmentation levels. Because we have chosen to use only
MSAs with a population over 200,000, most of the midwest small town problem is

65
eliminated. We are using the number of governments per 10,000 residents. Miami,
Florida has the lowest relative fragmentation score with one-sixteenth of a government
per 10,000 residents. Johnstown, Pennsylvania has the highest score with 8.16
governments per 10,000 residents. The mean is 2.1 (see Table C5, “RELFRAG”).The
relationship of relative fragmentation, jurisdiction count, and attainment will be explored
further in the next section, Trends in the Variables.
Not all local governments have an equal effect on fragmentation. The size, scope
and type of local governing bodies within an MSA can mitigate the degree of
fragmentation (Foster 1993). These are not considered by traditional simple measures of
fragmentation. The measures that we are including in this analysis are: Special district
dominance, Central city dominance, and Suburban unincorporation (County primacy). In
the following section we will describe these fragmentation variables.
As discussed in Chapter 3, special districts could either help mitigate
fragmentation through coordinating multiple jurisdictions or add to fragmentation by
adding an additional layer of government. The presumption here is that special districts
add an additional layer of government fragmentation. This is due the fact that most
special districts only handle one function. In addition, data does not exist to successfully
identify overlapping jurisdictions. Thus, the measure we will be using, special district
dominance (SDD), is defined as the number of special districts within an MSA divided
by the number of nonschool district governments such as town, cities, and counties, in the
MSA. The lower the value of SDD the less fragmented the MSA.
On average, there are approximately two special districts per general purpose unit
of government in an MSA (see Table C5, “SDD”). Shreveport-Bossier City Louisiana has
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the lowest score for SDD with 0.03 special district per general purpose government.
MSAs in Louisiana and Virginia have six of the lowest ten scores for SDD. Sacramento,
California has the highest score for SDD with 13.4 special districts per one general
purpose governments. MSAs in California occupy seven of the top-ten highest scores for
SDD.
While many single purpose special districts can increase fragmentation, large
general purpose governments, such as central cities, could serve to reduce fragmentation.
Dominant central cities could be leaders in providing higher levels of environmental
quality. They could also coordinate provision efforts by the smaller jurisdictions. The
measure of central city dominance we use is calculated by dividing the number of people
living in cities with a population greater than 50,000 by the total metropolitan population
(Foster 1993). A larger number for the central city dominance measure would indicate a
less fragmented MSA and a higher level of environmental quality.
Ten MSAs have a value of zero for CCD. Some MSAs do not have a city with
over 50,000 people, while others do not have central city by census definition18 The
MSA with the highest value for CCD is Lincoln, Nebraska with a value of 0.9. New York
City has the second highest value. Rather surprisingly seven of the top-ten CCD MSAs
are located in the western states of California, Texas and Arizona.
Some MSAs may have a dominant county government rather than a central city
government. The primacy of county government is important in dealing with MSAs with
large-unincorporated areas. If a significant portion of the population lives in
unincorporated areas, general-purpose county governments may act as consolidating
18

The three MSAs with no formally designated central city are: Monmouth, NJ, Brazoria, TX and NassauSuffolk, NY.
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agents for decision-making (Foster 1993). The measure for county primacy we are using
is the population in the unincorporated area divided by noncentral city population. The
larger the number for county primacy the less fragmented the MSA.
There are some inherent difficulties in calculating county primacy due to the way
different states treat towns and cities. In some states all the urban area is either covered
by a town or a city.19 Thus the value for unincorporated population is zero and the value
of CP is zero.20 This low score for County primacy is appropriate because there is total
geographic overlap of general purpose municipal and county governance in these areas.
This arrangement would seem to lead to high government fragmentation. Fifty-four
MSAs have a score of zero for county primacy.
An MSA can also have an infinite score for county primacy if all its population
lives in central cities. For these cases, we inserted a value of 165 to avoid the infinite
value. (This is slightly higher than the highest naturally occurring value of 161.) While
this is not the traditional idea espoused by Foster (1993), it captures the spirit of the
fragmentation measure. All an MSAs citizens are being served by only several large
municipal governments. The only MSA in the data set for which this occurred is Reno,
Nevada. The MSA with the highest naturally occurring score for CP was OdessaMidland, Texas with a score of 161.
A central city that is able to accommodate growth through annexation of
additional urban area should help to limit the amount of fragmentation of an MSA. If the
19

Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin have either townships or municipalities covering all urban areas.
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City and town overlap is controlled for in appropriate states by only counting population of the city or
town that was greater if they had the same name. In most cases it was the township. If city population was
greater than the MSA population, the MSA was designated as having zero unincorporated area.
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central city has historically been limited in its ability to annex or expand its boundaries,
the new urban areas that surround it will form their own governments and likely add to
the fragmentation of the MSA. To calculate the elasticity measure we will be using the
change in land area and population of central cities from 1950 to 2000. 21
Traditionally elasticity is defined as the percent change in one variable over the
percent change in another. Unlike calculating the elasticity of supply or demand, there is
no prior theory to ascertain what sign or magnitude the elasticity will be for a city. A city
could either expand or contract in land area since 1950, and expand or contract in
population since 1950. Any of the four combinations of the above are possible. Due to
the nature of cities and growth, the sign of the changes in land area and population
become important. A city that is growing in both land area and population will have a
positive elasticity as would a city that is both shrinking in population and land area. Yet
these two cities would represent opposite patterns of growth.
If the central city controls more land area than it did in 1950, it could have a
consolidating effect and reduce fragmentation. This would also be true if the population
of the central city grew since 1950. It is also possible that the positive effects of an
increase in land area might be mitigated by the negative effects of a decrease in
population or vice versa. Thus, it is important that the signs on the numerator and
denominator remain the same. Thus, instead of dividing percent change in land area by
percent change in population, we will add the two terms together. That way if both are
positive it will reinforce the consolidating effect. If both are negative, it will decrease the

21

We wish to thank David Rusk for sending his data and thus saving many hours of painstaking research
and data entry.
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consolidation effect. If the signs are opposite one will mitigate the other. We refer to this
measure as central city growth (CCG). Thus the CCG is calculated as follows:

CCG =

LA2000 − LA1950 POP 2000 − POP1950
,
+
LA1950
POP1950

(4.4)

where LA2000 is the land area of the central city in 2000. LA1950 is the land area of the
central city in 1950. POP2000 is the population of the central city in 2000, while
POP1950 is the population of the central city in 1950.
Central city growth is an important fragmentation measure as it is a good proxy
for a city’s ability to expand. Annexation laws are myriad and complex and not easily
categorized. A central city that has been able to expand its borders over time or grow in
population should have a consolidating affect on the MSA. Thus, a higher score for CCG
should have a positive effect on the level of environmental quality.
The MSA that had lowest CCG score is Johnston, Pennsylvania. MSAs with low
CCG scores usually had declining populations and constant central city land areas. Five
of the top-ten lowest scoring cities for CCG are in Pennsylvania or New York. The MSA
with highest CCG score is Lexington-Fayette, Kentucky. Five of the top-ten highest
scoring CCG MSAs were in western states of Arizona, Nevada, and California. MSAs
with high CCG scores had increasing land area and populations. But for those in the topten, increasing land area was the major factor. Two central cities, Lexington, Kentucky
and Augusta, Georgia, increased their land area by merging with the surrounding county.
Central cities in western states expanded their land area through aggressive use of state
annexation laws.
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In an effort to measure the political effects of fragmentation based on
jurisdictional fiscal power, we will also explore the Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index
(MPDI) developed by Miller (2002). Recall from chapter three that MPDI is measured by
summing the square root of the share of individual jurisdiction expenditures to total MSA
expenditures. The MPDI captures the ability of small jurisdictions to impede the will of
larger jurisdictions in the same geographical area. Thus for the MPDI, higher numbers
mean greater diffusion of power or fragmentation in the MSA. To calculate MPDI,
expenditures were summed by counties, towns, cities, and special districts. School
districts were not included as their decisions are not expected to have an effect on
environmental quality. We expand on Miller’s specification by including almost all
expenditures made at the local government level such as educational expenditures made
by general purpose governments.22 Such expenditures could add to the clout of a city or
county that makes them and could give them additional influence in environmental
decision making. A list comparing the expenditures we use and those used by Miller is
included in Table C2.
The average value for MPDI in the sample is 5.22. Fayetteville, North Carolina
had the lowest value of 1.7 while Boston had the highest value of 17.62. Seven MSAs
had scores over ten; Boston, Chicago, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, MinneapolisSt. Paul and Scranton-Wilkes-Barre. All of these MSAs are in the north or midwest.
There were 114 MSAs with MPDI scores below the average of 5.22. Only 21 percent of
these were in the north or midwest. A contributing factor to higher MPDI scores in the
north and midwest is the existence of townships. Townships only exist in selected north
22

We also calculated the measure used by Miller. Our measure and the Miller MPDI are highly correlated
with a correlation coefficient of 0.99.
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and midwestern states. Townships add another layer of government that often has
concurrent jurisdiction over areas that include municipal and county governments. As
was discussed in the section on county primacy, in eight states all the urban area is either
covered by a town or a city.

MSA Income, Taste and Demographic Parameters
MSA population, personal income and taste parameters are part of the theoretical
model. MSA population and personal income combine in the natural world to contribute
to MSA wealth, which we measure as MSA GMP. Taste parameters for the public good
and private good are also included in the theoretical model. The taste parameter for the
public good is proxied by the percent of the MSA that voted democratic. These measures
are discussed next.
The population of each MSA is determined from the counties that make it up from
the census of governments for the given year. The least populous MSA in the sample is
Waco, Texas with 201,775 people; the largest is Los Angeles, California with 9,727,751.
There are 58 MSAs in the sample with over one million people. The distribution of these
large MSAs reflects current population growth trends. Only 24 of the largest MSAs are
located in the north and midwest while 34 are located in the south and west.
Personal income data were gathered from the Census and is based on the personal
income of the corresponding urban area for the MSA. Mcallen-Edinburg-Mission, Texas
had the lowest personal income per capita at $12,056 while New Haven-Meriden,
Connecticut had the highest at $47,190.
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There is some minor variation between the mean personal income in the four
regions. The north had the highest average MSA per capita personal income of $27,988
while the south had the lowest at $23,208. The north also had the greatest variation in
MSA per capita personal income, while the midwest had the least.
The theoretical model relies on the income of residents to determine the level of
public good provided. However, in the natural world, the total economic productivity of
the MSA is a more appropriate measure of wealth. It is the yearly production of the MSA
that determines the amount of resources available to employ policies that can improve air
quality. The most complete description of MSA productivity would be given by Gross
MSA product (GMP). Unfortunately complete data on GMP is not available. In order to
calculate GMP, we use a gross state product measure weighted by each MSA’s
contributions to total state personal income. A similar approach is used by Bauer and Lee
(2006) of the Cleveland Fed to estimate gross state product from gross domestic product
data. More formally, GMP is measured by:

GMP= GSP*(MSAPI/STPI),

(4.5)

where GSP is gross state product, MSAPI is total MSA personal income, and STPI is
total state personal income. This yields a yearly estimate of GMP for 1992, 1997, 2002.
The motivation of the Cleveland Fed was to find a way to estimate GSP due to the long
lag in the release of the official GSP. We rely on the official BEA calculations of GSP to
estimate MSA GMP. Ocala, Florida had the smallest GMP while New York City had the
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largest. The relationship between MSA population, GMP, and attainment of the ozone
standard will be explored further in the next section on Trends in the Variables.
The theoretical model includes taste parameters for the preference for the public
good and the private good. These parameter values are unobservable and so proxy
variables must be used. In the natural world, one assumes that these preferences are
linked and move in opposite directions, if one has a high preference for the public good
one has a lower preference for the private good. Thus, one variable can be used to
quantify both parameters. The variable chosen to proxy for the preference for the public
good is the percent of voters in the MSA congressional elections between 1997 and 1999
that voted for a democratic candidate or against a republican candidate. The low value for
PERDEM was 4.8 percent in Harrisburg-Lebanon, Pennsylvania while the high value
was 100 percent in New Orleans and Lafayette, Louisiana. 23
Surprisingly, PERDEM is not correlated with any of the independent variables.
There are some minor trends in the PERDEM variable at the state level. States that Al
Gore carried in 2000 had a higher state average PERDEM score than states that George
Bush carried in 2000. In the 16 states in the sample that voted for Al Gore in 2000, the
state average value for PERDEM was 52 percent. While the 26 states that voted for
George Bush in 2000 had a mean PERDEM state value of 46 percent. There is some
degree of variation in PERDEM within the 42 state-sample. Twenty-two states have
standard deviations higher than ten for PERDEM for the MSAs within the state.

23

These extreme values are likely the result of two factors. First, the MSA lies primarily in one
congressional district. Second, the congressional candidate was a popular incumbent and ran unopposed in
that period.
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Six of the top-ten most populous MSAs had a value over 52 percent for
PERDEM.24 Boston had the highest with 74 percent. The remaining five MSAs with
greater than 52 percent for PERDEM were New York City, Los Angeles, Detroit,
Chicago, and Philadelphia. Dallas had the lowest score for PERDEM at 33 percent. The
remaining three MSAs with below 50 percent were, Houston, Nassau-Suffolk, and
Atlanta.
Data was also collected on the age distribution, racial composition, and
educational attainment of the MSA populations. It is not known a priori what the effect
of the age distribution will have on environmental quality. Three measures of age
distribution were collected, the percent of the population less than 25 years old, the
percent of the population between 25 and 64, and percent of the population 65 and over.
For 1997, the MSA with the highest proportion of its population under 25 was McallenEdinburg-Mission, Texas with 48 percent. The MSA with the lowest proportion of its
population under 25 was Sarasota-Bradenton Florida, with only 25 percent. Washington,
DC had the greatest proportion of its population between the ages of 25 and 65 with 58
percent. The MSA with the lowest proportion of its population between the ages of 25
and 64 was Mcallen-Edinburg-Mission, Texas with 43 percent. For the category of over
65, Sarasota-Bradenton Florida had the highest proportion of its population with 30
percent, while Austin San Marcos, Texas had the lowest with only 8 percent.
Literature on environmental racism suggests that areas with greater minority
populations should have worse environmental quality (see Scorecard 2007). Four racial
24

Commentators suggest that the real trends in the 2000 and 2004 elections are found at the county and
district level, not the state level. Urban areas and inner suburbs tended to support the democratic
presidential candidate while the outer suburbs and rural areas tended to support George Bush (see Nichols
2005).
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categories were used. They are percent of the MSA population that is white, percent
black, percent Hispanic, and percent Asian. The MSA with the highest percentage of its
population categorized as white was Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania with 97
percent. The MSA with the lowest percentage white was Mcallen-Edinburg-Mission,
Texas with 12 percent. The MSA with highest percentage of its population characterized
as black was Jackson, Mississippi with 43 percent. The MSA that had the smallest
percentage of its population characterized as black was Mcallen-Edinburg-Mission Texas
with 0.3 percent. Charleston, West Virginia, had the lowest percentage of its population
characterized as Hispanic, with only 0.4 percent, while Mcallen-Edinburg-Mission, Texas
had the highest with 87 percent. San Jose, California, had the highest percentage of its
population characterized as Asian with 21 percent, while Baton Rouge, Louisiana and the
lowest with an Asian population of only 0.3 percent.
For the category of percent of population graduating from college, it is expected
that a higher percentage of college graduates in an MSA should have a positive effect on
environmental quality. The intuition here is that if environmental quality is an amenity
than people with higher incomes should consume more of it. If college graduates have
higher incomes than nongraduates, then places with higher percentages of the population
with college degrees should have better air quality all else equal. The MSA with the
highest percentage of its population college graduates is Washington, DC with 36
percent. While Little Rock, Arkansas has the lowest percentage with only 16 percent of
its population college graduates.25

25

Data on educational attainment levels was only available at the state level for the years 1990, 1998, and
2002. Therefore each MSA in a state is assigned the same level. The years were assigned to the closest
corresponding year in the panel model.
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Price of Public Good Proxy Variables
The price of the public good is unobservable, thus proxy variables must be used
as was discussed earlier. These variables fall into three categories; urban form, economic
activity, and weather/geography. In this section the proxy variables for the price of the
public good are discussed.
The urban form variables affect air quality through their impact on automobile
emissions and other nonpoint source emissions. Urban form can affect the nature of
automobile trips. Controlling for VMT isolates a large portion of urban form pollution
however it is possible that other aspects of urban form may impact emissions. The public
transit variables, land area variable, density and land use variables attempt to control for
these additional effects.
The ideal measure to assess the contribution cars make to urban air pollution
would be motor vehicles emissions. Motor vehicles emit 48 percent of NOX and VOC
(FHWA 2003). While some data exist on motor vehicles emissions at the county level,
the data is incomplete. Therefore vehicle miles traveled is used as a substitute for motor
vehicles emissions. The daily vehicle miles traveled (DVMT1997) for the urban area of
the MSA is in thousands of miles. However for the empirical model, we divide by a
million to improve the scaling. Because of the link between automobile emissions and
ozone formation, greater levels of DVMT1997 should lead to a higher price for the public
good.
The lowest value for DVMT1997 was in Johnston, Pennsylvania with 1.32
million daily vehicle miles traveled. The maximum value is Los Angeles, California with
approximately 210 million daily vehicles miles traveled. To put this value in perspective,
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the earth lies approximately 93 million miles from the sun. The MSAs of Chicago,
Illinois, New York City, Atlanta, Georgia and Detroit, Michigan round out the top-five
highest in DVMT1997. DVMT1997 is highly correlated with MSAPOP (see Table C6).
This relationship will be examined further in the next section, Trends in the Variables.
Commute time can also influence emission levels for a given level of VMT.
Longer commute times suggest that cars are spending more time in rush-hour stop and go
traffic. For a given level of VMT, stop and go traffic generates higher emissions levels
(Safety Council 2006). Thus, MSAs with longer commute times should face a higher
price for the public good. Commute time is the average commute to work in minutes for
MSAs in 1999. Lubbock, Texas had the lowest commute time of 17.1 minutes, while
New York City had the highest of 38.9 minutes.
For a given level of VMT, public transit can affect the frequency of trips and the
mode of vehicle taken. The availability of public transit should lower the price of public
good provision as was discussed in an earlier section. We use several variables to
measure the effect of public transit on air quality. They include the amount of bus and
train routes, as well as the sum of all public transit fares.
There are ten MSAs that do not have any public transit route miles. The average
MSA public transit route miles are 928. There are 132 MSAs that have less than the
average. The MSA with the most route miles is Los Angeles, California with 8,448. New
York City is second with 8,444. Route miles are correlated with the population of the
MSA, with a correlation coefficient of 0.83(see Table C6).
An additional transit measure is revenue (SUMFARES). Transit fair revenue
serves to measure the utilization of transit in the MSA. If more people use transit, the
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price of providing clean air should be lower. Transit ridership rates would be a better
measure of utilization, but it is not readily available for all MSAs in the sample.
The ten MSAs without any transit routes also had zero fares collected. Of the
MSAs that collected fares, the minimum was Ocala, Florida with $7,335. The average
fare collection was approximately $37.17 million. One-hundred-sixty-six MSAs
collected less than this amount. New York City collected the most fares with
approximately $2.5 billion. Chicago, Illinois, Newark, New Jersey, Nassau-Suffolk, New
York and Washington DC round out the top-five MSAs in sum of fares. However, New
York City collects dramatically more fares than any other MSA. The total fares collected
by the entire remaining top-five MSAs still falls approximately $627 million short of the
New York City total. To normalize these transit measures across MSAs, we divide route
miles by sum of fares. Thus, given two similarly situated MSAs; the one with higher
transit revenue per route mile should have better environmental quality.26
The leading MSAs in fares per mile are New York City, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, Nassau-Suffolk, New York, Chicago, Illinois and Washington DC. Fares
per mile is not highly correlated with total route miles with a correlation coefficient of
0.44. However, fares per mile is correlated with train routes with a correlation coefficient
of 0.77(see Table C6). Only 34 MSAs have some form of rail public transit. It has been
observed that commuters prefer trains to buses. Rail can help to ease commuters out of
their cars at rush hours (Weyrich 2003). This service varies dramatically from very
limited trolley service to MSA wide networks of trains and subways. The smallest rail
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It is possible that higher revenue is just capturing MSAs with higher transit fares. I am assuming that
MSA with higher revenue have higher ridership rates. Fares in the largest MSAs vary by distance, mode of
transit, transit plan purchased etc. However the base fares are similar usually ranging from $1.75-$2.00.
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system is in Johnstown, Pennsylvania which has a 0.2 mile trolley that travels up a steep
hill. The largest system is in New York City with 1,706 miles of highly integrated
subway and rail service. Chicago, Illinois, Newark, New Jersey, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, and Nassau-Suffolk, New York round out the top-five MSAs in track
miles. Newark and Nassau Suffolk are both part of the New York City CMSA. Track
miles and the sum of fares collected are correlated with a correlation coefficient of
0.81(see Table C6). A dummy variable will be used to capture the effects of MSAs with
rail service.
Another facet of urban form is population density. Denser MSAs should have a
lower price for providing the public good due to the link between transit use and
automobile ownership, discussed earlier. Population density is defined as the MSA
population divided by its area in square miles. Some adjustments were made in order to
consistently compare areas across MSAs. An MSA’s area is defined by the contiguous
county boundaries that make it up. In most MSAs this corresponds with the population
distribution. (See Appendix A for MSA census definition). However in some western
MSAs, with very large counties, portions of the county may be totally uninhabited desert.
This is the case for the three MSAs with unadjusted areas over 10,000 square miles,
Riverside-San Bernardino, California, Phoenix, Arizona, and Las Vegas, Nevada. In
order to accurately compare these three MSAs with the rest of the sample, we modified
their areas to eliminate portions of the uninhabited desert counties. These western
counties are still large but are more in keeping with the inhabited area. St. Louis county
Minnesota, which makes up part of the Duluth-Superior MSA, is another large county
that has large sections that are uninhabited. We adjusted the area of this county based on

80
forest and lake coverage as well as its populated area. (See Appendix B for detailed
explanation of MSA area changes and calculations.)
The most compact MSA is Jersey City, New Jersey covering only 46 square
miles. It is also the most densely populated MSA with 11,974 people per square mile.
Trenton is the second smallest covering 226 square miles. Thirty-seven MSAs cover less
than 1,000 square miles, 22 of these are in the north and midwest. The MSA with the
greatest adjusted land area is Phoenix, Arizona with an area of 11,304 square miles. To
put this area in perspective, this is larger than the state of New Hampshire. It has a
density of 188 people per square mile. However, Las Vegas is the least dense MSA with
only 31 people per square mile.
To control for the effect the style of development in the MSA might have on air
quality, we use the percent of single family housing units (PRCNT1FAMILY) in the
MSA. A higher percent of single family housing should increase the price of the public
good. New York City had the lowest percentage of single family housing units with 40
percent. Peoria-Pekin, Illinois had the highest with 77 percent single family housing.
The presence of regional authorities can also affect urban form and land use
decisions. As was discussed in the fragmentation section, there are few regional
authorities that are officially recognized as governments by the census. Thus, we are
designating the presence of an official regional government in the MSA with a dummy
variable. The presence of a regional government would be expected to reduce the price of
the public good. The ten cities that have official regional governments are: Miami,
Florida, Portland Oregon, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
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Kansas City, Kansas, Denver, Colorado, Louisville, Kentucky, Charlotte, North Carolina,
San Antonio, Texas, St. Louis, Missouri.27
The location of an MSA in a CMSA is another urban form factor that may affect
MSA emissions. The nature of CMSAs suggests that neighboring MSA activity may
affect the ability of a given MSA to reduce its emissions. As was previously discussed,
these spillovers could have a positive or negative effect on MSA emissions policy. Thus,
the effect on the price of air quality, due to an MSA being in a CMSA, is not known a
priori. The location of an MSA in a CMSA is controlled for by a dummy variable (see
Table C4).
The economic activity and industrial characteristics of an MSA can also affect the
price of public good provision. Industries vary in their levels of pollution. An MSA with
a greater amount of large polluting industries will have a higher price for public good
provision. Stationary source emissions that come from a large manufacturing facilities or
an electric utility are generally considered point source emissions. To qualify as a point
source a certain threshold of emissions must be met. The emissions data come from the
EPA’s National Emissions Inventory (EPA 2006). Not all years are available, so we used
the closest years. The emissions data are for the years 1990, 1997, and 2001. If these
industries reach the level of point source polluters, all relevant emissions will be captured
by the EPA in the National Emissions Inventory.
Two pollutants are the primary constituents of ozone, VOC and NOX (EPA
2006b). Thus an MSA with more large polluting industrial plants will likely have greater
point source emissions of VOC and NOX. Point source emissions reported
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It should be noted that all MSAs have a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) to manage funds
from federal programs. However these MPOs are not considered governmental bodies.
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(PTSCTTL1997) are a yearly sum of VOC and NOX emitted within the MSA boundary
and measured in tons. Eugene-Springfield, Oregon had zero point source emissions. The
next lowest MSA was Visilia-Tualare-Porterville, California with 235 tons of point
source emissions. Houston, Texas had the greatest amount of point source emissions with
224,877 tons emitted in 1997.
However not all facilities reach the threshold for point source emitters. A
significant number of small plants can also emit enough pollution to affect the price of
public good provision in an MSA. We have included the number of people employed in
manufacturing jobs in an MSA (MFG1997) to account for these small manufacturers. To
determine MSA manufacturing sector employment for the years 1992 and 1997, we used
the two-digit SIC manufacturing code range 20-39. For 2002, The SIC data were matched
with the three digit NAICs data.28 The NAICS sector range was 311-339. There is some
duplication between manufacturers that meet the point source criteria and manufacturing
employment. However, the correlation coefficient between point source emissions and
manufacturing employment is only 0.54. Amarillo, Texas has the fewest manufacturing
employees at 2,407. Los Angeles, California has the greatest number of manufacturing
employees with 635,005. Manufacturing employment is correlated with MSA population
with a correlation coefficient of 0.89 (see Table C6).
Normalized manufacturing employment will also be examined. The percent of
manufacturing employment to total employment will be used. For this variable Hartford
Connecticut had the minimum with 2 percent of total employment in manufacturing,
while Hickory-Morgantown-Lenoir, North Carolina had the maximum with 48 percent.
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The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) has replaced the U.S. Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) system.
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An additional strategy to control for economic and industrial activity is to include
dummy variables for industries and utilities that are known to produce high levels of
precursor emissions. The variables of dirty industry and utilities capture the presence of
these firms with a dummy variable. Dirty industries were identified by SIC code and
include manufactures of; chemicals, nonmetallic mineral products, petroleum & coal
products, plastics & rubber products, or primary metals. Utilities were also identified by
SIC code and include all fossil fuel power generation facilities. There are 123 MSAs with
fossil fuel utilities and 54 that have dirty industry.
General economic activity could also affect the price of public good provision.
For those activities that are not covered under point source emissions or manufacturing,
we included general employment in the MSA (EMP1997). Higher levels of employment
could increase the price of public good provision, if it leads to greater area source
emissions. However, higher employment in cleaner service sector jobs might not increase
emissions. Thus, a priori, the effect of total employment on the price of providing better
air quality is unknown.
The MSA employment variable for 1992 and 1997 was created from the two digit
MSA SIC codes. The data was from the BLS web site. For 2002, NAICS data had to be
used. The MSA with the lowest number of people employed is Bremerton, Washington
with 61,063. The maximum value for employment is Los Angeles, California with
3,855,812. Employment is highly correlated with MSA population with a correlation
coefficient of 0.98. MSA employment and manufacturing employment are also highly
correlated at 0.93 (see Table C6).
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Weather is an important determinant of ozone formation. High summer
temperatures are necessary for ozone formation, while rain and wind can help to impede
ozone formation. Regional geographic features can also impact environmental quality
through their affect on prevailing winds, precipitation cycles, and temperature
fluctuations. However, the geography of every MSA is unique and does not to vary over
time. Because of these characteristics, the panel data model will be used to try to control
for these geographical variations. The following section discusses the weather variables
used in the cross-sectional model.
The three weather factors; rain, summer heat, and wind, affect ozone formation in
several ways. First, rain tends to wash the ozone out of the air. Second, wind aids in
vertical mixing of lower-level polluted air with cleaner upper air, which decreases ozone
formation. Third, hot, windless weather seems to inhibit vertical mixing. Less mixing
tends to increase ozone formation, this is called stagnation. In order to smooth any
unusual weather patterns, three-year averages were taken for rainfall and July
temperature for each MSA. The three years corresponds to the time period used to
calculate the ozone design value for an MSA.
Different methods of measuring the weather variables were used, depending on
how each variable affects the formation of ozone throughout the season. The ozone
season for this model is May through September. High temperatures are critical for ozone
formation, thus ozone is predominantly a summer phenomenon. In MSAs with cool
spring temperatures, ozone is not likely to form in May. However, if those MSAs have
hot July temperatures ozone can form. Thus, an average July temperature (JTEMP1997)
is more indicative of ozone formation than a seasonal average temperature which is likely
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to be considerably lower than the July average. Denver, Colorado had the lowest July
average temperature at 61 F° . Tucson, Arizona had the highest with 91 F° .
Rain has a cumulative effect on ozone formulation. Lack of rain in June can allow
precursor compounds to accumulate in the air and increase the risk of ozone formation in
early July. Because of the cumulative nature of the rain effect, total rain fall is used for
the whole season (TTLRAIN1997) as well as total July rainfall (JRAIN1997). MSAs
with higher levels of rainfall should have a lower price of public good provision.
California MSAs get almost no July rain. Seven MSAs received zero rain in July. The
largest reading for a California MSA was San Diego with 0.1 of an inch. Mobile,
Alabama received the most July rainfall with 14.6 inches. The MSA that received the
least total ozone season rainfall was Bakersfield CA with .4 of an inch. The ten MSAs
with the lowest ozone season rainfall were all in California. Miami, Florida had the most
ozone season rainfall with 51.3 inches. Seven of the top-ten MSAs in seasonal rainfall
were located in Florida. 29
Wind speed also plays somewhat of a cumulative role in ozone formation,
however only when temperatures are hot enough for ozone to form. Thus, an average
wind speed throughout July is more likely to indicate ozone formation than one day of
high gusts. Mean July wind speed (JULYMNWIND) over the past 30 years is used here
as is available from the National Climate Data Center (NCDC 2006). High summer wind
moves precursors from the air shed and thus the area is less susceptible to ozone
formation. The minimum average July wind speed of 4.8 miles per hour was measured in
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The state of Florida receives substantial rain from tropical storms systems and hurricanes; the period of
1995-1997 was no exception. However, Miami did not have a Hurricane hit it directly in the time period.
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Huntington-Ashland, West Virginia. The maximum value of 13.6 miles per hour is
attained by nine northern California MSAs around the CMSA of San Francisco-Oakland.
The location of an MSA on a large body of water may also effect the formation of
ozone. The coastal location allows for some of the precursor emissions to be blown out
over the water and thus not be available to form ozone inland. Therefore, the location of
an MSA on an ocean or great lake will likely reduce the price of providing clean air. A
dummy variable will be used to control for the coastal location of an MSA.

Trends in the Variables
In this section we examine the relationship between the dependent variables and
some selected independent variables. Two of the independent variables selected are the
demographic variables from the theoretical model, MSA population and personal income.
Daily vehicle miles traveled is also selected. Daily vehicle miles traveled is highly
correlated with the dependent variable area total emissions, as well as several
independent variables. The other independent variables are selected fragmentation
variables that illustrate the correlations of some of the fragmentation measures. we will
also examine some basic trends and how they correspond to those predicted by the
theoretical model developed in Chapter 2.

Independent Variables
Tables C7 and C8 list the MSAs which are clustered around the minimum and
maximum values of selected variables. The MSA’s attainment status of the ozone
standard is also included. The tables show the ten MSAs with the lowest values of the
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population and fragmentation variables. We refer to these as the bottom tier. The tables
also show the ten MSAs with the highest population and fragmentation variables. we
refer to these as the top-tier. The mean values listed in the tables, between the top and
bottom tier, are for the full 187 MSA sample. We will use these clustered MSAs at the
minimum and maximum values to get a preliminary indicator of how the variables in the
sample match with what is predicted by the theoretical model.
Table C7 shows the top and bottom-tier MSAs in population, GMP, and daily
vehicle miles traveled. The theoretical model predicts that MSAs with greater populations
should have higher levels of environmental quality. Environmental quality in this table is
the attainment of the ozone standard. The attainment status of the MSAs at the minimum
and maximum values of MSA population does not match what is predicted by the
theoretical model. Only two MSAs in the bottom population tier failed to attain the ozone
standard, Evansville, Indiana and Brazoria, Texas.30 The top-tier MSAs had much less
success meeting the ozone standard. Only one MSA in the top-tier in population met the
ozone attainment standard, Detroit, Michigan. This is a problem experienced by many
populous MSAs. Only five of the 20 most-populated MSAs were in attainment. The other
four were; Minneapolis, Minnesota, Indianapolis, Indiana, Seattle, Washington and
Cleveland, Ohio. The mean value of MSA population, 1,013,357, corresponds with the
populations of MSAs such as: Grand Rapids-Muskegon, Michigan and Raleigh-Durham,
North Carolina. The median value of MSA population, 523,307, corresponds with the
populations of MSAs such as: Mobile, Alabama and Wichita, Kansas. The relationship
between MSA population, daily vehicle miles traveled is examined next.

30

Brazoria is part of the Houston CMSA, which is in nonattainment.
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Vehicle miles traveled and population are highly correlated. This is to be expected
as the more people leads to more cars and more car trips. Eight of the bottom 10 MSAs in
daily vehicle miles traveled (least DVMT) have populations less than 300,000. Nine of
the top-ten MSAs in daily vehicle miles traveled are also in the top-ten in population. The
theoretical model predicts that MSAs with high levels of daily vehicle miles traveled
should have lower levels of public good provision. The attainment status of the MSAs at
the minimum and maximum values of daily vehicle miles traveled follows the theory.
Seven of the ten lowest in daily vehicle miles traveled are in attainment of the ozone
standard for 1997. While, one of the ten highest MSAs in daily vehicle miles traveled is
in attainment of ozone standard in 1997. The mean value of DVMT1997 of
approximately 18 million miles, corresponds with the vehicle miles traveled of MSAs
such as: Bergen-Passaic, New Jersey and Austin-San Marcos, Texas. The median value
of DVMT1997 of approximately eight million miles, corresponds with the vehicle miles
traveled of MSAs such as: Jackson, Mississippi and Columbus, Georgia.
In the theory chapter it is predicted that MSAs with higher personal incomes
should have higher environmental quality. As was discussed in an earlier section, MSA
GMP is a better indicator of MSA wealth. GMP is normalized by MSA population to
facilitate comparisons across MSAs. Per capita GMP and MSA per capita personal
income are correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.86 (see Table C6).31 The
attainment status of the MSAs at the minimum values of MSA GDP per capita does not
follow the theory, while the trend of the MSAs at the maximum values is unclear. Seven
of the ten lowest MSAs in GMP per capita are in attainment of the 1997 ozone standard.
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This correlation is partially due to the formula used to estimate GMP, which allocates GSP to MSAs as a
function of their share of total state personal income.
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Six of the ten MSAs with the highest GMP are in nonattainment of the 1997 ozone
standard. The mean value of MSA GMP per capita of approximately $30,000,
corresponds with the GMP per capita of MSAs such as: Sacramento, California and
Savannah, Georgia. The median value of MSA GMP per capita of approximately
$29,000, corresponds with the GMPs of MSAs such as: Greensboro-Winston Salem,
North Carolina and Baltimore, Maryland.
While the daily vehicle miles traveled measure seems to correspond to the theory
at the minimum and maximum values of the variable, MSA population and GMP per
capita do not. It is likely that MSAs with high GMPs per capita and populations have
other confounding factors which contribute to poor environmental quality. It is possible
that variables correlated with MSA population such as: daily vehicle miles traveled; and
the economic activity variables of employment, manufacturing employment, and point
source emissions all overwhelm the positive effects of greater population. These factors
will be examined and controlled for in the next chapter.
Table C8 illustrates the top and bottom-tiers of MSAs for selected fragmentation
variables. The measures are jurisdiction count, relative fragmentation and metropolitan
power diffusion index. These measures were selected as they give a general picture of the
composite nature of government fragmentation. Jurisdiction count is a popular measure
of fragmentation in the literature. The MSAs in the top and bottom-tiers of jurisdiction
count are intuitively appealing. While the MPDI is more complex, it is correlated with
jurisdiction count and generates similar results at the maximum and minimum values.
Relative fragmentation is not correlated with either jurisdiction count or MPDI and tends
to yield less intuitive results.
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The theoretical model predicts that MSAs with lower levels of fragmentation
should have higher environmental quality. The attainment status of the MSAs at the
minimum and maximum values of jurisdiction count and MPDI follow this prediction.
Nine of the bottom ten MSAs in jurisdiction count (least fragmented) were in attainment.
Only Jersey City, New Jersey was in nonattainment in this group. Of the top-ten MSAs in
jurisdiction count (most fragmented) eight were in nonattainment. Only Minneapolis,
Minnesota and Kansas City, Missouri were in attainment. The mean value of jurisdiction
count, 121, corresponds with the jurisdiction count of MSAs such as York, Pennsylvania
and Middlesex-Somerset, New Jersey. The median value of jurisdiction count, 77,
corresponds with the jurisdiction count of MSAs such as Tacoma, Washington and West
Palm Beach, Florida.
Nine of the ten bottom tier MSAs in MPDI (least fragmented) were in attainment.
Only El Paso, Texas was in nonattainment in this group. While, eight of the top-ten
MSAs in MPDI (most fragmented) were in nonattainment. Only Minneapolis, Minnesota
and Detroit, Michigan were in attainment. All of the five highest ranking MSAs in MPDI
and jurisdiction count were in nonattainment (see Table C8). The same MSAs are
included in the top-five in both jurisdiction count and MPDI. The mean value of MPDI,
5.2, corresponds with the MPDI of MSAs such as Washington, DC and TampaSt. Petersburg, Florida. The median value of MPDI, 4.67, corresponds with the MPDI of
MSAs such as Wichita, Kansas and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina.
The attainment status of the MSAs at the minimum and maximum values of
relative fragmentation do not closely track the predictions made by the theoretical model.
Six out of the bottom-ten MSAs in relative fragmentation (least fragmented) were in
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nonattainment. These tend to be populous MSAs located within CMSAs such as New
York City and Los Angeles. Three of the top-ten MSAs in relative fragmentation (most
fragmented) were in nonattainment (see Table C8). The existence of township
governments likely plays a role in relative fragmentation. All of the top-ten MSAs in
relative fragmentation are located in states that have townships.32 The mean value of
relative fragmentation, 1.54, corresponds with the relative fragmentation of MSAs such
as: Tulsa, Oklahoma and Chicago, Illinois. The median value of relative fragmentation,
1.25, corresponds with the relative fragmentation of MSAs such as Birmingham,
Alabama and Chattanooga, Tennessee.
In summary, jurisdiction count is an appealing measure of fragmentation because
it is easy to quantify and intuitively appealing. MPDI is a more complex measure but is
correlated with jurisdiction count. Both variables at their minimum and maximum values
track the theory model reasonably well with regard to MSA attainment status. Relative
fragmentation is another intuitively appealing measure of government fragmentation.
However it does not track the theoretical model as well for MSAs at the minimum and
maximum values with regard to attainment status. The relationship of all the
fragmentation variables to attainment status will be fully explored in the next chapter.
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Twenty states have township forms of government they are: Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan ,Minnesota , Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey ,New
York ,North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island ,South Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
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Air Quality Summary
In this section we highlight some of the differences between the MSAs that are in
attainment and those that are not. The relationship between MAXEPA ozone and
emissions will be examined in the two groups. The lack of correlation among the three
dependent variables will also be examined.
Table C9 lists the summary statistics yielded when the MSAs are split into two
groups determined by attainment status of the ozone standard in 1997. Seventy-two
MSAs are in nonattainment while 115 are in attainment. Of the MSAs located in CMSAs,
seventeen are in attainment, while 36 are in nonattainment. It is possible for MSAs within
the same CMSA to have different attainment values. In the Chicago-Gary CMSA,
Chicago and Gary are in nonattainment while Southbend is in attainment. Also in the
Portland-Vancouver CMSA, Portland and Vancouver are in attainment while Salem is
not. The summary statistics of Maximum EPA ozone values (MAXEPA) are compared
next.
For those MSAs in attainment, the mean of MAXEPA was 0.1 parts per million
(ppm).33 The maximum value for MAXEPA was 0.14 ppm. This is surprising as the
cutoff value for attainment status is 0.12 ppm. In fact 14 MSAs have values above 0.12
ppm in the attainment set. We will refer to these 14 MSAs as attainment-outliers.
For those MSAs in nonattainment, the mean value for the MAXEPA was 0.13
ppm. The maximum for the MAXEPA was 0.22 ppm in Riverside-San Bernadino,
California. The minimum value for MAXEPA was 0.09 ppm in Lincoln, Nebraska. Once
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Ozone is measured in parts per million. The hourly ambient air quality standard is 0.12 parts per million.
This represents a concentration of 0.12 molecules of ozone for every one-million molecules of air mixture.
Ozone values are shown as one-hour averages.
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again, this minimum value is surprising in that the cutoff value for being in
nonattainment is 0.12 ppm. In fact 21 MSAs in nonattainment had values below the
threshold value of 0.12 ppm. We will refer to these 21 MSAs as nonattainment-outliers.
Several potential explanations for the above inconsistencies exist. They involve
how the EPA designates MSAs and counties as reaching attainment of the ozone
standard. While data on ozone and emissions are collected every year, the EPA does not
review an MSA’s designation as attaining or nonattaining every year. Historically the
EPA has universally revisited the designations of attainment of ozone standards for
counties and MSAs only after significant changes to the clean air act.34 This corresponds
to three different years: 1978, after the NAAQS were changed in 1977; 1991, after the
1990 clean air act amendments; and in 2004, after litigation was finally settled regarding
the 1997 changes. Another reason the EPA would revisit the attainment status of an
MSA is if a petition or lawsuit was filed challenging the EPA’s designation. For the time
period we are examining, this suggests that some MSAs might have fallen in or out of
attainment but had not yet been reclassified.
To try to understand the potential magnitude of this effect, we examined the
county level data in the year before and after 1997 to see if there were changes to MSA
status that had been in process in 1997, but not yet reflected in official attainment status.
Looking at the yearly county level data only four MSAs changed status from1996 to
1997.35 Ten changed status from 1997-1998. 36 All fourteen MSAs went from
34

Personal correspondence with M. Chang, Senior Research Scientist, Center for Urban and Regional
Ecology, Georgia Institute of Technology.
35
These four were: Evansville-Henderson, Indiana-Kentucky, Salt Lake City-Ogden, Utah, RichmondPetersburg, Virginia and Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, Virginia.
36
These ten were: Salinas, Californian, Santa Cruz-Watsonville, California Lake Charles, Louisiana,
Bangor, Maine, Portland-Vancouver, Oregon, Reading, California, Nashville, Tennessee, Seattle-BellevueEverett, Washington, Tacoma, Washington, and Sheboygan, Wisconsin.
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nonattainment to attainment. Only two of the 21 nonattainment outliers correspond to the
above 14 MSAs that changed status to attainment, Evansville-Henderson, located in
Indiana and Kentucky and Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, Virginia. The five
MSAs in the San Francisco CMSA changed status in 1995 to attainment only to relapse
by 1999.37 Only San Jose and Oakland correspond to the list of the 14 attainment outliers.
However, it is also possible for an MSA to violate the ozone standard in a given
year but not fall into nonattainment because the EPA did not revisit its designation and no
lawsuit was filed. In Georgia, this happened in the Macon MSA. From 1997 through
2003, Macon was in violation of the three year average ozone attainment value.
Similarly it is possible for an MSA to petition for attainment status, only to relapse back
into violation before the status is changed. In an attempt to gather additional information
on why some nonattainment areas had low ozone readings while some attainment areas
had high readings, we next examine the data on ozone precursor emission at the MSA
level.
In Table C10, MSAs are again separated by attainment versus nonattainment. The
table illustrates the nonlinear nature of the emissions /attainment relationship. It is
possible for an MSA to have very low emissions and be in nonattainment and it is also
possible for an MSA to have very high emissions and be in attainment.
Table C10 compares the ten highest and lowest emitting MSAs based on
attainment status. The top section of the table compares the ten lowest emitting MSAs in
attainment versus those in nonattainment. The bottom section of the table compares the
ten highest emitting MSAs in attainment versus those in nonattainment. Emissions are the
37

The five San Francisco area MSAs were: Santa Rosa, Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose, and VallejoFairfield-Napa.
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total amount of VOC and NOX measured in tons. Emissions are also broken out into area
and point source totals. The mean values are only for the ten listed MSAs.
For the ten MSAs with the lowest emissions, there is a small difference in the
means between those in attainment and those that are not. For the ten attaining MSAs, the
mean value for total emissions is 28,131 tons. For those ten in nonattainment, the mean
total emissions were 34,840 tons. The mean emissions for the least emitting nonattaining
MSAs were 24 percent greater than the mean for those in attainment. Surprisingly the
MSAs in attainment had a slightly higher point source mean emissions value; 3,276 tons
versus only 2,811 tons for the nonattaining MSAs.
For the ten highest emitting MSAs, there were far greater differences in emissions
for those in attainment versus those in nonattainment. Detroit emitted the largest amount
of any MSA in attainment with 678,763 tons. Chicago topped the list for MSAs in
nonattainment at 906,628 tons. The mean values were also very different. The mean
value for total emissions for the highest emitting MSAs in nonattainment was 68 percent
greater than for those in attainment.
Table C12 measures the ratio of area emissions and point source emissions to
total emissions. The average ratio for area and point source emissions is also calculated.
While the absolute values of emissions differed considerably for the highest emitters, the
average ratio of area source emissions to total emissions was similar in both the lowest
emitters and the highest emitters. For the top-ten emitters, the average ratio of area
emissions to total emissions was 74 percent for those MSAs in attainment and 78 percent
of total emissions for those MSAs in nonattainment. For the ten lowest emitting MSAs,
the ratio of area emissions to total emissions for attainment MSAs was 89 percent; for
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those MSAs in nonattainment the ratio was 92 percent. The next section looks at the
relationship of emissions and fragmentation in the two outlier groups.

Lack of Correlation in Air Quality Indicators
Earlier the lack of correlation among the air quality indicators in the 187 MSA
sample was discussed. This is surprising given that MAXEPA ozone is used to determine
attainment status. Furthermore while emissions and ozone formation may not have a
linear relationship, a greater positive correlation is expected than is found. In this section
we further examine the MSAs described as attainment-outliers and nonattainmentoutliers earlier.
Previously, it was noted that some MSAs attainment status seemed to be contrary
to what the values for MAXEPA ozone would indicate. Table C12 separates these 35
MSA outliers by attainment status and then lists the MAXEPA ozone values, total
emissions, and three fragmentation variables. This table further illustrates the lack of
correlation between ozone, emissions, and attainment.
Twenty-one MSAs in the sample of 187 have MAXEPA ozone values appeared to
have met the standard for attainment in 1997 with values below 0.12 ppm, yet were
deemed in nonattainment for 1997. Of the 21, four are in the bottom tier for emissions in
Table C8 (these are the lowest emitters). The mean value for total emissions for this
group was 115,791 tons.
Fourteen MSAs in the sample have ozone values greater than the cutoff value of
0.12 ppm, but were considered to be in attainment for 1997. Four of these are in the top-
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tier for emissions from Table C10 (these are the highest emitters). For the 14 attainmentoutliers, the average emissions were 206,272 tons.
Turning to the three fragmentation variables, the 21 nonattaining-outliers have on
average; 156 jurisdictions and 2.44 governments per 10,000 people. The 14 attainment outliers have on average; 140 jurisdictions and 1.19 governments per 10,000 people. The
average MPDI value for the nonattaining MSAs is higher than that of the attaining MSAs
as well.
When the 35 outliers are removed from the sample, the correlation coefficients for
the air quality indicators rise. Table 4.14 compares the correlation coefficients with and
without the outliers. The correlation between attainment and MAXEPA rises to a fairly
high level of -0.77. The other two variables still are not in the range in which they would
be called highly correlated. This is in keeping with the nonlinear relationship between
emissions levels and ozone formation.
Table C12 demonstrates some of the shortcomings of the cross-sectional
approach. The 21 MSAs that are nonattainment-outliers have lower mean ozone and
emissions than those 14 MSAs that are attainment-outliers. However, the means of the
three fragmentation variables are all higher for the 21 nonattainment MSAs. There is
likely to be some unobserved heterogeneity that is present in the data that contribute to
these unusual results.
There is possible unobserved heterogeneity at several levels. Twelve of the 21
nonattainment-outliers are in three states, Pennsylvania, New York, and Colorado.
Unique geographic or political features might allow some of the outliers to maintain their
unusual status of attainment or nonattainment. It is possible that state level institutions
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could be playing a role. There is also an overlap of states in both the attainment-outliers
and the nonattainment-outliers. California and Michigan have MSAs in both groups. This
suggests that the unobserved heterogeneity may also occur at the local level, again
suggesting the need for a panel estimation approach.

Trends in Key Variables Over Time
This section analyzes some basic trends across years. The years we examine are
1992, 1997 and 2002. Trends in attainment will be examined. In addition, the data panels
will be divided into groups of MSAs based on their attainment status over the three
periods. The relative means of these groups will be compared with what the theoretical
model predicts.
Table C13 shows the trends over the three periods for the means. The general
trend seems to be toward cleaner air. More MSAs are in attainment and mean emission
values have declined. In 1992, Seventy-five MSAs were in attainment. By 1997, forty
more MSAs reached attainment, bringing the total MSAs in attainment to 115. Only six
more MSAs reached attainment by 2002, for a total of 121. The mean values of area total
emissions declined by 24 percent from 1992 to 2002. However, the mean values of
MAXEPA ozone stayed relatively constant over the three panels. This suggests that
nonattainment MSAs, with the worst ozone levels, were improving air quality, but MSAs
in attainment were experiencing rising ozone levels. There were no overall trends in the
other variables. The next section examines MSA trends based on their attainment status
over the three periods.
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There are three basic attainment groups in the panel data set. The first is the 75
MSAs that have always been in attainment, we will refer to these MSAs as the AIA
group. The second is the 61 MSAs that have never been in attainment, we will refer to
these MSAs as the NIA group. The third is the 51 MSAs whose attainment status has
changed; we will refer to these MSAs as the CIA group.
Almost all MSAs in the CIA group went from nonattainment to attainment. There
are only six anomalous MSAs. Five are in the CMSA of San Francisco-Oakland. These
all went from nonattainment in 1992, to attainment in 1997, back to nonattainment in
2002. Springfield, Massachusetts is the other anomalous MSA. It went from attainment in
1992, to nonattainment in 1997, back to attainment in 2002. Next we examine selected
means of the three groups.
Table C14 lists the means of the three MSA groups. For MAXEPA ozone, the
NIA group has a mean value of 0.13 ppm and the AIA group has a mean of 0.1 ppm. The
value for the CIA group is 0.11. The NIA and AIA group means are intuitively appealing
as the NIA mean exceeds the ozone threshold value of 0.12 ppm but the AIA mean does
not. For area total emissions, the NIA group has the highest mean value, followed by the
CIA group. The AIA group has the lowest value.
The NIA group has both the highest mean population and highest GMP of the
three groups. The AIA group has the lowest means for both MSA population and MSA
GMP. The NIA group population mean is over three times greater than the AIA
population mean. The CIA group means for MSA population and GMP fall in between
the NIA and AIA group.
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The NIA group is generally more fragmented that the other two groups. The NIA
means for MPDI and SD are approximately 50 percent larger than the means of the AIA
group. While the JDCNT mean is approximately 140 percent larger than the AIA group
mean. For CCD and RELFRAG the means are similar. The mean values of the
fragmentation variables for the CIA group tend to fall in between the NIA and AIA group
means.

Summary
In this chapter, an empirical framework which guided data collection was
presented. Variable development was discussed and data trends were presented. Overall,
there is considerable heterogeneity among MSAs in attainment and out of attainment.
While we have attempted to capture relevant features of our theoretical model, there may
continue to be important unobserved factors across MSAs. As such, in the next chapter
we will develop two estimation approaches; one based only on the 1997 cross section
data and one based on the 1992 to 2002 panel data. Estimation results are also presented
in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION

This chapter will present the empirical model as well as estimation results. The
first section discusses the cross-sectional model. Several estimation issues, including the
estimation technique and specification tests are addressed. Results from the crosssectional approach are also presented. The second section discusses the panel model.
Estimation technique and specification tests are addressed. Results from the panel
approach are presented and used as a robustness check for the cross-sectional results. The
third section discusses the implications of both the cross-sectional and panel model
empirical results and concludes.

Cross-sectional Model
The theoretical model predicts that as the number of jurisdictions increases the
level of public good provision decreases. In this stylized model the change is immediate.
However, in the natural world the effect local government structure has on air quality is
determined by the ability of local governments to control emissions, in particular area
source emissions. Policies that affect emissions take time to develop and implement. In
addition, the residents that live in the MSA will take time to adjust to new conditions.
The influence on air quality that an additional unit of government fragmentation has on
MSA air quality is likely to be gradual. Therefore, changes in air quality in the shortterm will likely be modest in a particular MSA due to incremental changes in government
structure when compared to differences in governmental structure across MSAs.
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For instance in Atlanta, the new city of Sandy Springs was created in 2006,
several other areas are also likely to incorporate within the Atlanta MSA in the near
future. In the short term these additional jurisdictions are likely to have a minimal effect
on MSA air quality. However over time, as these new jurisdictions’ land use and transit
policies are put in place residents throughout the MSA will adjust their behavior. It is
these long-term changes that are expected to influence area emissions and have larger
affects on air quality. Over time Atlanta will resemble MSAs with higher degrees of
fragmentation. For these reasons, a cross-section model which exploits inter-MSA
variation is first explored. Specifically, the long-term effect of differing levels of
government fragmentation across MSAs is explored through the following crosssectional model:

AQi = α i + β FFi + ∑ β pPREFDEMip + ∑ β jUFij + ∑ β nGEOin + ∑ β qECONi + ei , (5.1)
n

j

n

q

where AQi is a variable representing the air quality of the ith MSA. MSA government
fragmentation is represented by Fi. PREFDEMi is a vector of relevant demographic and
preference variables, UFi is a vector of urban form measures, GEOi is a vector of
relevant geographical variables, and ECONi is a vector of economic activity measures in
the MSA. The error term is represented by ei. Table C16 lists the variables explored in
each category and their definitions. For a detailed description of the variables and the
source of the data, see chapter four.
If AQi is a binary variable, then equation (5.1) is estimated via logistic or probit
regression. If instead AQi is a continuous variable, OLS can be used if the following four
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classical assumptions are met: 1) the expected value of the error term is zero, 2) errors
have uniform variance and are uncorrelated, 3) observations on independent variables can
be considered fixed in repeated samples, 4) there is no exact linear relationships between
independent variables.
In the model presented in equation (5.1), there may be concern that some of the
urban form variables and economic activity variables could be endogenous. Consider the
following model were the variables of urban form and economic activity are listed and
highlighted in bold type:

AQi = α i + β FFi + ∑ β pPREFDEMip + β 1PRCNT1FAMILY +β 2DVMT + β 3COMTIME
n

+β 4FARESPERMI + β 5CMSA + β 6REGGOV +β 7DENSITY + β 11MFGAVGT +
β 8PTSCTTL + β 9PTSCTTLSQ + β 10EMP + ∑ β nGEOin + ei ,
n

(5.2)
and definitions for these variables are in Table C3. In the above equation the endogeniety
could be from two sources simultaneity bias or unobserved heterogeneity. Simultaneity
bias occurs when one or more of the independent variables are jointly determined with
the dependent variable. Such a problem might exist if jurisdictions made decisions
regarding the amount of public transit to provide contemporaneously with their decision
on the amount of air quality to provide. Another possibility of simultaneity bias is if
firms made location decisions based on air quality in the MSA. If simultaneity bias exists
then estimates from OLS or probit models would be biased and inconsistent.
Unobserved heterogeneity bias occurs if one of the independent variables is
correlated with characteristics of the MSA that are unobservable. For instance, if the level
of public transit provided in an MSA is correlated with a characteristic of the MSA that is
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not controlled for in the model, such as local political will, or the ability of local
governments to secure federal transit financing.
The results of both unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity bias is that one or
more of the independent variables is correlated with the error term in equation (5.1). This
leads to bias in the estimation. Simultaneity bias and unobserved heterogeneity bias can
generally be controlled for in a similar manner using IV variables and two stage least
squares estimation. The next section discusses the possible sources of endogeniety
followed by a more formal treatment of estimation with endogenous regressors.

Potentially Endogenous Regressors
There are seven urban form variables: PRCTN1FAMILY, DVMT, COMTIME,
FARESPERMI, CMSA, REGGOV, and DENSITY. Of these variables, two are
potentially endogenous: FARESPERMI and DVMT. The decision of an MSA or
jurisdiction to provide public transit to its residents is likely based on a variety of factors.
Some of these factors are observable such as road congestion. Others may be
unobservable, such as resident’s willingness to ride public transit, local political will, or
the ability of local governments to secure federal transit financing. In addition, current
transit levels are likely to reflect decisions made in prior years. This is particularly true
when considering large capital expenditures for such things as trains and train stations. If
an MSA experienced poor air quality in the past, it might allocate more money to transit
for the future. Thus, the transit variables are possibly endogenous.
Another urban form variable that might be endogenous is DVMT. MSAs may
make decisions that can affect DVMT simultaneously with decisions on air quality.
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MSAs that are not in compliance with the ozone standard may choose policies that limit
DVMT such as high occupancy vehicle lanes or policies to encourage car pooling. Thus,
DVMT is possibly endogenous.
In the category of “economic activity”, there are five variables considered in my
models: EMPGROWTH, MFGAVGT, PTSCTTL, DIRTYIND, and UTILITY. For these
variables, it is possible that MFGAVGT and PTSCTTL are endogenous if firms base
their location decisions in part on the air quality of the MSA. Henderson (1996) found
that firms which produce high levels of VOCs were more likely to locate in counties that
had experienced at least three years of attainment of the ozone standard. However, most
firms that produced high levels of VOCs were located in nonattainment counties. Also,
counties that had never been in attainment, counties that had always been in attainment,
as well as counties that switched from nonattainment to attainment, all experienced
growth in polluting industries from 1978-1987 (Henderson 1996). Counties that had
been in attainment for the entire period experienced the fastest growth rate for new
polluting firms. However the nonattainment counties started with close to 90 percent of
all the major polluting industries. Therefore, it is unlikely that the overall distribution of
industry changed dramatically. Thus, the variables of MFGAVGT and PTSCTTL will be
treated as exogenous in the cross-sectional model. The validity of this assumption will be
tested in the panel data specification.
In summary, based on economic intuition, only two variables out of 14 used in the
urban form and economic activity, fares per mile (FARESPERMI) and daily vehicle
miles traveled (DVMT), are considered endogenous. All variables in the geography
category are considered exogenous. The variables capturing preferences and demographic
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composition of an MSA are also considered exogenous. Given the long process involved
in changing jurisdiction structure within an MSA, the fragmentation variables are initially
considered to be exogenous. However, we test this latter assumption.

Estimation with Endogenous Variables
The problem of endogenous variables due to omitted variables, unobserved
heterogeneity, or simultaneity can generally be dealt with in three ways. First, a suitable
proxy variable for an omitted variable can be used. Second, a suitable instrumental
variable may be found for the omitted variable or independent variable that is correlated
with the unobservable. Third, one can assume that the endogenous variable as well as the
omitted variable that it is correlated with does not change over time and use the panel
data approach of fixed effects (Wooldridge 2000). We will be discussing all three
approaches in this chapter. The first and second options will be discussed next. The third
option will be discussed in the section on the panel data model.
The cross-sectional model developed in chapter four, and repeated here: Air
quality = f (Governmental Fragmentation, MSA Total Income, Taste Parameters, Price of
Public Good Provision), contains the unobservable variable for the price of the public
good. If this variable is omitted, both OLS and the logit model will yield biased and
inconsistent estimates. Thus proxy variables are used to minimize this problem. To see
this, consider our base empirical model equation (4.3):

Air quality = f (Governmental Fragmentation, MSA Total Income,
Taste Parameters, Price of Public Good Provision),

(5.3)

107
equation (5.3) can be restated in general form as follows for ease of exposition:

y1 = α i + β 1 x1 + β 2 x 2 + β 3 x 3 * + ei ,

(5.4)

where y1 is a variable representing the air quality of an MSA. Assume x1 and x2 are
observable variables while x3* is not observed. If a proxy variable x3 is available such
that:
x3* = δ 0 + δ 3 x 3 + υ 3 ,

(5.5)

then equation (5.5) can then be substituted into equation (5.4) for x3*. The following
assumptions must be made in order for the proxy variables to be suitable. The coefficient
values for x1and x2 must be nonzero and that the error term v3 must be uncorrelated with,
x1, x2, as well as x3. In addition the proxy variables must also be uncorrelated with the
error term in the structural equation (5.4). This last condition can be restated by equation
(5.6),

E(x3*|x1,x2, x3)=E(x3*| x3)= δ 0+δ 3x3 .

(5.6)

The assumptions present in equation (5.6) are rather strong and they need not be
completely true for the proxy variable to still be useful (Wooldridge 2000). However, if
the basic assumption that the proxy variables are uncorrelated with the error term in the
structural equation is violated the results of an OLS or logit or probit regression will
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again be biased and inconsistent. Controlling for this correlation using instrumental
variable estimation is discussed next.
The instrumental variables estimation method is used to control for the correlation
of independent variables with the error term. A suitable instrumental variable for the
correlated independent variable must be related to the correlated independent variable as
well as be exogenous and uncorrelated with the error term. Generally this relationship is
expressed using the structural equation below:

y1 = α 0 + β 1 y 2 + β 2 z 2 + u,

(5.7)

where z2 is assumed exogenous. In our application y1 would be a measure of air quality
and y2 would be DVMT or FAREPERMI. If y2 is correlated with u, the OLS and logit
and probit coefficients estimates will be biased and inconsistent. In order to control for
this endogeniety, a suitable instrumental variable (IV) can be used in place of y2 and then
equation (C21) is estimated using two stage least squares.
A suitable IV must be correlated with y2 as well as be exogenous and uncorrelated
with u. The above conditions for an appropriate IV for the transit variables are expressed
using equation (5.8),

y 2 = π 0 + π 1 z1 + π 2 z 2 + υ 2 .

(5.8)

where by definition E( V2)= 0 and the Cov(z1, V2) =0 and Cov(z2, V2) =0. The relevant
identification condition is that π2 does not equal zero. This will be tested for by using
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standard OLS and a t test. One cannot test for whether the IV is uncorrelated with error
term; this must just be assumed (Wooldridge 2000, p 473). Before writing the IV model
for our application we first discuss potential outside instruments.
Recall our two potentially endogenous regressors are transit fares per route mile
as well as daily vehicle miles traveled. The MSA population in 1900 might be a suitable
instrument for 1997 levels of transit. The instrument for the transit variable must be
correlated with 1997 transit levels but not be correlated with the unobservable factors
discussed above that might lead an MSA to choose to provide transit. Population in 1900
is chosen because it precedes the mass-production of the automobile and the
accompanying expansion and improvement of roads. The proliferation of automobiles
and roads is a leading cause of MSA area ozone component emissions. Population in
1900 does not have a direct effect on current ozone levels or attainment status and is not
correlated with past attainment, air quality, or emissions. Population in 1900 is positively
correlated with 1997 MSA transit variables however, for the variables of FAREPERMI,
SUMFARES, and TRACKMI, it has the correlation coefficients of 0.80, 0.83, and 0.74
respectfully. It is slightly less correlated with TRANRTE with a correlation coefficient of
0.51. we estimated a standard OLS regression to test the validity of this instrument on
FAREPERMI. The R-squared is 0.63 and the coefficient has the expected sign and is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, MSAPOP1900 may be a reasonable
instrument for the transit variable of FAREPERMI.
Vehicle miles traveled is another potentially endogenous variable. An instrument
must be correlated with DVMT yet be uncorrelated with air quality. Instruments for
DVMT could be the number of drivers licenses issued in an MSA and the gas tax in the
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state.38 Gas tax is set at the state level and thus is not likely to be influenced by MSA air
quality concerns. The more drivers licenses the higher the expected value of DVMT all
else equal. For the gas tax, the higher the gas tax the lower the level of DVMT all else
equal. we ran a standard OLS regression to test the validity of these instruments. The R
squared is 0.92 and both coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically
significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, driver’s licenses and state gas tax seem to be
reasonable instruments for VMT.
With suitable instruments in place, the IV model is estimated by two stage least
squares. Equation (5.1) is the structural equation and equations (5.9) and (5.10) below
are the IV equations,

DVMT = π 0 + π 1driverslic+ π 2gastax + β X + υ 2
FAREPERMI = θ 0 + θ 1MSAppop1900 + β X + ω 2.

(5.9)

(5.10)

The next section presents results of estimates for equation (5.1) using OLS and using the
IV estimation just discussed.

Cross-section Results
The following section discusses the results of the cross-sectional analysis. Four
different estimation strategies are presented. The first two specifications are probit and
IV probit models with the binary dependent variable being the attainment of the ozone
standard. The second two specifications examine the continuous dependent variable
38

The number of driver’s licenses issued is only available by state. To estimate the number of driver’s
licenses per MSA, the statewide total was allocated by MSA population.
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ozone level using OLS and IV two-stage least squares.
Several model specification tests were run to check for the appropriate functional
form, the presence of heteroskadasticity and multicollinearity. The Ramsey RESET test
was used to test different functional forms. The Ramsey RESET test is a general model
specification test. It tests whether nonlinear combinations of the predicted values help
explain the dependent variable. Specifically for the model,

y = α 0 + ∑ β ixi + e,

(5.11)

the residuals are calculated and inserted back into the original model as the terms as ŷ 2
and ŷ 3 ,
y = α 0 + ∑ β ixi + δ1 yˆ 2 + δ 2 yˆ 3 + e,

(5.12)

the null hypothesis is that (5.11) is correctly specified and therefore in equation (5.12)

δ1 = δ 2 = 0 . The intuition behind the test is that, if nonlinear combinations of the
explanatory variables have any power in explaining the dependent variable, then the
model is miss-specified (Wooldridge 2000, p281).
The choice of functional form was informed by the physical process of ozone
formation. Recall from the discussion of air quality variables that ozone formation is a
nonlinear process due to the complex interaction of emissions, sunlight, and other
weather and geographical features of the MSA. Several different nonlinear functional
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forms were tested.39 Log-linear, semi-log, and quadratic specifications were all tested
with the Ramsey RESET test. The RESET tests indicated that a form of the quadratic
specification in which only the variable PTSCTTL is squared is preferred.
A link test was also conducted on the linear model. The link test creates two
additional variables and includes them in the regression. The first variable is just the
predicted values of the dependent variable, ŷ . The second is ŷ 2. The coefficient for the
ŷ should be significant while the coefficient for ŷ 2 should not be significant if the model

is specified correctly (StataCorp., 2007). A statistically significant coefficient on the
square term of the link test indicated that the linear specification was not ideal. The link
test result further supports the RESET test findings, indicating that a nonlinear
specification is to be preferred.
The models were also tested for heteroskadasticity. Both the Bruesh-Pagan and
White test found evidence of heteroskadasticity. To correct for this, White's robust
standard errors are used when available (Wooldridge 2000). In the IV probit model
specification, robust standard errors are not available. However, when computing the IV
OLS standard errors with and without White's corrections, the difference in the standard
errors was minimal. In general, the robust standard errors were larger, leading to less
precise estimates of the coefficients. Thus, care should be taken when one evaluates the
statistical significance of the coefficients in the IV probit specification.
Multicollinearity was tested for using the variance inflation factor test. The
variance inflation factor test (VIF) measures the impact of multicollinearity among the
independent variables in a regression model on the precision of the estimation. It
39

All testing was done using the OLS specification. Testing becomes quite onerous with the probit model.
In addition, to facilitate comparisons across the OLS and probit specifications, models should have a
common functional form.
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expresses the degree to which multicollinearity among the predictors degrades the
precision of an estimate. Typically a VIF value greater than ten indicates a high degree of
multicollinearity.
Values over 10 for the variance inflation factor test were generated for GMP and
DVMT suggesting high levels of multicollinearity. Three potential strategies exist for
dealing with the issue of multicollinearity. The best is to gather more observations.
However, this is not possible as we are using all suitable United States MSAs in my
cross-section. Another option is to do nothing and realize that hypothesis tests are
conservative. A third option is to drop one or more of the offending variables. GMP is in
the theoretical model, therefore it is not appropriate for it to be dropped. DVMT is also
crucial to the urban form variables and again would not be appropriate to drop.
Therefore, some multicollinearity remains and estimates will have to be interpreted
accordingly.
Of paramount interest in this analysis is modeling the ozone attainment status of
an MSA. Therefore, the probit results will be the focus of the discussion. The OLS results
will be used to illustrate potential inconsistencies in the probit results. The empirical
estimates for the air quality models are presented in Tables C17 through C23. The
discussion of the parameter estimates is divided into four groups of variables which
potentially affect the ozone’s standard attainment status of an MSA. To aid in the
interpretation of the results, the marginal effects of each explanatory variable on the
“average” MSA will be discussed. The fragmentation measures are discussed first
followed by urban form, economic activity, and the preference variables.
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Probit Fragmentation Measures
Table C17 shows the results for the six fragmentation measures using the probit
specification. This variable is equal to one if the MSA is in attainment of the ozone
standard and zero otherwise. Six different models are explored and reported in Table
C17. In each model, the only change is the fragmentation measure included in the model.
The expected sign for each fragmentation variable is given at the top of each column in
Table C17. Each fragmentation variable is modeled separately, as it is usually not
possible satisfy the ceteris paribus conditions when more than one fragmentation measure
is included. In addition, the interpretation of the results becomes difficult when more
than one measure of fragmentation is used. Relative fragmentation cannot be used in a
model because it was not possible to satisfy the ceteris paribus condition with any type of
population measure.40
The empirical results suggest that none of the three local government form
variables, central city dominance (CCD), special district dominance (SDD), or county
primacy (CP), have a statistically significant impact on the ozone attainment status of the
MSA. These results are in general agreement with Foster (1993) and Nelson and Foster
(1999) in their studies on the impacts of fragmentation on MSA economic growth.
The empirical results suggest that MSAs with higher values of MPDI and
jurisdiction count (JDCNT) are less likely to meet the ozone standard. Using the
marginal effects, the “average” MSA that adds an additional unit of MPDI is 10 percent
less likely to meet the ozone attainment standard. To put this in the context of the MSAs
in the sample, if MPDI is increased by one standard deviation (1.24) the “average” MSA
40

Relative fragmentation measures the number of governments per unit of population, thus it is only
possible to add governments and still maintain the assumption population stays constant.
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is 12.4 percent less likely to attain the ozone standard. The Tampa-St. Petersburg MSA
has approximately the average value for MPDI, if one-half standard deviation is added, it
would have an MPDI value that was similar to an MSA such as New London CT. Only
15 of the 41 MSAs with MPDI values equal to New London’s of 6.57 or higher were in
attainment in 1997.41
The results for jurisdictional count (JDCNT) indicate that an MSA, which adds
one additional jurisdiction, is 0.14 percent less likely to reach the attainment standard. If
jurisdiction count is increased by one-half a standard deviation, (70 jurisdictions) this
would decrease the chance of being an attainment by 9.8 percent. This is a prospect that
seems unlikely as the average MSA has only 121 jurisdictions. Consider instead an
increase in jurisdictions by five units, this would imply the average MSA would be 0.8
percent less likely to attain the standard.
The empirical results suggest that MSAs with higher levels of central city growth
are more likely to be in attainment of the ozone standard. Using marginal effects, the
“average” MSA that adds an additional unit of central city growth (CCG) is 5.8 percent
more likely to meet the ozone attainment standard. The average value for CCG is 5.02.
To put this in the context of the MSAs in the sample, if CCG is increased by one-half a
standard deviation (3.7) the “average” MSA is 21.5 percent more likely to attain the
ozone standard. The Houston, Texas MSA with a CCG value of 4.9, is close to the
average value. If one-half a standard deviation is added it would have a CCG value that
was similar to an MSA such as Ocala, Florida with a CCG value of 8.8. Of the 31 MSAs

41

In the probit model marginal effects are not constant, but depend on the data point at which they are
calculated. I calculated the marginal effects for the values of MPDI and JDCNT that are used here that are
different than the mean values reported in the table. These values are very similar to the mean values. Thus,
we will assume constant marginal effects for ease of exposition (see Wooldridge 2000, 538).
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with CCG values of 8.8 or higher 24 were in attainment in 1997. Examining the MSAs
with values of CCG one-half standard deviation lower than the average includes MSAs
such as, Evansville-Henderson, Indiana with a value of 1.2. For the 75 MSAs that have
values of CCG of 1.2 or less only 25 were in attainment of the ozone standard.
To try to further understand how CCG impacts the ozone attainment standard, we
substituted its two component parts, change in central city population since 1950 and
change in central city area since 1950, for CCG into the probit model. Both components
have similar statistically significant impacts on attainment. Marginal effects for the
average MSA indicate that a one unit increase in the population component of central city
growth increases the likelihood of reaching the attainment standard by 9.4 percent. While
increasing the area component of central city growth by one unit increases the likelihood
of attaining the ozone standard by 6.3 percent. Examining the correlation coefficients of
the three measures indicates that while the population portion may have a larger effect on
attainment, the land area component is highly correlated with the final central city growth
measure. The correlation coefficient for land area and CCG is 0.9 while the population
component only has a correlation coefficient of 0.3. Surprisingly, the two components
are not very correlated with each other, only having a correlation coefficient of 0.16.
As was shown in an earlier section there are a group of outlier MSAs that have
calculated third highest daily maximum values (MAXEPA) that are incongruent with
their attainment status. In order to test the effect that these MSAs have on the probit
results, the dependent variable of attainment was changed to conform to the MAXEPA
value. The results of the revised attainment-model are presented in Table C19 and
suggest that only one of the three previously statistically significant fragmentation
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variables has a statistically significant impact on MSA "attainment." CCG still has a
positive and statistically significant effect on attainment status. The formerly statistically
significant variables of MPDI and JDCNT do maintain the same sign as in the previous
probit specification, but are not statistically significant. This result suggests that there are
additional institutional components involved in reaching “attainment.” Fragmentation
appears to play a role in some MSAs’ ability to coordinate their activities sufficiently to
get a desired attainment status for a given ozone reading. MSAs that are less fragmented
appear to be able to obtain a designation of attainment, even if their ozone reading should
technically put them in nonattainment. While other more fragmented MSAs that should
be in attainment based on ozone readings are unable to coordinate their regulatory
response in a sufficient manner to rebut the incorrect classification of nonattainment.
Before presenting results from the IV regression, we first discuss results for covariates
other than fragmentation.

Control Variables
Of the five preference and demographic variables, college (COLLEGE), less than
25 (LESS25), and gross metropolitan product (GMP) all have a statistically significant
effect on the attainment of the ozone standard. Percent democrat (PERDEM) and
percent white (WHITE), do not have a statistically significant effects on attainment of the
ozone standard.
The estimated effect for COLLEGE is counterintuitive. For the average MSA
with 24 percent of its population college graduates, adding an additional one percentage
point to COLLEGE indicates that the MSA is seven percent less likely to attain the ozone
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standard. It is possible that this counterintuitive result is because of simultaneity bias.
This will be examined in the discussion of the IV results. For the percent of population
under age 25, a one percent increase in this variable indicates the MSA is seven percent
less likely to be in attainment. Increasing GMP by $1 billion indicates an average MSA is
two percent more likely to be in attainment, holding all else constant.
Six urban form variables were included in the models.42 Density, commute time
(COMTIME), and percent single-family (PRCNT1FAMILY) did not have a statistically
significant impact on the attainment of the ozone standard. The MSAs presence in a
CMSA had a large statistically significant impact on attainment. The marginal effect for
CMSA indicates that MSAs located in CMSAs are 68 percent less likely to attain the
ozone standard than those MSAs not within a CMSA.
DVMT has a statistically negative effect on attainment. If an additional million
miles is added to the average MSA’s DVMT, it is 2.6 percent less likely to attain the
ozone standard. The transit variable, fare per mile of transit routes (FAREPERMI), also
has a statistically significant impact on the attainment status of an MSA. The results
suggest that an increase in FAREPERMI decreases the likelihood that an MSA will be in
attainment. This is another anomalous result and will be further examined in the IV
section.
Three variables are included in the category of economic activity. Only
manufacturing employment (MFGAVGT) has no statistically significant effect on
attainment. Employment growth (EMPGROWTH) has a positive and statistically

42

Regional authorities are not included in final empirical model. F-tests suggest that the coefficient values
are not statistically different from zero in the probit specification for the three models of interest here,
MPDI, JDCNT and CCG. Furthermore, only 10 MSAs have official regional governments.
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significant effect on attainment. If the average MSA increased employment by one
percent from 1992 to 1997, it would be four percent more likely to attain the ozone
standard.
Point source total emissions have a statistically significant negative effect on the
likelihood of reaching attainment. A joint F-test reveals that the null hypothesis that both
the point source emissions and point source squared emissions coefficients both equal
zero can be rejected at the 10 percent level. The positive coefficient for point source total
squared suggests that as emissions increase, the chance of attainment of the ozone
standard decreases but at a decreasing rate. For the average MSA adding 1000 tons of
additional point source emissions, decreases the chance that an MSA will be in
attainment by 0.88 percent. The inflection point for this quadratic function, in which
additional point source emissions have zero effect on the chance of attainment for the
average MSA, is approximately 138,400 tons of emissions. To put this value in
perspective, the median value of point source emissions is 14,083 while the mean is
28,362. Only Cincinnati, Chicago, Detroit, and Houston exceed 138,400 tons of point
source emissions annually.
The dummy variables for the presence of dirty industry or power plants were not
included in the final empirical specification due to ceteris paribus constraints with point
source emissions. It is not possible to keep point source emissions constant while making
incremental changes to the dummy variable of power plant or the presence of dirty
industry. Both power plants and dirty industry are likely to be large point source polluters
and would be counted in point source emissions. In order to satisfy the ceteris paribus
conditions any power plant or dirty industry that is added or subtracted from an MSA
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would either have zero point source emissions or the current distribution of point source
emissions would have to change to accommodate the new entrant. Neither possibility
seems to be a credible assumption.
Seven variables are included in the categories of weather and geography. In the
weather category total ozone season rain (TTLRAIN), and July average wind speed
(JULYMNWIND) do not have a statistically significant effect on the attainment of the
ozone standard. July temperature (JTEMP) does have a statistically significant negative
effect on attainment. If the average MSA’s July average temperature were to rise by 1°,
it would be 4 percent less likely to attain the ozone standard.
In the geography category, the regional variables SOUTH and MIDWEST and the
coastal location variable all have a statistically significant effect on the attainment of the
ozone standard. The regional variable west does not have a statistically different effect
than the default region, north. SOUTH has a large statistically significant positive effect
on the attainment of the standard. This result suggests that all else equal, an MSA in the
south is 64 percent more likely to attain the ozone standard than an MSA in the north.
MIDWEST has a similar effect, indicating a 37 percent greater chance of attainment than
a similar MSA in the north. If an MSA is located in a coastal region, it is 33 percent more
likely to attain the ozone standard as an MSA located inland (See Table C18).
The lagged ozone value has a very large positive coefficient and is statistically
significant. The maximum EPA value for 1992 (MAXEPA1992), suggests that an
increase of 0.01 ppm in ozone in 1992 makes it 43.4 percent more likely that an MSA
will be in nonattainment in 1997.
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Recall, this variable is included as way to control for unobserved heterogeneity when
using proxy variables (Wooldridge 2000, 289). The IV probit results are discussed next.

IV Probit Results
In Table C20 the results from the IV probit variables are given. The CCG variable
still maintains significance at the 10 percent level and MPDI is marginally insignificant at
the 15 percent level while JDCNT is not statistically significant. In the instrumental
variables specification, the magnitude of the fragmentation variables increases, but so do
the standard errors. This is a common problem when using an instrumental variables’
approach to control for potential endogenous repressors (Wooldridge 2000, 475).
Because the Newey's efficient two-step estimator had to be used in Stata to get the IV
estimates to converge, we were unable to calculate marginal effects.43 Thus, it is not
possible to compare the magnitude of the change in effect of the IV estimates and the
probit estimates.
To test the possible endogeniety of DVMT and FAREPERMI in the probit
model, we conducted a Wald test as well as the two-stage endogeniety test suggested by
Wooldridge (2002). The Wald test is computed by Stata. When using the Newey twostep estimator, the residuals from the first stage regression are included in the second
stage estimation. The Wald test is a joint test of significance on those residuals'
coefficients. The Wald test statistic was 0.34, this is weak evidence against the null
hypothesis that DVMT and FAREPERMI are exogenous in equation (5.2).
43

In Stata using Newey’s two step estimator, the coefficients' t-statistics can be used to determine
statistical significance, but deriving the marginal effects from two-step models such
as this one are difficult and not currently available in Stata (Statacorp 2007, see also Wooldridge 2002,
section 15.7 for a discussion of a slightly simpler two-step probit estimator and the issues involved in
computing the marginal effects).
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In an effort to further test for endogeniety and perhaps determine which variable
might be exogenous, we computed a form of the augmented regression test suggested by
Wooldridge (2002). To perform the test, we ran the OLS regression on the suspected
endogenous variable, DVMT, and all other exogenous variables, including relevant
instruments and saved the residuals. We repeated this procedure with the second
endogenous variable, FAREPERMI. We then used these two residuals from the OLS
regression in the probit regression that includes the potentially endogenous variables. The
reported t-statistic on the residuals is a valid test of the null hypothesis that the variables,
DVMT and FAREPERMI are exogenous (Wooldridge 2002, 474). For the DVMT
residual, the test statistic was 0.4. For the FAREPERMI residual, the test statistic was
0.25. When a joint F-test was computed, the test statistic was 0.34. These tests support
the assumption of exogeneity DVMT and FAREPERMI. If DVMT and FAREPERMI
are exogenous, the IV probit estimator is less efficient than the probit estimator. This
results in larger standard errors in the IV estimation (Wooldridge 2000, 483). This is in
fact what we find in the results of the IV probit model reviewed below. The results of the
remaining independent variables are discussed next
Only those independent variables that were statistically significant, potentially
endogenous, or yield theoretically incongruent results in the probit models presented in
Table C17 will be discussed in this section. In general, the IV results support the probit
results. However, very few of the variables have statistically significant coefficients.
Again in this section the general focus will be on the MPDI model. However results tend
to be consistent across the three fragmentation models of interest MPDI, JDCNT, and
CCG.
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For the demographic and preference variables, the percent of college graduates
living in an MSA has a statistically significant effect on the attainment of the ozone
standard (see Table C20). For the IV probit model, the magnitude of the college effect is
greater than the probit result. Because marginal effects are not available, the percent
change on the likelihood of attainment for the average MSA cannot be estimated.
However, as the IV probit coefficient is larger than the probit coefficient it is possible
that the probit model underestimates the effect.
There are several variables of interest in the urban form group. The results of the
IV probit regression suggest that MSA location in a CMSA has a statistically significant
negative effect on attainment of the ozone standard. The magnitude of the CMSA effect
on attainment is greater in the IV specification than in the probit model. This suggests
that CMSAs are likely to have a negative effect on attainment. The two potentially
endogenous explanatory variables DVMT and FAREPERMI are discussed next.
The IV probit regression results suggest that higher values of daily vehicle miles
traveled (DVMT) decrease the likelihood of attainment. The IV probit estimate for
DVMT has a greater magnitude on the coefficient estimate than the probit model but a
larger standard error. Thus, the IV estimates offer evidence that the probit model
accurately estimates the negative effect DVMT has on attainment.
For the variable FAREPERMI, the IV probit results still show a negative effect on
attainment although it is not statistically significant. This is contrary to the intuition that
greater amounts of public transit should contribute to the attainment of the ozone
standard. This result will be revisited in the discussion section. A joint F-test on the four
variables CMSA, DVMT, FAREPERMI, DENSITY and COMTIME indicate that the
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null hypothesis that they all equal to zero cannot be rejected.
In the weather and geography group, the results of the IV probit model suggest
that higher July average temperature has a marginally statistically significant impact on
the attainment of the ozone standard. The magnitude of the coefficient is approximately
the same as the probit estimate. This suggests that the probit model accurately estimates
the effect of July temperatures on the likelihood of attainment of the ozone standard. The
positive effects of being in the south and midwest are also generally supported in the IV
specification (see Table C20). The magnitude of the lagged ozone value increases and
remains highly statistically significant.

OLS Results
Table C21 shows the results for the six fragmentation measures using the OLS
specification. In this specification the dependent variable is the calculated third highest
daily maximum EPA ozone value (MAXEPA). While the attainment status is determined
by the MAXEPA value, attaining the ozone standard and maintaining low ozone levels
are not necessarily congruent goals. Henderson (1996) shows that overall ozone levels
tend to rise under the one-hour ozone standard over time even though more counties
reached attainment. Only those MSAs in nonattainment have an incentive to reduce
ozone. As long as an MSA’s MAXEPA value does not cross the threshold, an MSA
faces no sanctions if its ozone level rises.
While the attainment of the ozone standard is what matters to MSAs, using the
value of MAXEPA as the dependent variable has several advantages. First, MAXEPA is
continuous. As discussed earlier, there is limited variation in attainment status over time.
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This is problematic for a panel data fixed effects approach. Using MAXEPA allows for
comparisons of results between the cross-sectional approach and the panel approach.
Second, MAXEPA results may be able to help us in the understanding of some of the
anomalous probit results. The specification for the OLS estimation is the same as for the
probit models. The fragmentation variables will be discussed first followed by the other
independent control variables.

OLS Fragmentation Variables
The MPDI variable which had a statistically significant effect on attainment of the
ozone standard only has a marginally significant effect on MAXEPA. If MPDI were to
increase by one unit, the MAXEPA value would increase by 0.0008 ppm. Increasing
MPDI by one standard deviation increases the ozone value by 0.0012 ppm. To try and
gauge the magnitude of this effect, we determine how many MSAs would cross the 0.12
ppm threshold for attainment if 0.0012 was added or subtracted from its MAXEPA value.
Only three MSAs in attainment would cross the 0.12 ppm threshold, decreasing the
number of attaining MSAs by 2.6 percent. Seven MSAs in nonattainment would fall
below the threshold, decreasing the number of nonattaining MSAs by 9.6 percent.
The empirical results suggest that MSAs with greater values for JDCNT are more
likely to have higher values of MAXEPA. Adding an additional jurisdiction increases
MAXEPA by 0.000014 ppm. If an MSA were to increase its number of jurisdictions by
one-half standard deviation, MAXEPA would be expected to increase by 0.00085 ppm.
This effect is of a lesser magnitude than the MPDI result.
The CCG variable also had a statistically significant effect on attainment of the

126
ozone standard in the probit models, but has only a marginally significant effect on
MAXEPA. If an MSA were to add one unit of CCG, the MAXEPA value would be
expected to decline by 0.00018 ppm. Again, using the one-half standard deviation value
used in the probit analysis, MAXEPA would decline by 0.0007 ppm. This is a smaller
effect than that for MPDI and would only cause three nonattaining MSAs to cross over
the attainment threshold. The other independent control variables are discussed next.

OLS Control Variables
This section will focus on the model including the MPDI as the measure of
fragmentation, as did the probit section. The MPDI is the most interesting fragmentation
measure that is also available to test in the panel framework. As in the probit
specification, the results across the three models of interest MPDI, JDCNT, CCG are
fairly consistent. As the EPA technically determines MSA attainment status from the
MAXEPA value, one would expect that MAXEPA and attainment status should be
correlated. However, as was discussed earlier, that is not the case. The general
empirical theory remains the same for both dependent variables. Independent variables
that should make it make it less likely to reach the attainment of the ozone standard
should also lead to increases in the value of MAXEPA. The following section discusses
the four independent variable groups, demographic and preference variables, urban form,
economic activity, and weather and geography.
None of the Demographic and preference variables have a statistically significant
effect on the MAXEPA ozone value. Even the college variable which had a statistically
significant impact in both probit and IV probit specifications does not even have a
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marginally significant effect on the MAXEPA ozone value.
Of the six urban form variables, only CMSA has a statistically significant impact
on the MAXEPA ozone value. If an MSA is part of a CMSA, it can be expected to have
.0054 ppm higher ozone value than an MSA not in a CMSA, all else equal (see Table
C21).
The results for the two endogenous variables DVMT and FAREPERMI differ
from the results of the probit model. The results in Table C21 indicate that DVMT has no
statistically significant effect on MAXEPA. This is contrary to the negative effect found
in the probit model. These differences will be further analyzed in the panel data section.
FAREPERMI has a negative effect on MAXEPA. However, the result is not
statistically significant. This result is in contrast to the probit result, which found that
higher values of FAREPERMI made it more likely that an MSA would be in
nonattainment. These incongruent results could be due to the nature of MAXEPA in
nonattainment MSAs. In nonattainment MSAs with high values for FAREPERMI, the
value of MAXEPA tends to be lower than the MAXEPA value for other nonattainment
MSAs with lower values of FAREPERMI. For instance, New York City with the highest
value for FAREPERMI of 516,642 and has a MAXEPA value of 0.137. While Houston,
TX has a relatively modest value for FAREPERMI of 15,696, but has a MAXEPA value
of 0.189. In fact, the top-five MSAs in FAREPERMI have an average FAREPERMI
value of 183,595 and average MAXEPA value of 0.13. While the five MSAs with the
highest MAXEPA values, that are not in the top-twenty for FAREPERMI, have an
average FAREPERMI value of 10,690 and an average MAXEPA value of 0.18.
The OLS results for economic activity differ slightly from the probit results. The
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variables, manufacturing employment and point source total emissions have a statistically
significant impact on MAXEPA. However employment growth (EMPGROWTH) does
not have a statistically significant effect on MAXEPA. Manufacturing employment has a
negative effect on MAXEPA. As there is a large variation in the MSA manufacturing
employment, we will compare the effects using one-half standard deviation of 45,615. 44
For an MSA that increases its manufacturing employment by one-half a standard
deviation, it would decrease MAXEPA by 0.0024 ppm.
Point source total emissions have a statistically significant positive effect on
MAXEPA. The marginally statistically significant negative value for point source total
squared suggests that the effect of point source emissions on MAXEPA increases as
emissions increase at a decreasing rate. The inflection point for this quadratic function,
in which additional point source emissions have zero effect on MAXEPA, is
approximately 149,000 tons of emissions. This value is similar to the value of 138,400
tons of emissions for the average MSA in the probit model.
The seven geography and weather variables have a similar effect on MAXEPA
ozone as they did on attainment status. Two of the weather variables have a statistically
significant effect on MAXEPA. Total ozone season rain has a statistically significant
negative effect on MAXEPA. If one standard deviation of total rain were added, 9.34
inches, then MSA would be expected to have 0.002 ppm lower values of MAXEPA.45
July average wind also has a positive statistically significant effect on MAXEPA.
This effect is unexpected and contrary to ozone formation theory. This result is
examined further in the IV section. July temperature has a marginally statistically
44
45

The mean value for manufacturing employment is 61,177 while the median is 28,008.
The average total July rain is 18.4 inches while the median is 19.3 inches .
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significant positive effect on MAXEPA.
The four geography variables do not appear to have a statistically significant
effect on MAXEPA. Only the regional variable south has a marginally statistically
significant effect on MAXEPA. The results suggest that an MSA in the south can be
expected to have a lower level of MAXEPA than an MSA in the north all things equal.
This is in agreement with the probit result. However a joint F-test on the four variables
COASTAL, SOUTH, MIDWEST, and WEST indicate that the null hypothesis that they
all equal zero cannot be rejected.
In the OLS specification the lagged variable MAXEPA in 1992 has a very large
positive coefficient and is statistically significant. The results suggest that if an
additional 0.01 ppm is added to the 1992 MAXEPA value, it will increase the 1997
MAXEPA value by 0.0065 ppm.

IV OLS Results
In order to accurately interpret the estimates from the IV specification one must
first determine the likelihood that the suspected variables are indeed endogenous. To test
the possible endogeniety of DVMT and FAREPERMI in the OLS model, we used the
augmented regression test suggested by Wooldridge (2000) for OLS. We ran the OLS
regression on the suspected endogenous variable, DVMT, and all other exogenous
variables, including relevant instruments and saved the residuals. We repeated this
procedure with the second endogenous variable, FAREPERMI. We then used these two
residuals from the OLS regression in the full OLS model that includes the potentially
endogenous variables. The reported t-statistic on the residuals is a valid test of the null
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hypothesis that the variables, DVMT and FAREPERMI, are exogenous (Wooldridge
2000, 484).
For the DVMT residual, the test statistic was 0.25. For the FAREPERMI
residual, the test statistic was 0.69. When a joint F-test was computed, the test statistic
was 0.06. This is an odd result. The individual t-tests suggest that neither variable is
endogenous, while the joint test shows that there is fairly strong evidence that at least one
of the variables is endogenous. One potential explanation for this could be
multicollinearity in the residuals. It is possible that multicollinearity among the two
residuals results in the t-test not having sufficient evidence to sort out the separate effects
of each residual. However, the two residuals still have a substantial combined effect on
the sum of squared errors which is what is used in the F-test.
A VIF test, run after the augmented regressions, produces VIF factors for the
DVMT and FAREPERMI residuals of 53 and 20 respectively. These high values suggest
that multicollinearity is present among the two residuals. Thus, the evidence of
endogeniety in the OLS model is somewhat mixed. It is possible that either DVMT or
FAREPERMI is endogenous. However, the evidence for the existence of endogeniety is
not overwhelming. Thus, the IV OLS estimators may be less efficient then the OLS
estimator. This will produce larger standard errors if both variables are exogenous. The
next section will discuss the results of the IV OLS regression.
In Table C22 the results from the instrumental variables regression are given for
MAXEPA. These results differ from the OLS fragmentation variable estimates. Only the
CCG variable maintains statistical significance at the 15 percent level. The standard
errors are larger; however, the signs on the coefficients remain the same.
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The results for the other control variables are also presented in Table C22 for the
IV OLS specification. Once again, the focus will be on the variables that were
statistically significant in the OLS specification. Generally, the IV results support the
OLS results. Once again, the IV specification yielded fewer statistically significant
coefficients than the OLS specification. The four groups of independent control variables
will be discussed briefly next.
None of the demographic and preference variables have a statistically significant
effect on the MAXEPA ozone value. For the urban form group, the inclusion of an MSA
in a CMSA raises the value of MAXEPA compared to stand alone MSAs. However, it is
not statistically significant.
In the economic activity group manufacturing employment still has a negative
effect on MAXEPA, but the effect is not statistically significant. While, greater point
source total emissions increases MAXEPA ozone values and is marginally statistically
significant. The signs on both coefficients support the OLS results.
For the geography and weather group, the IV results generally support the
anomalous OLS results. July average wind maintains a positive statistically significant
effect on MAXEPA. Examining the regional differences in Table C4 suggests a possible
explanation for this anomaly. Western MSAs have the highest average value for
MAXEPA of 0.123, they also have the highest average July wind at 9.7 miles per hour.
This average wind speed for the region is 1.3 miles per hour higher than the second place
region, the midwest. Perhaps the unique topography of mountain ranges and valleys
found in some western MSAs overcomes the usual effect that higher winds have on
ozone formation.
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July temperature no longer has a statically significant effect on MAXEPA in the
IV specification. The effect of total rain lessens the value of MAXEPA by about the same
magnitude as the OLS result however, the standard error increases.
For the geographical variables, only the regional variable SOUTH has a
marginally statistically significant effect on MAXEPA. The results suggest that an MSA
in the south can be expected to have higher levels of MAXEPA than an MSA in the north
all things equal. This result does not agree with the probit result. However a joint F-test
on the four variables COASTAL, SOUTH, MIDWEST, and WEST indicates that the null
hypothesis that they all equal zero cannot be rejected.
The lagged MAXEPA value is still positive and highly statistically significant.
The magnitude of the coefficient is about the same as the OLS value only increasing to
0.0067.

Discussion I
The cross sectional model provides evidence that fragmentation hinders an
MSA’s ability to reach the attainment of the ozone standard. However this effect is an
economically modest one. The model of primary interest is that of the attainment status
of the MSAs rather than the levels of ozone. Ultimately it is being in attainment of the
ozone standard that provides MSAs with incentives to reduce ozone levels. Thus, the
probit results are the more relevant than the OLS. Three of the six fragmentation
variables were statistically significant in the probit model. They were MPDI, JDCNT,
and CCG. For the OLS model only one fragmentation variable was statistically
significant, CCG.
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In the probit model an incremental increase in MPDI for the “average” MSA
decreased the likelihood of attainment by 10 percent. This change (a one unit increase in
MPDI) is very similar to the standard deviation for MPDI of 1.24. For the average MSA
that increased MPDI by one standard deviation from approximately 5.23 to 6.37 it would
be 12.4 percent less likely to be in attainment of the ozone standard. The two MSAs
mentioned previously, Tampa-St. Petersburg and New London, CT illustrate the
influence of expenditures and jurisdiction count on the variable MPDI. New London has
an MPDI value of 6.57; it has 124 jurisdictions and expenditures of approximately $463
million. The Tampa-St. Petersburg MSA has fewer jurisdictions with 90 and almost eight
times the expenditures of New London with $ 3.7 billion. However, it has a lower MPDI
value of 5.16. This highlights the effect that consolidation of expenditures can have on
MPDI and potentially attainment of the ozone standard.
The results for jurisdictional count (JDCNT) indicate that the “average” MSA,
which adds ten additional jurisdictions, is 1.4 percent less likely to reach the attainment
standard. Again examining the MSA of New London CT, it has 124 jurisdictions which
is close to the average of 121. If it were able to consolidate some of its 18 townships, six
cities, or 100 special districts it could conceivably decrease its jurisdiction count by 35
units (one-quarter of a standard deviation). This would increase the likelihood of
attainment of the ozone standard by 4.9 percent, a modest impact.
The “average” MSA that adds an additional unit of central city growth (CCG) is
5.8 percent more likely to meet the ozone attainment standard. The average value for
CCG is 5.02 and one half-standard deviation is 3.7. Thus, an MSA like Houston, TX
which has approximately the average value for CCG would be 21.5 percent more likely
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to attain the ozone standard if it could increase its CCG value by one-half a standard
deviation. For Houston, CCG would increase by one-half a standard deviation if Houston
central city expanded its land area by approximately 30 percent and if its central city
population grew by approximately 30 percent. 46 This type of consolidation seems rather
unlikely to occur.
The cross-sectional model provides evidence that fragmentation has an effect on
the attainment of the ozone standard. The probit model provides the strongest evidence
of the effect while the OLS results are only modestly supportive. This difference in
results is reasonable when considering the different nature of the dependent variable in
each specification. The OLS specification measures a continuous variable for which
governments that are in attaining MSAs have little incentive to lower. Thus, for the 114
MSAs in attainment, it is a poor approximation of jurisdictional behavior. The probit
model more accurately approximates the behavior of jurisdictions in all MSAs. Those
jurisdictions in MSAs that are in attainment have incentives to stay in attainment, while
those jurisdictions in nonatttaining MSAs have incentives to try to reach the ozone
standard. Thus, the probit model offers the correct measure of the environmental good,
“attainment of the ozone standard.”
As described in Chapter 2, Foster (1993) and Nelson and Foster (1999) introduced
three fragmentation variables that measured local government structure: central city
dominance, special district dominance, and county primacy. These three measures were
included in the analysis here and they did not have a statistically significant effect in any
of the models. This result is fairly consistent with the literature. Foster (1993) only

46

Any combination of central city land area expansion and central city population expansion that equaled
approximately 60 percent would result in a 3.07 increase in CCG.
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found special district dominance to be a consistent statistically significant predictor of
population growth. While, Nelson and Foster (1999) found that central city dominance
was a statistically significant predictor of population growth.
In comparing the statically significant measures of government fragmentation to
the insignificant measures, two key differences are apparent. First, population levels and
location do not appear to play a significant role in determining attainment of the ozone
standard. Central city dominance (CCD) and county primacy (CP) are both measures of
population distribution within an MSA, and neither is ever statistically significant. The
statistically significant variable, CCG measures the change in central city population
from 1950 to 2000 and incorporates growth in land area. The ability to expand the land
area of a central city and attract additional population appears to be a better indicator of
the power the central city has to influence ozone policy, rather than population levels.
MPDI is another statistically significant fragmentation measure that measures the
concentration of expenditures in the MSA. MPDI is not correlated with CCD or CP,
further illustrating the relative lack of importance population distribution seems to play in
determining attainment of the ozone standard.
It also appears that the specific purpose of an additional jurisdiction may not be
relevant for determining attainment of the ozone standard. Comparing SDD with the
statistically significant variable, JDCNT, it appears that general government
fragmentation plays a more important role in attainment of ozone standard than if that
jurisdiction is a general purpose or special purpose government.
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Additional Cross-Sectional Models
Several other specifications of equation 5.1 were formulated to test the robustness
of both the probit and OLS results discussed above. In an effort to determine whether
MSAs that are far from the one-hour attainment standard behave differently from MSAs
that are close to the standard, an interaction term was added. For all MSAs, the absolute
value of the difference between the one-hour ozone standard of 0.12 ppm and the 1997
MAXEPA value was calculated. All MSAs that were within 0.02 ppm of the ozone
standard were assigned the dummy variable of one. This corresponded to 119 MSAs.
This dummy was interacted with the three statistically significant fragmentation
variables, MPDI, JDCNT, and CCG in both the probit and OLS specifications.
The probit models produced no statistically significant effects for the interaction
term. In the OLS specification, the CCG interaction term was statistically significant,
while jurisdiction count was marginally significant at the 12 percent level. For CCG, the
result suggests that the effect of increasing CCG by one unit for MSAs within 0.02
absolute value of the standard decreases MAXEPA by 0.000042 ppm as compared to a
decrease of 0.000592 ppm for MSAs that are not within 0.02 ppm of the standard. This
result remains statistically significant in the IV specification as well. The results suggest
that MSAs that are closer to the standard benefit less from reductions in fragmentation as
measured by CCG.
In an effort to explain the unexpected positive sign on the college variable, we
tested several different model specifications. A quadratic term was added for the college
variable, and several different age and race terms were substituted in place of less than 25
and percent white. The college coefficient remained negative and statistically significant
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throughout all the different variations in the age and race variables such as percent
Hispanic, percent Black, percent over 65, and percent between 25 and 64. The quadratic
term had a positive coefficient but was not statistically significant. Further analysis of the
college variable will be undertaken in the panel data section.
Overall, the covariates that were statistically significant had the appropriate signs.
In the probit model, FAREPERMI, had an unexpected sign suggesting that MSAs with
greater transit, were more likely to be in nonattainment. FAREPERMI was not
statistically significant in the OLS model. In the IV probit specification FAREPERMI
maintains its negative sign but it is not statistically significant. Controlling for the
possible endogeniety of FAREPERMI is further complicated by the potential for transit
to be used historically to try and alleviate automobile congestion. Often, these efforts
were made before the clean air act required MSA action to reduce ozone. In most cases,
traffic congestion persisted even after transit was built. In the panel model it is possible to
control for these historical correlations.
Another anomalous result is that of DVMT in the OLS model. While DVMT was
not statistically significant, it has the incorrect negative sign, suggesting that MSAs with
more daily vehicle miles traveled are likely to have lower ozone readings. In the IV OLS
specification DVMT maintains its negative sign but is not statistically significant. This
result will be explored further in the panel model.
While endogeniety may be present in the ozone levels model (the cross section
OLS model), in the key model of interest, the attainment model, the assumption of
exogeneity of both DVMT and FAREPERMI seems to be reasonable.
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Given the lack of clear evidence, we next explore a subset of the models presented in this
section for which panel models may be estimated.

Panel Data
A key benefit of panel data is to be able to control for unobserved heterogeneity
when one or more of the independent variables is correlated with an unobservable. If the
unobservable characteristics are assumed to be fixed over time, the fixed effects estimator
can be used to produce unbiased estimates.
In the cross-sectional model recall two methods are utilized to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. The first is the use of proxy variables. The second is the use
of the lagged dependent variable. Using the panel data in a random effects probit
specification, we can test key variables to determine whether they might be correlated
with unobservables. If we find they are not, this serves to bolster the results in the crosssectional model.
There are several key variables of interest: the statistically significant
fragmentation variables MPDI and jurisdiction count (JDCNT), the potentially
endogenous variables, and the variables with unexplained results in the cross-section
models. Next is a general description of the fixed effects estimator (FE). Consider a
general model of the form in equation (5.13),

yit = β1 xit1 + β 2 xit 2 + ...β k xitk + ai + uit ,t = 1, 2,..., T .,

(5.13)

where yit is a variable measuring air quality and x1 - xk are the fragmentation variables

139
and control variables discussed earlier and ai is a vector of MSA fixed effects, and ui is
the error term. In order to remove ai we can average equation (5.13) overtime to get
equation (5.14).
yi = β1 xi1 + β1 xi 2 + ...β1 xik + ai + ui ,

T

T

t =1

t =1

(5.14)

where yi = T −1 ∑ yit , xi = T −1 ∑ xit and so on. Subtracting (5.14) from (5.13) yields
equation (5.15),

&&
yit = β1 &&
xit1 + β 2 &&
xit 2 + ...β k &&
xitk + u&&it ,t = 1, 2,..., T .

(5.15)

yit = yit1 − yi is the time demeaned data on y and &&
xit = xit1 − xi is the time
Where &&
demeaned data on x and so on. If the explanatory variables are assumed to be exogenous,
the fixed effects estimator is unbiased. The fixed effects estimator allows for the
explanatory variables to be correlated with the unobserved fixed effects, ai. However, if
the dependent variable yit is a binary variable that represents MSA attainment status and
does not change over the three periods of panel data, it too will be removed by
subtracting (5.14) from (5.13) (Green 1993 and Baltagi 1999). This is the case for 136 of
the MSAs in the sample, 75 are always in attainment and 61 are always in nonattainment
in the three panel periods. Thus the fixed effects specification is helpful for the
continuous dependent variable MAXEPA but not the binary dependent variable of
attainment status. The random effects (RE) model allows for the inclusion of such fixed
variables and as such, it is discussed next.
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Random effects allows for the inclusion of all the observations in the model
regardless of whether the dependent variable changes over time. The general random
effects model is as follows. Suppose equation (5.16) is an unobserved effects model
similar to equation (5.13),

yit = β 0 + β1 xit1 + β 2 xit 2 + ...β k xitk + ai + uit ,t = 1, 2,..., T .,

(5.16)

An intercept is included here so that ai can be assumed to have zero mean. However for
the RE model, we also assume that ai is uncorrelated with all independent variables.
Rewriting equation (5.16) with the composite error term vit = ai + uit gives equation (5.17)

yit = β 0 + β1 xit1 + β 2 xit 2 + ...β k xitk + υit ,t = 1, 2,..., T .

(5.17)

Since ai is in the composite error for each time period in equation (5.17), the composite
errors vit are serially correlated as expressed in equation (5.18),

Corr (uit , vis ) = σ a2 /(σ a2 + σ u2 ), t ≠ s.

(5.18)

General least-squares (GLS) can be used to resolve the serial correlation that is
necessarily present in random effects (Wooldridge 2000, 450). Wooldridge defines the
necessary transformation to estimate the serial correlation in the errors as equation (5.19),

λ = 1 − [σ a2 /(σ a2 + σ u2 )]1/ 2 ,

(5.19)
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where Lambda is between zero and one. The transformed equation is shown in (5.20),

yit − λ yi = β 0 (1 − λ ) + β1 ( xit1 − λ xi1 ) + ... + β k ( xitk − λ xik ) + (υit − λυi ) = 1, 2,..., T . (5.20)
A more general way to think of the random effects estimator is that it is a combination of
the fixed effects estimator and a λ -weighted value of the between estimator. Recall that
the between estimator is defined in equation (5.14).
The random effects estimator crucially depends on ai being uncorrelated with any
independent variable. If the random effects estimator is used when ai is correlated with
the independent variables, the estimates are generally inconsistent (Wooldridge 2000,
453). Hausman 1978 devised a test to check this condition of the random effects model.
The Hausman test compares the results from fixed effects and random effects models and
tests if they are equal. However, in my data is not possible to conduct the fixed effects
estimation on the full sample. Thus the Hausman test is not practical.
In a test suggested by Gould (2001) one uses the relationship of the between
estimator (BE) and the fixed effects estimator to determine whether the random effects
estimator is biased. The intuition behind the test is similar to that of the Hausman test. If
all of the independent variables are uncorrelated with ai, the fixed effects estimates
should be equivalent to the random effects estimates. Since the random effects estimator
is a matrix weighted average of the fixed effects and the between estimator, it can be
shown that if the random effects assumptions are satisfied the fixed effects estimates are
equivalent to the between estimates (Gould 2001).
The test requires that the random effects estimator be broken down to its
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component parts of the fixed effects estimator and between estimator for each
independent variable for which we think there is a possible correlation with ai. An F-test
can be used for each variable’s two components, the fixed effects estimate and the
between estimate. The null hypothesis is that the fixed effects estimate equals the
between estimate. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at a reasonable level of
statistical significance, it suggests evidence that the selected variable is not correlated
with ai. To fully simulate a Hausman test, one must run a joint F-test on all the
independent variables. However if there are variables that appear to be correlated with ai,
one can leave them out of the Joint f-test and test whether the remaining variables are
uncorrelated with ai.
The Gould test has several benefits for my analysis. Because the test is run within
the random effects framework, it allows for comparisons using the full sample. Also
unlike the Hausman test, which tests all independent variables at once, the Gould test
allows for selective testing of individual dependent variables. Thus the Gould test can
serve as an additional endogeniety test for key variables in the cross-sectional models. If
it can be shown that the independent variable is not correlated with ai in the panel model,
it is suggestive evidence that the variable is not correlated with unobservables in the
cross-sectional model. As was discussed earlier, the effects of endogeniety or unobserved
heterogeneity have similar results on regression estimates and are controlled for in similar
manner. For some of the variables in the cross-sectional analysis, the IV technique was
used to try and control for potential endogeniety. However, not all variables had suitable
instruments. Thus, if unobserved heterogeneity is not present in the panel model it
bolsters the claims for exogeneity in the cross-sectional models.
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Panel Results for the Dependent Variable of Attainment
Table C23 shows the panel probit specification results for two of the three
fragmentation measures that had explanatory power in the cross-section models.47 The
dependent variable is the binary variable, attainment of the ozone standard. The number
of observations is 187 MSAs, the same as the cross-sectional model. The models are
generally weaker overall with fewer statistically significant variables.
The empirical results suggest that MSAs with higher values of MPDI and
jurisdiction count (JDCNT) are less likely to meet the ozone standard. The results for the
model with the metropolitan power diffusion index (MPDI) indicate that an MSA which
adds one additional unit of MPDI, is 20 percent less likely to reach the attainment
standard. The random effects result also supports the probit result in the cross-sectional
model, but it is approximately twice as large.
Using the marginal effects, the “average” MSA that adds an additional unit of
jurisdictional count (JDCNT) is 0.2 percent less likely to reach the attainment standard.
This result is in general agreement with the cross-sectional results that found the marginal
effect of jurisdiction count to be 0.14 percent. This result provides additional support for
the cross-sectional model.
In order to determine the validity of the random effects estimates, we conducted
the Gould test on both models. In model 1 that contains MPDI, college and MPDI
variables had statistically significant F-statistics at the 1 percent level. This suggests that
these variables may be correlated with unobservables. To test this prediction, we
conducted a joint F-test in model 1 with all variables included. This produced an F-
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Recall, that one of the measures, central city growth (CCG) is only available in the cross-sectional model
and thus is not included in table C23.
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statistic with a p-value of 0.0003, indicating that one could reject the null hypothesis that
all pairs of estimates were equal. A second F-test was conducted, dropping the likely
correlated variable college. The resulting F-statistic had a p-value of 0.16. This is weak,
suggestive evidence that the remaining variables of interest are not correlated with
unobservables. If COLLEGE and MPDI are dropped, the resulting F-statistic had a pvalue of 0.65. This is considerably stronger evidence that the remaining variables are not
correlated with unobservables.
Thus, the results of the random effects estimates for the variables MPDI and
COLLEGE should be viewed cautiously. It is also possible that the remaining variables
are also inconsistent if they are correlated with the either MPDI or COLLEGE
(Wooldridge 2000, 166). 48 Examining the correlation coefficients for COLLEGE, it
appears to be relatively uncorrelated with any of the other variables in the estimation
equation. MPDI has correlation coefficients between 0.4 and 0.6 with several of the other
control variables, including employment, gross metropolitan product, manufacturing
employment, DVMT and point source total emissions. Thus, the estimates in model 1
should be viewed cautiously.
In model 2 which uses JDCNT as the fragmentation measure, only COLLEGE
had statistically significant F-statistic at the one percent level. In model 2 a joint F-test
without COLLEGE generated an F-statistic with a p-value of 0.54. As COLLEGE
appears to have little correlation with the other control variables, the results for other
covariates in model 2 are not as likely to be inconsistent. These results for models 1 and 2
48

If any independent variable is correlated with ui, generally all estimators are inconsistent. If only x1 is

correlated with ui than

β̂

1

will be inconsistent. If x1 and x2 to are correlated, βˆ2 will also be inconsistent.

However, if x1 and x2 are uncorrelated βˆ2 will not be inconsistent (Wooldridge 2000, 166).
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and their implications on the cross-sectional model will be discussed in greater detail in
the summary section. Next we will examine the other covariates of interest.
The demographic and preference variable, COLLEGE, has a statistically
significant positive effect on attainment in both random effects models 1 and 2. This is in
contrast to the results in the cross-sectional probit model which found a statistically
significant negative effect on attainment. As was noted earlier, the college variable is
likely correlated with unobservables in both models 1 and 2 and thus is inconsistent. Due
to this correlation, a fixed effects approach is recommended. The COLLEGE variable
will be revisited in the next section discussing MAXEPA in which fixed effects
estimation is available.
The urban form variable of DVMT was found to be exogenous in the crosssectional probit model. That result is supported by the random effects panel model as
DVMT is unlikely to be correlated with unobservables in the random effects panel model.
However, DVMT is not a statistically significant predictor of attainment in either model 1
or 2.
The economic activity variables were judged to be exogenous by economic
intuition in the cross-sectional probit model. The assertion is bolstered by the results of
the Gould test for both models 1 and 2. None of the economic activity variables, log
employment, manufacturing employment, or point source total emissions were found to
be likely correlated with unobservables in the random effects specification. Neither log
employment nor manufacturing employment is statistically significant in either model.
Point source total emissions have a marginal statistically significant negative effect at the
15 percent level on attainment of the ozone standard. This result supports the result found
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in the probit cross-sectional specifications.
The weather variables of July temperature (JTEMP) and total ozone season rain
(TTLRAIN) offer mixed support for the results of the probit cross-sectional model.
TTLRAIN has a positive and statistically significant effect on the attainment of the ozone
standard in both models 1 and 2. While total rain did not have a statistically significant
effect in the probit cross-section model, the random effects result is in agreement with
ozone formation theory.
July temperature (JTEMP) does have a statistically significant positive effect on
attainment in the random effects model 2 and a marginally insignificant positive result at
the 15 percent level in model 1. This is contrary to the result found in the cross-sectional
probit model as well as contrary to ozone formation theory. This result will be revisited
in the section discussing the dependent variable MAXEPA in which a fixed effects
approach can be utilized.

Results for the dependent Variable MAXEPA
Table C24 shows the results for the two fragmentation measures using the random
effects estimator and the panel fixed effects estimator with the dependent variable of
MAXEPA. The variable MAXEPA is a continuous variable thus no observations are
dropped due to lack of variation. If the random effects estimator is unbiased, it is
preferred as it has greater efficiency than the fixed effects estimator. The random effects
estimator will be discussed first.
The random effects results from Table C24 indicate that MPDI has a positive but
statistically insignificant effect on MAXEPA. This result is similar to that of the OLS
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cross-section results. In model 2 JDCNT has the incorrect sign and is highly insignificant.
In order to determine the validity of the random effects estimates, we conducted
the Gould test on both models. In model 1 that contains MPDI, the variables of DVMT,
Density, and GMP had statistically significant F-statistics at the one-percent level. This
suggests that these variables may be correlated with unobservables. To further explore
this proposition, we conducted a joint F-test in model 1 with all variables included. This
produced an F-statistic with a p-value of 0.004, indicating that one could reject the null
hypothesis that all pairs of fixed effects and between estimates were equal. Additional Ftests were conducted including different combinations of the three variables. All
generated statistically significant F-statistics. Only dropping all three variables DVMT,
DENSITY, and GMP generated a reasonable F-statistic with a p-value of 0.32, which
suggests that the remaining control variables are not correlated with unobservables.
Model 2 generated similar results as model 1.
DVMT, DENSITY, and GMP are reasonably correlated with other covariates in
the model. Thus, the random effects estimates presented in Table C24 are all likely to be
inconsistent. As such, we will focus the remainder of the discussion on the fixed effects
estimates in Table C24.
The fixed effects results from Table C24 indicate that as MPDI increases
MAXEPA also increases however, the effect is not statistically significant. In model 2
JDCNT also has a positive effect on MAXEPA but is not statistically significant. Both
results offer modest support of the OLS cross-sectional model. We next examine the
other covariates of interest; the urban form variable DVMT, will be addressed last.
The college variable has a positive effect on MAXEPA but is not statistically

148
significant. This is suggestive evidence that MSAs that increase the percentage of
residents with a college degree have higher levels of MAXEPA, all else equal. The July
temperature variable also has a positive but insignificant effect on MAXEPA.
One of the covariates that have inconsistent results is the variable COLLEGE. It
has a highly statistically significant negative effect on attainment of the ozone standard in
the cross-sectional probit models, but is not statistically significant in any of the OLS
cross-sectional models. To further explore this inconsistency in the models, we interacted
COLLEGE with attainment status. The results indicate that COLLEGE has a very small
negative effect on MAXEPA but it is not statistically significant, while the interaction
term has a larger positive statistically significant effect of 0.0003 on MAXEPA. This
suggests that adding college graduates to attaining MSAs increases MAXEPA by a
greater amount than nonattainment MSAs. A joint F-test produced a statistically
significant p-value at the one percent level. As the 95 percent confidence interval for the
COLLEGE estimate is between -0.00065 and 0.00053, the overall effect is unknown.
However, it is likely that adding additional college graduates to nonattainment MSAs has
almost zero effect on MAXEPA, while adding college graduates to MSAs in attainment
has a small positive effect on MAXEPA.
The incongruence of the COLLEGE estimates in the cross-sectional results and
random effects results is thus likely due to two factors. First the COLLEGE variable is
correlated with unobservables and is inconsistent. However, as college is uncorrelated
with the other covariates, this bias should not contaminate the other coefficient estimates.
Second, COLLEGE seems to affect MSAs in attainment differently from those in
nonattainment.
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In the OLS cross-sectional models DVMT was not statistically significant. In the
fixed effects specification DVMT has a negative and statistically significant effect on
MAXEPA. This suggests that as DVMT increases MAXEPA decreases. This result is
contrary to ozone formation theory. As was discussed earlier, automobile emissions are a
major source of ozone precursor emissions that have a direct link to vehicle miles
traveled. The fixed effects results rely on the assumption of exogenous independent
variables. If DVMT is indeed endogenous this could bias the results. In order to control
for the potential endogeniety of DVMT, we conducted an IV panel regression with the
same instruments for DVMT, as used in the cross-sectional model; state level gas tax’s
and drivers’ licenses. DVMT still maintains its negative effect on MAXEPA however,
now it is not statistically significant. The other covariates maintain the same signs
however the standard errors generally increase.
In order to further evaluate the DVMT variable, we interacted DVMT with
attainment status. The results indicate that DVMT has a negative effect on MAXEPA but
that effect is not statistically significant. However, the interaction term has a positive and
statistically significant effect. A joint F-test yields a statistically significant p-value at the
ten percent level. These results indicate that additional DVMT affects MSAs in
attainment differently from those in nonattainment.
An additional cofounder for the DVMT variable is its trend relative to area total
emissions. From 1992 until 2002 DVMT has increased by 27 percent. While area total
emissions have decreased by 24 percent. This suggests that while DVMT had been
increasing the amount of ozone precursor pollutants being emitted has been decreasing.
A lower level of precursor emissions is likely to lower MAXEPA levels.
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Finally, using the panel data fixed effects model, we find suggestive evidence to
support the contention that attainment status is the more important motivator than ozone
levels (MAXEPA) for MSAs. We added an interaction term of attainment status and
fragmentation to the fixed effects model. The result for the MPDI term yield a positive
coefficient of 0.0003 and a p-value 0.8, the interaction term generates a coefficient of
0.00091 and statistically significant p-value of 0.009. A joint F-test yields a statistically
significant p-value of 0.02. This is suggestive evidence that MSAs in attainment behave
differently than those in nonattainment. Adding an additional unit of MPDI to an MSA
in attainment increases its MAXEPA level by almost 0.001 ppm more than an MSA in
nonattainment. Thus, MSAs in attainment are likely to have greater increases in ozone
levels due to increases in MPDI all else equal. A similar effect was found for jurisdiction
count. This is suggestive evidence that MSAs in attainment are not as concerned with
MAXEPA levels as long as they remain below the attainment threshold.

Discussion II
The panel data model’s primary purpose is that of a robustness check on the
cross-sectional results. As such, the panel data model offers four important benefits.
First, it provides a way to test for unobserved heterogeneity. Second, it allows for a
robustness check of the estimates of marginal effects for two fragmentation variables of
interest. Third, it is useful to clarify the results from covariates that are potentially
endogenous, or generated estimates that switched signs in various specifications, or were
contrary to economic theory. Fourth, it is possible to verify the appropriateness of the
probit specification versus the OLS specification.
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One of the key benefits of the panel data specification is the ability to control for
unobserved heterogeneity as well as test for its presence. Using Gould's variation on the
Hausman test, we were able to test two of the individual fragmentation variables as well
as many of the important covariates correlations with ai, an unobserved effect. The
results generally support the main cross-sectional probit results which are the models of
interest.
In model 1 in the random effects specification with MPDI as the fragmentation
variable, recall that the marginal effect of an additional unit of MPDI was approximately
a 20 percent decrease in the likelihood of attainment of the ozone standard. However, the
MPDI variable was found to be correlated with unobservables, thus its estimate is
inconsistent. If MPDI is positively correlated with ai, then we can infer that the value of
the MPDI estimate is biased upward. However, ai is unobservable, thus it is difficult to
assess the direction of the potential correlation. But we do have several useful points of
reference as well as economic intuition that can give some guidance as to the direction of
the correlation. The possibility that MPDI is negatively correlated with ai is not a great
concern. If that were the case, it indicates that the 20 percent value generated in the
random effects model is biased toward zero, thus the actual effect is larger. In addition,
the cross-sectional value of 10 percent would also be biased downwards, and thus be a
minimum value. A negative correlation would suggest that MPDI has a very large
negative effect on the likelihood of attainment. This seems unlikely given the data. MPDI
has held fairly constant over the 10 year period, while 51 MSAs have reached attainment.
The primary concern is the effect a positive correlation would have on the
estimate of MPDI. If MPDI is positively correlated with ai, the estimates of MPDI will be
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biased upward, away from zero. If this bias is large enough, the actual effect MPDI has
attainment could be close to zero. What is a reasonable upper limit on the effect MPDI
has on attainment? This is a difficult question to answer. If the random effect estimate is
inconsistent, the cross-sectional estimate is also likely to be inconsistent. Thus, the
consistent value estimate is likely to be less than the marginal effect of 10 percent.
A reasonable range for the estimate might be determined whether we could
estimate a lower bound for MPDI. MPDI is highly correlated with jurisdiction count.
Jurisdiction count was found to be uncorrelated with ai in the random effects model. We
might be able to use the relationship between jurisdiction count and MPDI to get a
reasonable estimate on the lower bound of the MPDI effect.
Again referring to the example used in the cross-sectional discussion, TampaSt. Petersburg has approximately the average value for MPDI of 5.16 and has 90
jurisdictions, while New London Connecticut has an MPDI value of 6.57, approximately
one-half a standard deviation greater than Tampa-St. Petersburg. New London has a
jurisdiction count of 124. This difference of 34 jurisdictions is approximately equal to
one-quarter of a standard deviation for the variable JDCNT. Recall increasing
jurisdiction count by one-quarter of a standard deviation decreased the likelihood of
attainment by approximately 5 percent. This suggests that the lower bound for the MPDI
effect might be approximately 5 percent. Thus, a likely range for the effect MPDI has on
the attainment of the ozone standard is that an increase of one unit of MPDI, decreases
the likelihood of attainment of the ozone standard by more than five percent but less than
10 percent.
It is possible for MSAs to change their value of MPDI by one-half a standard
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deviation. In the period from 1992-2002, nine MSAs changed MPDI by approximately
1.24, one increased its MPDI, while eight decreased by approximately 1.24 or more.
This indicates that it is possible for MSAs to change their MPDI to a degree that is
statistically relevant for ozone formation. In addition, this list includes several large
MSAs, in which if the ozone standard was obtained, could potentially benefit several
million people. This list includes Detroit, Newark, St. Louis, and Philadelphia.
The jurisdiction count results from the random effects model support the results
from the cross-sectional probit model. The random effects results indicate that
jurisdiction count has a negative statistically significant effect on the attainment of the
ozone standard. The marginal effects estimate for the random effects model is a 0.2
percent decrease in the likelihood of attainment compared to 0.14 percent decrease for the
probit cross-sectional model.
Using the Gould test, jurisdiction count was found to be uncorrelated with
unobservables. Thus, the results from both random effects model and the cross-sectional
probit model are likely to be consistent. Recall the example of an MSA that decreases its
jurisdiction count by one-quarter standard deviation, 35 jurisdictions, is approximately 5
percent more likely to reach attainment.
To determine whether this is a likely occurrence for MSAs, we examined the
panel data. Nine MSAs increased their jurisdiction count by 35 or more, while one
decreased its jurisdiction count by 35 or more. Again, some large MSAs are in this list.
Those MSAs that increased by 35 jurisdictions or more include Chicago, Nassau Suffolk,
Atlanta, and Denver, only Philadelphia decreased by 35 or more. Another large MSA,
Baltimore, decreased by 26 jurisdictions. Once again due to the populations of these
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larger MSAs, millions of people could potentially be affected if the changes in the
number of jurisdictions facilitated a change of attainment status for the ozone standard.
The results from the panel data generally confirmed the cross-sectional results in
determinations of endogeniety as well as clarifying some enigmatic results from other
covariates. An important consideration in the empirical specification is the potential
endogeniety of DVMT. Using the augmented regression tests in the cross-sectional
probit model indicated that DVMT was not endogenous in that specification. However,
running the Durbin, Watson, Hu augmented regression test in the OLS specification
indicated that DVMT was endogenous.
The results from the Gould test on DVMT in both the attainment specification and
the MAXEPA specification support the cross-sectional endogeniety tests. DVMT is
found to be uncorrelated with unobservables in the attainment specification. This is
suggestive evidence that DVMT is not endogenous. However, in the MAXEPA
specification, which coincides with the OLS specification in the cross-sectional tests,
DVMT was found to be correlated with unobservables. This result supports the finding
of endogeniety in the cross-sectional OLS specification.
The DVMT results overall are hard to interpret. In the cross-sectional probit
model, DVMT has a statistically significant negative effect on attainment. This is the
theoretically expected result. That result is generally not supported in the random effects
model. In model 2, which contains jurisdiction count, DVMT has a statistically
significant positive effect on attainment. In the cross-sectional OLS specification,
DVMT has a negative effect on MAXEPA, but it is not statistically significant. In the
fixed effects specification, DVMT has a statistically significant negative effect on
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DVMT. This suggests that as DVMT decreases MAXEPA values increase.
In an effort to further explore these conflicting results several different fixed
effects specifications were utilized. First a fixed effects instrumental variable regression
was run. The results for the IV fixed effect specification indicate that DVMT still has a
negative effect on MAXEPA, but it is not statistically significant. DVMT was also
interacted with attainment; the interaction term suggests that additional DVMT has
different effects on MSAs depending on attainment status. While the total effect of
increasing DVMT is uncertain, an MSA in attainment will likely experience a greater
increase in MAXEPA levels due to increases in DVMT than a similarly situated MSA in
nonattainment. As was noted earlier, MSAs in attainment seem to behave differently
from those in nonattainment with regard to ozone levels. The DVMT result may be
further evidence of this dichotomy.
In addition trends in DVMT, emissions, and attainment may also contribute to
these results. DVMT is increasing in the period of 1992 to 2002, while area total
emissions are decreasing. Also 51 MSAs reached the ozone attainment standard during
the period. While no MSAs that started the period in attainment, ended it in
nonattainment. The decoupling of DVMT and ozone levels is also supported by the fact
that a small segment of the nation’s automobile fleet account for a large portion of ozone
forming emissions (Kahn, 2001).
Another covariate with unexpected results in the cross-sectional specification was
the college variable. In the cross-sectional probit model college has a statistically
significant negative effect on attainment. In the random effects model college is found to
have a statistically significant positive effect on attainment. However, college was found
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to be correlated with unobservables. Thus, the results in both cross-sectional and random
effects models are likely to be inconsistent. Once again, this inconsistency may be due to
the differences in behavior for MSAs in attainment or nonattainment.
In the fixed effects model an interaction term of college and attainment was
added. The results suggest that adding additional college graduates to an MSA in
attainment increases the value of MAXEPA, while adding college graduates to
nonattainment MSAs has almost zero effect on MAXEPA levels. This result suggests
that the overall effect on attainment is likely to be minimal.

Summary
In summary three fragmentation variables were found to have statistically
significant effects on MSA attainment of the ozone standard in the cross-sectional model.
Higher levels of MPDI and jurisdiction count were found to hinder attainment of the
ozone standard, while greater values of central city growth aided in reaching the
attainment standard. The panel data results generally support the results from the crosssectional models, as well as help to resolve some important estimation issues. MPDI was
found to be correlated with unobservables in the random effects model, indicating that the
cross-sectional results for MPDI may be biased as well. However, no such problem was
found with the jurisdiction count variable. MPDI and jurisdiction count are highly
correlated and this relationship was used to estimate a reasonable range for the effect
MPDI has on the attainment of the ozone standard. MPDI is a nuanced measure of
fragmentation, incorporating several elements of the other fragmentation variables such
as jurisdiction count and a form of central city dominance. However, it appears that the
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simple measure, jurisdiction count, is a reasonable proxy for the effect MPDI has on an
MSA’s ability to attain the ozone standard. The implications these results have for
environmental quality, as well as local government form decisions will be discussed next
in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This dissertation contributes to two bodies of literature, that of environmental
federalism and that of urban growth and local government form. In the area of
environmental federalism this dissertation extends the collective action model to include
local governments. An empirical framework is developed that includes cross-sectional
and panel data. In the urban growth and local government form literature, this dissertation
comprehensively tests many existing measures of local government fragmentation within
an environmental policy framework. It also modifies and extends some of the
fragmentation variables. The results suggest that local government fragmentation does
hinder MSAs from attaining of the ozone standard.
The remainder of this chapter will address the following. First, the contributions
this dissertation has made to the environmental federalism literature are reviewed,
followed by a discussion of the contributions made to the urban growth and local
government form literature. Next, we review the basic empirical estimation structure and
results. Some policy implications of the results will then be discussed and finally some
areas of future research will be offered.
The environmental federalism literature has traditionally focused on jurisdictions
as environmental standard setting entities. In this context, the literature consists primarily
of theoretical inquiries on the outcomes of subnational governments such as states,
setting environmental standards (See Oates and Schwab 1988). In this framework,
environmental goals are endogenous for the decision-making agents. This
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dissertation extends the literature to include how the number of local jurisdictions within
the borders of an MSA affects its ability to meet exogenously set air quality standards.
Another usual assumption in the environmental federalism literature is that
decisions made by one jurisdiction do not affect the environmental quality of another
jurisdiction. In particular, it is assumed that pollution does not spillover across borders.
However for an MSA that includes many jurisdictions in close geographic proximity,
clearly decisions made by one jurisdiction will have effects on its neighbors. Thus, the
effects of border spillovers are important to incorporate into a model of local government
fragmentation and environmental quality.
We find the collective action model is well suited for modeling why
environmental quality may be under provided in an MSA composed of many jurisdictions
when spillovers are present. The collective action model seeks to explain why individual
rationality does not guarantee an outcome that is rational for the group (Olson 1965). In
some cases, such as the provision of public goods, individual rationality predicts an
outcome that is clearly at odds with the Pareto efficient outcome for the group. This
notion is embodied in the Samuelson social welfare function (Samuelson 1954). Mueller
(1989) showed that for Cobb Douglas utility functions that Olson's notion that increased
N would lead to larger departures from an efficiency standard was true. In this
dissertation, we adapt the Mueller framework to describe jurisdictional choice over
voluntary decisions to increase levels of environmental quality by taking costly actions.
The empirical literature on urban growth and local government form is
predominantly concerned with population growth and economic development of a region.
In particular, researchers examine whether fragmentation measures can explain observed
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growth patterns in metropolitan areas. This literature attempts to resolve the question of
whether fewer larger centralized local governments or many smaller decentralized local
governments are the most conducive to growth and development.
In the urban growth and local government form literature the variables used to
measure local government fragmentation can be grouped as follows. First, “simple”
counts of governments, such as jurisdiction count and relative fragmentation (JDCNT
RELFRAG see table 4.1 for a description), these are used by Razin and Rosentraub
(2000) and Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2002). Razin and Rosentraub find that relative
fragmentation does not have a statistically significant effect on urban sprawl. The urban
sprawl dependent variable is an index based on various population and housing density
measures. Carruthers and Ulfarsson found that higher levels of relative fragmentation are
associated with lower population densities and higher property values. No direct effect
on public service expenditures was found. Less fragmented metropolitan areas also
tended to cover more land.
Second some researchers have focused on local government structure and created
the measures of special district dominance, central city dominance, and county primacy,
(SDD, CCD, and CP see table 4.1 for a description).They were initially used by used by
Foster (1993) and then Nelson and Foster (1999). Foster found that special district
dominance had a statistically significant negative effect on population growth. While
Nelson and Foster found that central city dominance had a statistically significant
positive effect on MSA income growth and special district dominance was marginally
statistically significant and negative.
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Additional measures created in the past research include the metropolitan power
diffusion index (MPDI see Table C3 for a description) developed by Miller (1999) and
central city elasticity used by Rusk (1995). These measures are more complex and try to
capture the more nuanced relationships between the jurisdictions of the MSA. The MPDI
attempts to measure the political effects of fragmentation based on jurisdictional fiscal
power. The goal of the central city elasticity measures is to try and capture the effect of a
dynamic growing central city on a metropolitan area population and economic growth.
The measure we use, central city growth (CCG see Table C3 for a description) is
computed differently from Rusk’s, but the intent is the same.
Miller found that MSAs have become more diffuse since 1972. He also found that
the MPDI was correlated with the absolute number of municipal governments but
uncorrelated with population growth. Rusk (1995) compares different pairs of
metropolitan areas and finds that the metropolitan areas with more elastic central cities
had higher rates of population and economic growth.
This dissertation extends the literature by examining the effect that local
government fragmentation has on regional environmental quality. In addition, it extends
the use of the computationally complex measure of MPDI to include additional local
government expenditures as well as additional years of panel data. This dissertation also
comprehensively tests all of the above listed fragmentation measures to determine which
might affect regional environmental quality.
Two empirical estimation strategies were implemented, a cross-sectional
approach and a panel data approach. The cross-sectional approach estimates the effects
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that long-term changes in local government structure have on attaining the ozone
standard by measuring differences across MSAs. Several key econometric issues had to
be resolved in order to successfully estimate the cross-sectional model. First, suitable
proxy variables had to be found to estimate the price of the public good, which is
unobservable. Second, the potential endogeniety of the public transit variable, fare per
mile (FAIRPERMI) as well as daily vehicle miles traveled (DVMT) had to be controlled
for with an instrumental variables approach. Third, unobserved heterogeneity had to be
controlled for by using a lagged dependent variable.
The panel data model’s primary purpose was that of a robustness check on the
cross-sectional results. As such, the panel data model served several important functions.
First, it provided a way to test for unobserved heterogeneity. Due to the lack of variation
in the binary dependent variable ATTAIN (whether or not an MSA is in attainment of the
ozone standard), fixed effects estimation was not possible, nor was a traditional Hausman
test available. Using a procedure developed by Gould (2001), we were able to determine
whether key variables were correlated with unobservables. Second, it allowed for a
robustness check of the estimates of marginal effects for two fragmentation variables of
interest, MPDI and JDCNT. Third, it was useful to clarify the results from covariates that
were potentially endogenous such as DVMT. Fourth, it was possible to verify the
appropriateness of the probit specification versus the OLS specification.
Three of the six tested fragmentation variables were found to have statistically
significant effects on MSA attainment of the ozone standard in the cross-sectional model.
Higher levels of MPDI and jurisdiction count were found to hinder attainment of the
ozone standard, while greater values of central city growth aided in reaching the
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attainment standard. Generally, the panel data results’ supported the results from the
cross-sectional models. In addition, the panel model resolved some important estimation
issues. MPDI was found to be correlated with unobservables in the random effects
model, indicating that the cross-sectional results for MPDI may be biased as well. This
was not an issue for the variable jurisdiction count. MPDI and jurisdiction count are
highly correlated with each other and this relationship was used to estimate a reasonable
range for the effect MPDI might have on the attainment of the ozone standard. This range
suggests that a one unit increase in the MPDI, for an MSA, is likely to lead to a decrease
in the chance of attainment of the ozone standard by greater than five percent but less
than ten percent.
MPDI is a nuanced measure of fragmentation as it quantifies the entire power
structure among all the MSA’s jurisdictions. It is the sum of the square root of each
jurisdictions ratio of its expenditures to total MSA expenditures. Local jurisdiction
budgets are very fungible and as such it is likely that MPDI captures the political will and
local residential tastes and preferences. Thus, it is not surprising that MPDI might be
correlated with unobservables. Jurisdiction count, while “simple,” is not nearly as
dynamic a measure as MPDI. It takes many years and sometimes decades to create a new
city. The amount of counties in the country has not changed much in 50 years. Special
districts are more easily created but the number of special districts still has considerably
less variation than jurisdictional expenditures. Thus, it seems reasonable that JDCNT was
not found to be correlated with unobservables. In the next section we explore the results
from the cross-sectional probit model highlighting the effect that changes in the three
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statistically significant fragmentation variables of MPDI, JDCNT and CCG, would have
on a selected group of populous MSAs.

Changes in Fragmentation and Attainment of the Ozone Standard
This section presents illustrative examples of how fragmentation might hinder
attainment of the ozone standard in a select group of MSAs. Table C25 shows the ten
most populous MSAs within 0.01 ppm of the ozone standard. Only MSAs not in CMSAs
and that are not considered outliers were considered. Also the MSA of Atlanta is
included. From these 11 MSAs, we selected one MSA that had close to the average value
for each of three variables of interest (MPDI, JDCNT, and CCG) to focus on in my
discussion. The three MSAs chosen are Tampa-St. Petersburg for MPDI, Phoenix for
JDCTN, and Columbus, Ohio for CCG. Again, Atlanta will also be discussed in detail as
it is of local interest. Next, using these four MSAs, we discuss the effects that changes in
the three variables would have on the likelihood of attainment of the ozone standard.
In order to determine the effect of changing MPDI, we calculated the incremental
effect that the average county, city, town, or special district would have on MDPI for
each MSA.49 For instance, in the MSA of Atlanta there are 20 counties, 107 cities, and
106 special districts. The average expenditure for a county is approximately $126
million, the average expenditure for a city is $18 million, and the average expenditure for
a special district is $19 million. To determine the effect of consolidation, we calculate
how the likelihood of attainment would change if the MSA were to consolidate an
additional ten percent of its cities and 20 percent of its special districts. For ease of

49

This calculation differs from the actual MDPI slightly due to the uneven distribution of jurisdictional
expenditures. This variation is not present when using average effects.
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exposition, we will refer to his as the “standard consolidation.” If Atlanta were to
consolidate ten percent of its cities and 20 percent of its special districts, this would
decrease its MPDI by 0.86. Using approximately the average value of the estimated range
for the MPDI marginal effect on attainment of the ozone standard of 8 percent, this
consolidation translates into a 6.9 percent increase in the likelihood of attainment of the
ozone standard. The standard consolidation of jurisdictions in Atlanta would imply
approximately 32 jurisdictions are eliminated from JDCNT. This would translate into
approximately a 4.5 percent increase in the likelihood of attainment using the JDCNT
estimated marginal effect on ozone attainment of 5 percent. We will next do similar
calculations for the three MSAs highlighted above for each of the three fragmentation
variables.
The MSA of Columbus, Ohio is in attainment. It has six counties, 75 cities, 79
towns, and 46 special districts. The average expenditure for a county is approximately
$137 million, the average expenditure for a city is $18 million, the average expenditure
for a town is $1.1 million, and the average expenditure for each special district is $4.9
million. Since Columbus is in attainment of the ozone standard, the fragmentation effect
of interest is not consolidation but rather the impact of additional jurisdictions. If
Columbus were to add ten percent more towns and cities and 20 percent more special
districts (we call this the “standard expansion”), this would have an effect of increasing
MPDI buy approximately 0.3.50 Assuming the MPDI marginal effect of 8 percent, this
would decrease the likelihood of attainment by roughly 2.3 percent. In terms of
jurisdiction count, Columbus would gain approximately 25 jurisdictions from the
50

For MSAs with many cities, towns, and special districts the effect of consolidation is almost equal to the
effect of expansion. However in the case of counties, some MSAs have only two or three counties and the
effects of consolidation versus expansion can differ by a nontrivial amount.
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standard consolidation. The estimated marginal effect from model 2 in Table C18 would
imply a decrease in the likelihood of attainment by 3.4 percent.51
The MSA of Phoenix, Arizona is in nonattainment for 1997. It has two counties,
32 cities, and 94 special districts. The average expenditure for a county is approximately
$723 million, the average expenditure for a city is $93 million, and the average
expenditure for a special district it is approximately $14 million. The standard
consolidation would generate a decrease in MPDI of approximately 0.7. This would
increase the likelihood of attainment by 5.4 percent. In terms of jurisdiction count, the
standard consolidation would reduce the number of jurisdictions by approximately 22 and
would increase the likelihood of attainment by 3.1 percent.
The MSA of Tampa-St. Petersburg is in attainment. It has four counties, 35 cities,
and 51 special districts. On average, each county spends approximately $549 million,
each city spends $32.2 million, and each special district spends $6.9 million. The
standard expansion of cities and special districts yields an increase in MPDI of
approximately 0.4. This would decrease the likelihood of attainment by 3.1 percent. In
terms of jurisdiction count the standard expansion would increase the number of
jurisdictions by approximately 14, and would decrease the likelihood of attainment by 1.9
percent.
The effects of central city consolidation are likely to be smaller than that of
JDCNT and MPDI. The central city growth variable is measured over a span of 50 years.
Thus, any changes that would occur over the span of several years will likely have a
small effect on that variable. In the period 1990 to 2000 six of the 11 MSAs had
51

Columbus is the only MSA of the 11 that has a greater JDCNT effect than MPDI effect. This is due to
the small average expenditure level of towns relative to cities and special districts.
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approximately zero central city land area growth, thus we only consider how changes in
central city population change CCG. The average growth rate for the 11 central cities
selected from 1990-2000 is approximately 12 percent. If central cities were to grow in
population by 10 percent, this would have a relatively minor effect on CCG. For the
MSAs of Atlanta, Columbus, and Tampa-St. Petersburg, the effect of increasing central
city population by 10 percent results in a 0.24 percent increase in CCG or less. A 0.24
percent increase in CCG makes it 1.4 percent more likely that an MSA will be in
attainment. A 10 percent increase in population has the largest impact on CCG for
Phoenix, and results in an increase in the likelihood of attainment by 7.4 percent.
It is also possible for counties and central cities to merge. A merger of the central
city and its surrounding county would have a dramatic effect on central city growth. For
example, if the city of Atlanta was to merge with all of Fulton County or some portion of
Fulton County and was to increase its population by 50 percent and its land area by 50
percent, this would generate a value for CCG of 5.24 and would increase the likelihood
of attainment by 14 percent.
Table C25 illustrates the effect that modest changes in the three fragmentation
variables of interest can have on selected MSAs. For those MSAs in nonattainment the
standard, contraction in the number of cities, towns, and special districts can have a
modest though potentially meaningful effect on the likelihood of attainment. For the ten
MSAs within 0.01 ppm of the standard, the standard contraction had the greatest effect on
Salt Lake City and Louisville, increasing their likelihood of attainment by approximately
three to six percent. For the MSA of Atlanta this range was slightly higher, increasing its
likelihood of attainment by approximately five to seven percent. For those MSAs in
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attainment the effect of the standard expansion of the number of cities, towns, and special
districts is smaller. The standard expansion had the greatest effect on Columbus and
Tampa-St. Petersburg, decreasing their likelihood of attainment by approximately two to
three percent.
Modest changes in CCG generally had smaller effects on the likelihood of
attainment. This effect tended to be smaller for MSAs in nonattainment with the
exception of Phoenix. For those MSAs in nonattainment, Salt Lake City experienced the
highest increase in the likelihood of attainment of 0.5 percent. For MSAs in attainment,
Raleigh-Durham had the greatest decrease in the likelihood of being in attainment of 2.5
percent.
As these examples illustrate the effects of changing the variables of MPDI,
JDCNT, and CCG on the likelihood of attainment are modest. However, if only one MSA
in the sample were to come into attainment or maintain its attainment status through
measures that decrease one of these three variables, it could potentially benefit millions
of MSA residents. Potential future research is discussed next.
Future Research
Several areas of future research are contemplated. The first is a more integrated
treatment of the urban form variables. This dissertation uses several variables to control
for the effect that urban form has on attainment of the ozone standard as well as levels of
ozone (MAXEPA). One of the key variables in the urban form category is DVMT. The
results for the DVMT variable are not in keeping with the theoretical model for the OLS
MAXEPA specification. The OLS results suggest that higher values of DVMT lead to
lower levels of ozone. As was discussed earlier, Kahn (2001) suggests a potential reason
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for this is a small segment of the nation’s automobile fleet account for a large portion of
ozone forming emissions. However, it would be helpful to obtain actual automobile
emissions at the MSA level and use that in place of DVMT in the models. If the
automobile emissions results follow the predictions of the theoretical model, this would
confirm the difficulty of using DVMT as a proxy for automobile emissions in some
MSAs.
Three other variables in the urban form category are not statistically significant
in the cross-sectional probit model. They are commute time, density of the population
per square mile, and percent single-family homes. These measures attempt to control for
the effects of urban sprawl on the attainment of the ozone standard. These measures may
be too coarse to capture some important yet subtle differences in urban form among
MSAs. Several sophisticated sprawl indices have been constructed by Razin and
Rosentraub (2000) and Ewing, Pendall, and Chen (2002), that might better capture the
relationship between sprawl and attainment of the ozone standard, however, they do not
include all the MSAs in my sample. Extending these indices to include the full sample
may add some additional explanatory power to the model.
The second area of future research we consider focuses on the estimation of the
models. Two particular areas that may be improved are controlling for the unobserved
heterogeneity bias in the random effects probit model and/or estimating the magnitude of
the bias on the MPDI estimate. In the panel random effects probit model, it was
determined that MPDI is likely correlated with unobservables, while jurisdiction count
was not. As was discussed earlier, this has an intuitive explanation due to the dynamic
qualities of the jurisdictional level expenditure components of MPDI. This correlation
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induces the random effects probit estimate to be biased. Estimating the amount of bias or
attempting to add additional variables to the random effects model to alleviate the
unobserved heterogeneity is another area of future research.
The panel model may also be extended through the addition of new data. The
2007 census of governments will be available sometime in 2008. However, during this
time, the U.S. EPA changed the ozone standard. The EPA issued the 8-hour ozone
standard in 1997 which is 0.08 ppm. The new standard was adopted due to concerns that
the 1-hour standard was inadequate for protecting public health. Due to litigation, the 8hour standard was not implemented until 2004. In 2002, Sixty-six MSAs were in
nonattainment of the 1 hour standard. The EPA currently lists over 100 MSAs that are
currently in nonattainment of the 8-hour standard. If the 2007 year of panel data is added,
the regulatory standard to which the municipalities are reacting has changed. However, if
the supposition is true that MSAs are most concerned with the “binary outcome” of either
being in attainment or not in attainment, then adding the 2007 panel could add important
variation in to the data.
A final area of potential future research would be to extend this framework into
the area of water quality. Water quality presents interesting modifications to the model,
as upstream and downstream effects would need to be considered. In addition MSAs can
be composed of several watersheds, which could pose problems of spatial
autocorrelation. Border effects may also need to be considered in that watersheds often
originate outside the MSA borders. In the case of water quality, the directional nature of
water and pollution flows would require modification of both the theoretical approach
and the empirical approach.
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However, water quality might be more conducive variable than air quality to
analyze the effects that fragmentation has on local government efforts to meet an
exogenously set environmental standard. Local jurisdictions have more authority in
controlling nonpoint source water pollution than they do for nonpoint source air
pollution. Automobiles are the primary source of nonpoint source emissions for air
pollutants. However, tailpipe emissions as well as automobile inspection policy is usually
set at the state level. The source of nonpoint water pollution is often runoff from local
impervious surfaces such as streets and parking lots, construction site runoff, as well as
lawn and agricultural runoff. Local jurisdictions have more options to control these
sources of runoff such as, stream buffer requirements, best management practices for
construction sites, as well as general land use planning authority. In addition, local
jurisdictions are more likely to benefit directly from investments to improve water
quality. River sheds tend to be smaller than air sheds, thus benefits are more localized. In
addition, the nature of rivers suggests that jurisdictions only need to get cooperation from
their upstream neighbors to reap the benefits of their actions. The additional incentives
localized benefits provide to jurisdictions are not present for air quality. Any
improvements to air quality generated by a jurisdiction mix homogenously throughout
the MSA air shed, and are available to all jurisdictions.
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APPENDIX A:
DEFINING METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS AND CONSOLIDATED
METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS:
The Census Defines Metropolitan Statistical Areas as follows:
Each metropolitan statistical area must have at least one urbanized area of 50,000
or more inhabitants
Under the standards, the county (or counties) in which at least 50 percent
of the population resides within urban areas of 10,000 or more population,
or that contain at least 5,000 people residing within a single urban area of
10,000 or more population, is identified as a "central county" (counties).
Additional "outlying counties" are included in the CBSA if they meet
specified requirements of commuting to or from the central counties.
Counties or equivalent entities form the geographic "building blocks" for
metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas.
If specified criteria are met, a metropolitan statistical area containing a
single core with a population of 2.5 million or more may be subdivided to
form smaller groupings of counties referred to as "metropolitan divisions."
CMSAs- An area that meets theses requirements for recognition as an
MSA but also has a total population of one million or more may be
recognized as a CMSA if: (1) separate component areas can be identified
within the entire area by meeting specified statistical criteria, and (2) local
opinion indicates there in support for the component areas. If recognized,
the component areas are designated PMSAs, and the entire areas becomes
a CMSA. If no PMSAs are recognized, the entire are is designated an
MSA.
Urbanized areas are defined by the census as follows:
For Census 2000, the Census Bureau classifies as "urban" all territory,
population, and housing units located within an urbanized area (UA) or an
urban cluster (UC). It delineates UA and UC boundaries to encompass
densely settled territory, which consists of:
•
•

core census block groups or blocks that have a population density of at
least 1,000 people per square mile and
surrounding census blocks that have an overall density of at least 500
people per square mile
In addition, under certain conditions, less densely settled territory may be
part of each UA or UC.
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APPENDIX B:
LAND AREA CHANGES
The Phoenix MSA is made up of two counties Maricopa and Pima. The total area
of the MSA is 14,598 square miles. A substantial amount of this land area is desert. The
city of Phoenix is located primarily in the center of Maricopa County. The county is
9,224 square miles in area. In order to capture the population centers, we measured the
distance to the outlying municipalities from the central city of Phoenix. The relevant
radius used for Phoenix was 60 miles around the city of Phoenix. This radius captures the
far flung municipalities of Eloy, Globe, and Wickensburg.
The Las Vegas MSA is made up of two Nevada counties: Clark and Nye and one
Arizona county: Mohave. The total three county area is 39,720.This area has a very large
desert component. The city of Las Vegas is located in Clark County. The county is 8,091
miles in area. we measured the distance to the outlying municipalities from the central
city of Las Vegas. The farthest municipality is Boulder city which gives the relevant
radius used for the Las Vegas MSA of 40 miles from the center city.
The Riverside-San Bernardino MSA is made up of two counties: Riverside and
San Bernardino. The total county area is 27,408 square miles which is mostly desert.
San Bernardino County is the largest county in the continental U.S. measuring 20,105
square miles. we measured the distances to outlying municipalities from the central city
of San Bernardino. The relevant radius used for the San Bernardino MSA was 45 miles
around the city of San Bernardino. This captures Palm Springs and Yucca Valley.
For Duluth-Superior we adjusted the area of St. Louis county Minnesota, which
has over 2,000 square miles covered by dense forest or lakes. Since Duluth borders Lake
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Michigan a radial measure was not appropriate. Instead we estimated an area that
included the population centers of the county. The most populous area came out to be
approximated 1,234 square miles. The adjusted area for Duluth-Superior then becomes
1,909 square miles.
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APPENDIX C:
TABLES
Table C1
Hypothetical calculation of Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index (MPDI)a

Jurisdiction
count
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total Exp.

a

MSA Region A
Jurisdiction
Expenditure
$900,000
$20,000
$20,000
$20,000
$20,000
$20,000
$1,000,000
MPDI

MSA Region B
Power Jurisdiction Jurisdiction
Power
Index
count
Expenditure
Index
0.948683
$900,000 0.94868
1
0.141421
$9,091 0.09535
2
0.141421
$9,091 0.09535
3
0.141421
$9,091 0.09535
4
0.141421
$9,091 0.09535
5
0.141421
$9,091 0.09535
6
$9,091 0.09535
7
1.65579
$9,091 0.09535
8
$9,091 0.09535
9
$9,091 0.09535
10
$9,091 0.09535
11
$9,091 0.09535
12
$1,000,000
Total Exp.
MPDI
1.9975

From Miller (2002)
Power Index = square root of (jurisdiction expenditure/total expenditure)
MPDI = Sum of all jurisdictions Power Index
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Table C2
Accounts included in MPDI variable definitions
Variable

Variable

Specification
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1
MPDI1

b

Specification
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2
MPDI2

Municipal Expense account
c

Description
Financial Administration
Fire Protection
Judicial and Legal Services
Central Staff Services
General Public Buildings
Health Services
Own Hospitals
Other Hospitals
Regular Highways
Toll Highways
Housing and Community Development
Libraries
Natural Resources
Parking Facilities
Parks and Recreation
Police Protection
Welfare, Federal Categorical Assistance Programs
Welfare, Cash Assistance
Welfare, Vendor Payments for Medical Care
Welfare, Vendor Payments for Other Purposes
Welfare Institutions
Welfare
Sewerage
Solid Waste Management
General
Water Utilities
Electric Utilities
Gas Utilities
Transit Utilities
Air Transportation
Miscellaneous Commercial Activities, NEC
Corrections
Elementary and Secondary Education
Other Higher Education
Social Insurance Administration
Private Transit Subsidies
Protective Inspection and Regulation, NEC
Sea and Inland Port Facilities
Liquor Stores
Interest on Debt

b

These accounts are included in Miller’s definition of MPDI. (Miller 2001).

c

These accounts were suggested to be included by
Professor David Sjoquist of Georgia State University .
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Table C3
Variable Definitions
Variable Name
Variable Definition
Dependent Variables
attain1997
Dummy variable =1 if Ozone standard met,
=0 otherwise
maxepa
Third Highest Ozone Monitor Reading
as averaged across MSA monitors
areattl
Area total emissions for NOX & VOC
in an MSA in 1997
MSA Income Demographic and Taste Variables
pi
MSA Per capita personal income, 1992,1 997, 2002

Data Source
EPA Green book
http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/index.html

EPA
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/ozone/areas/aqdata.htm

EPA's National Emissions Inventory
ftp://ftp.epa.gov/pub/EmisInventory/nei_criteria_summaries/

Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm

MSAGMP

Gross metropolitan product 1992, 1997, 2002

Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm

msapop

MSA population 1992, 1997, 2002

Census of Governments, The Inter-univ. Consortium
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR 2006)
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/index.html

perdem

Percent of votes in the MSA congressional elections
between 1997 and 1999 cast for a democratic candidate
or against a republican candidate

Places Rated Almanac, 1999

age
less25
btw2564
over65

Percent of MSA population less than 25 1992, 1997, 2002
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates,
Percent of MSA population between 25 and 64 1992, 1997, 2002 County Population datasets,
Percent of MSA population 65 and over 1992, 1997, 2002
http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html
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Table C3
Variable Definitions
Variable Name
Variable Definition
MSA Income Demographic and Taste Variables
white
Percent of MSA population that is white 1992, 1997, 2002
balck
Percent of MSA population that is black 1992, 1997, 2002
hispanic
Percent of MSA population that is hispanic 1992, 1997, 2002
asian
Percent of MSA population that is asain 1992, 1997, 2002
college

Percent of MSA population that
graduated college 1992, 1997, 2002
Fragmentation Variables
jdcnt1997
See Ch 3 for detailed description
relfrag1997
See Ch 3 for detailed description
ccd1997
See eq 3-3 in Ch 3 for detailed description
sdd1997
See eq 3-1 in Ch 3 for detailed description
cp1997
See eq 3-4 in Ch 3 for detailed description
ccg
See eq 4-4 in Ch 4 for detailed description
mpdi1 1997
See eq 3-5 in Ch 3 for detailed description
mpdi2 1997
See eq 3-5 in Ch 3 for detailed description

Data Source
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates,
County Population datasets,
http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html

U.S. Census Bureau, Education attainment by state,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/educ-attn.html

All Fragmentation variables from:
Census of Governments, The Inter-univ. Consortium
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR 2006)
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/index.html
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Table C3
Variable Definitions
Variable Name
Variable Definition
Price of Public Good
Urban Form
prcnt1family
Percent of single family homes

Data Source

Census of Governments American Housing Survey (AHS)
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/access.html

dvmt1997

MSA Daily Vehicle Miles Traveled 1992, 1997, 2002
(in thousands of miles)

Federal Highway administration (FHA 2006)
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohpi/hss/index.htm

comtime

MSA average commute time to work in minutes

Places Rated Almanac, 1999

trackmi
tranrte
sumfares

Total public transit train track miles
Total public transit train and bus route miles
Total Fares received from public transit
in 1997 (in thousands)
Dummy variable =1 if MSA in CMSA,
=0 otherwise
Presence of Regional Government
Dummy variable =1 if Regional gov. in MSA
=0 otherwise
MSA population density (population 1997
divided by total MSA land area)

All public tranist variables from:
National transit database (NTD 2006)
http://www.ntdprogram.com/ntdprogram/data.htm

CMSA
reggov

density

Economic Activity
emp
MSA Total Employment 1992, 1997, 2002
mfgavgt

MSA Employment in only
the Manufacturing sector 1992, 1997, 2002

ptscttl

MSA point-source total emissions 1992, 1997, 2002

U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006 Density
Regionalism on Purpose, 2001

U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006 Density
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/density.html

BLS and the economic census for 1992, 1997 and 2002
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006, BLS 2006).
http://www.bls.gov/cew/
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/us/US000_22.HTM
EPA's National Emissions Inventory
ftp://ftp.epa.gov/pub/EmisInventory/nei_criteria_summaries/
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Table C3
Variable Definitions
Variable Name
dirtyind

Variable Definition
Dummy variable=1 if there are
Chemical, Nonmetallic mineral product,
Petroleum & coal products, Plastics & rubber products, or
Primary metal manufacturing plants
within the MSA, =0 otherwise

Data Source
U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006 Census of Industry
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/us/US000_22.HTM

utlity

Dummy variable=1 if there is a
Fossil fuel power generation facility
within the MSA, =0 otherwise

U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006 Census of Industry
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/us/US000_22.HTM

MSA total rainfall from May 1st - Sept 30th 1992, 1997, 2002
Total rainfall in just July 1992, 1997, 2002
July mean temperature 1992, 1997, 2002
July Maximum temperature 1997
July mean wind speed in 1997

All Weather Data is from:
US National climate data service (NCDS 2006)

Weather
ttlrain
jrain
jtemp
julymaxtemp
julymnwind
Geography
south
midwest
west
north
Coastal

http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/normals/usnormals.html

Dummy variable =1 if MSA in region,
=0 otherwise
see table 4-2 for a list of states and regions

U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006

Dummy variable =1 if If MSA is located
on a great lake or ocean, =0 otherwise

U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006
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Table C4
Region Definitions, MSAs and CMSAs
Region
south
midwest
west
north
total MSAs

MSAs
77
39
37
34

CMSAs
5
5
6
3

187

19

Number of
MSAs in
Avg.
attainment MAXEPA
61
0.113
30
0.107
12
0.123
5
0.120
108

The states included in the four regions are as follows:
North: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
Mid West: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, N. Dakota, Ohio, S. Dakota, and Wisconsin.
South: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
N. Carolina, Oklahoma, S. Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and W. Virginia.
West: Arizona, Californian, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming.
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Table C5
Summary Statistics
Variable Name
Dependent Variables
attain1997
maxepa1997
areattl1997

Obs

Mean

Std.Dev

Min

Max

187
187
187

0.61
0.11
105,455

0.49
0.02
111,743

0.00
0.07
18,193

1.00
0.22
722,606

MSA Income and Taste variables
pi1997
Msagmp1997 ( in $billions)
msapop1997
perdem
white1997
black1997
hispanic1997
asian1997
less25
btw2564
over65

187
187
187
187
187
187
187
187
187
187
187

25,043
32.7
1,013,357
52.09
75%
11%
10%
3%
35%
52%
13%

4,321
46.4
1,291,955
71.48
16%
9%
14%
3%
3%
2%
3%

12,056
4.7
201,775
4.8
12%
0.3%
0.5%
0.3%
25%
43%
8%

47,190
355.0
9,127,751
100
97%
43%
87%
21%
48%
58%
30%

Fragmentation Variables
jdcnt1997
relfrag1997
ccd1997
sdd1997
cp1997
ccg
mpdi21997

187
187
187
187
187
187
187

121
1.55
0.39
1.77
4.76
5.10
5.23

140
1.15
0.21
2.27
23.31
7.51
2.47

10
0.16
0.00
0.03
0.00
-0.58
1.70

1,103
8.16
0.90
13.44
250.00
52.61
17.62

Price of Public Good
Urban Form
prcnt1family
dvmt1997 (1000s)
comtime
trackmi
tranrte
sumfares (1000s)
farepermi
sqmiles
density
CMSA
reggov

187
187
187
187
187
187
187
187
187
187
187

0.61
18,025
24.06
52.65
903.36
36,000
14,093
2,564
648
0.28
0.04

0.08
25,849
3.71
218.82
1349.21
196,000
40,815
3,729
1,203
0.45
0.20

0.40
1,320
17.1
0
0
0
0
46
31
0
0.00

0.77
209,816
38.9
1706.2
8448
2,490,000
516,643
39,370
11,974
1
1.00
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Table C5
Summary Statistics
Variable Name
Economic Activity
emp1997
empgrowth
mfgavgt1997
ptscttl1997
powerplant
dirtyind

Obs

Mean

Std.Dev

Min

Max

187
187
187
187
187
187

444,593
0.13
61,177
28,362
0.66
0.29

599,390
0.09
91,232
36,929
0.48
0.45

61,063
-0.12
2,407
0
0
0

3,855,812
0.46
653,005
224,877
1
1

Weather
ttlrain1997
jrain1997
jtemp1997
julymaxtemp
julymnwind

187
187
187
187
187

18.41
3.84
75.86
86.14
8.13

9.34
2.61
5.98
6.39
1.68

0.41
0.00
61.38
71.10
4.80

51.32
14.59
91.30
104.20
13.60

Geography
south
midwest
west
north
coastal

187
187
187
187
187

0.41
0.21
0.16
0.18
0.26

0.49
0.41
0.36
0.39
0.44

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1

Lagged value of Dependent variable
maxepa1992
areattl1992 (in tons)

187
187

0.12
122,388

0.03
132,677

0.07
23,879

0.30
858,942
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Table C6
Correlation Coefficients
attain1997
maxepa1997
areattl1997
pi1997
msagdp1997
gmpcap1997
perdem
jdcnt1997
relfrag1997
ccd1997
sdd1997
cp1997
ccg
mpdi21997
mpdi11997
MSApop1997
density
prcnt1family
dvmt1997
comtime
totrksmb
totrowsmb
sumfaresb
farepermi
emp1997
mfgavgt1997
mfgper1997
ptscttl1997
drty_ind
power_plant
ttlrain1997
jrain1997
jtemp1997
julymnwind
coastal
cmsa1y
south
midwest
west
maxepa1992
areattl1992

attain

maxepa

areattl

pi

msagdp

gmpcap

1997

1997

1997

1997

1997

1997

-0.28
0.45
1.00
0.29
0.92
0.33
0.12
0.74
-0.21
0.21
-0.08
-0.07
-0.12
0.61
0.62
0.93
0.31
-0.27
0.93
0.51
0.65
0.79
0.47
0.46
0.95
0.90
-0.01
0.65
0.01
0.33
-0.03
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.19
0.36
-0.09
0.06
0.00
0.47
0.99

####
0.25
0.29
1.00
0.42
0.86
0.09
0.29
####
0.09
####
0.19
####
0.30
0.30
0.34
0.39
####
0.31
0.45
0.26
0.35
0.24
0.28
0.38
0.34
0.00
0.12
####
0.22
####
####
####
0.25
0.33
0.55
####
0.04
0.09
0.21
0.29

-0.30
0.46
0.92
0.42
1.00
0.41
0.15
0.63
-0.23
0.28
-0.03
-0.04
-0.13
0.50
0.50
0.99
0.46
-0.38
0.94
0.58
0.76
0.81
0.69
0.68
0.97
0.87
-0.03
0.49
-0.06
0.28
-0.10
-0.04
-0.06
0.08
0.28
0.43
-0.16
0.01
0.07
0.50
0.93

1.00
-0.58
-0.28
-0.27
-0.30
-0.29
-0.04
-0.31
-0.08
0.04
-0.14
-0.06
0.23
-0.37
-0.37
-0.30
-0.27
0.32
-0.28
-0.36
-0.26
-0.29
-0.19
-0.20
-0.30
-0.24
0.05
-0.17
-0.01
-0.15
0.23
0.04
0.12
-0.05
-0.05
-0.38
0.30
0.16
-0.10
-0.59
-0.30

-0.58
1.00
0.45
0.25
0.46
0.30
0.02
0.30
-0.16
0.08
0.09
0.00
-0.12
0.30
0.32
0.48
0.24
-0.22
0.48
0.43
0.24
0.37
0.17
0.17
0.44
0.41
0.00
0.34
0.06
0.32
-0.18
-0.08
0.15
-0.03
0.11
0.39
-0.04
-0.16
0.08
0.87
0.50

-0.29
0.30
0.33
0.86
0.41
1.00
0.06
0.25
-0.13
0.14
-0.04
0.19
-0.17
0.23
0.23
0.31
0.34
-0.46
0.34
0.41
0.24
0.33
0.24
0.28
0.35
0.31
0.00
0.17
-0.17
0.19
-0.15
-0.10
-0.30
0.22
0.18
0.54
-0.24
0.04
0.09
0.22
0.32

perdem

-0.04
0.02
0.12
0.09
0.15
0.06
1.00
0.11
0.07
0.06
-0.07
-0.15
-0.10
0.11
0.11
0.14
0.20
-0.05
0.11
0.12
0.14
0.18
0.15
0.17
0.14
0.12
-0.07
0.06
-0.03
0.17
-0.06
-0.10
-0.15
0.12
0.17
0.14
-0.13
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.13

jdcnt

mpdi1

msapop

fare

1997

1997

1997

permi

-0.31
0.30
0.74
0.29
0.63
0.25
0.11
1.00
0.24
-0.02
0.01
-0.10
-0.23
0.89
0.90
0.63
0.08
-0.09
0.61
0.26
0.49
0.59
0.22
0.21
0.69
0.68
0.06
0.56
0.15
0.27
-0.07
-0.03
-0.19
0.10
0.01
0.23
-0.33
0.23
-0.04
0.25
0.70

-0.37
0.32
0.62
0.30
0.50
0.23
0.11
0.90
0.36
-0.21
-0.07
-0.11
-0.31
0.99
1.00
0.51
0.05
-0.08
0.48
0.23
0.35
0.52
0.11
0.09
0.56
0.59
0.14
0.46
0.27
0.32
-0.09
-0.02
-0.28
0.12
0.00
0.23
-0.42
0.23
-0.08
0.28
0.59

-0.02
0.19
0.26
-0.06
0.18
-0.02
-0.05
0.19
-0.08
0.14
0.14
0.03
-0.10
0.13
0.14
1.00
0.43
-0.35
0.96
0.56
0.73
0.82
0.63
0.61
0.98
0.89
-0.03
0.50
-0.03
0.29
-0.10
-0.05
-0.02
0.05
0.27
0.40
-0.15
0.01
0.08
0.54
0.95

-0.20
0.17
0.46
0.28
0.68
0.28
0.17
0.21
-0.15
0.22
-0.05
-0.03
-0.12
0.09
0.09
0.61
0.58
-0.36
0.49
0.47
0.77
0.44
0.98
1.00
0.56
0.36
-0.08
0.19
-0.10
0.14
-0.03
0.08
-0.07
0.04
0.24
0.27
-0.13
-0.04
-0.01
0.18
0.47
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Table C7
Ozone attainment, Population, Vehicle miles traveled and GMP per capita
Lowest ten in Class
MSA NAME
Waco
Springfield
Lynchburg
Longview-Marshall
Wilmington
Asheville
Green Bay
Evansville-Henderson
Yakima
Brazoria

ST.

MSA NAME
Los Angeles-Long Bch.
New York-Newark
Chicago
Boston-Brockton
Detroit
Houston
Philadelphia
Atlanta
Nassau-Suffolk
Dallas

ST.

attain

a

TX
IL
VA
TX
NC
NC
WI
IN
WA
TX

c

MSAPOP

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0

201,775
204,130
205,559
206,732
206,738
210,042
213,072
214,538
216,234
220,854

MSA NAME

ST.

Johnstown
Salinas
Visalia-Tulare
Boulder-Longmont
Yakima
Longview-Marshall
Fayetteville-Springdale
Fort Collins-Loveland
Santa Cruz-Watsonville
Odessa-Midland

PA
CA
CA
CO
WA
TX
AR
CO
CA
TX

attain

a

b

DVMT

0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

1,320
1,321
1,691
1,728
1,778
1,850
2,119
2,172
2,246
2,295

MSA NAME

ST.

Mcallen-Edinburg-Missn.
Ocala
Visalia-Tulare-Portervle
El Paso
Daytona Beach
Huntington-Ashland
Pensacola
Mobile
Lakeland-Winter Haven
Johnstown

TX
FL
CA
TX
FL
WV
FL
AL
FL
PA

MSA NAME

ST.

New Haven-Meriden
Washington
Wilmington-Newark
San Jose
Oakland
San Francisco
Nassau-Suffolk
Newburgh
New York-Newark
Odessa-Midland

CT
DC
DE
CA
CA
CA
NY
NY
NY
TX

attain

a

1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0

GMP/cap

d

$15,504
$20,510
$20,742
$20,835
$21,448
$21,479
$21,499
$21,644
$21,652
$21,672

Highest ten in Class

187 MSA sample mean
187 MSA sample median

CA
NY
IL
MA
MI
TX
PA
GA
NY
TX

attaina

MSAPOPc

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

9,127,751
8,958,529
7,078,564
5,327,463
4,415,628
3,791,921
3,789,278
3,541,230
3,209,124
3,047,983

MSA NAME

ST.

Los Angeles-Long Beach
Chicago
New York-Newark
Atlanta
Detroit
Washington
Boston-Brockton
Houston
Philadelphia
Dallas

CA
IL
NY
GA
MI
DC
MA
TX
PA
TX

1,013,357
523,307

a

DVMTb

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

209,816
142,004
123,115
89,530
87,621
80,171
79,177
77,018
74,956
70,050
18,024
8,057

attain= 0 if MSA failed to meet 1997 one-hour ozone standard

b

attain= 1 if MSA met 1997 one-hour ozone standard

c

all data for the year 1997

attaina

DVMT = dailey vehicle miles traveled

GMP/cap= MSA Gross Metropolitan Product per capita

d

MSAPOP = MSA population

attaina GMP/capd

0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1

$56,438
$55,186
$51,413
$42,974
$42,500
$42,500
$39,637
$39,637
$39,637
$39,227
$29,974
$28,932

186

Table C8
Ozone attainment and Selected Fragmentation variables
Lowest ten in Class
MSA NAME
Fayetteville
Amarillo
Roanoke
Jersey City
Lynchburg
Ocala
Odessa-Midland
Lubbock
Tallahassee
Pensacola

ST.

'MSA NAME
Chicago
Boston-Brockton
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
Philadelphia
Houston
Minneapolis-St. Paul
Kansas City
Denver
Nassau-Suffolk

ST.

attaina

NC
TX
VA
NJ
VA
FL
TX
TX
FL
FL

JDCNTb

1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

10
12
13
15
15
15
15
16
16
19

'MSA NAME

'ST.

Fayetteville
Ocala
Lubbock
Tucson
Amarillo
Roanoke
El Paso
Tallahassee
Albuquerque
Asheville

NC
FL
TX
AZ
TX
VA
TX
FL
NM
NC

attaina

MPDIc

1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

1.7
2.04
2.11
2.12
2.16
2.17
2.2
2.3
2.37
2.45

'MSA NAME

'ST.

Miami
New York-Newark
New Orleans
Springfield
Norfolk-Va Bch-Newpt Ns
Jersey City
Baltimore
Los Angeles-Long Beach
El Paso
Fayetteville

FL
NY
LA
IL
VA
NJ
MD
CA
TX
NC

'MSA NAME

'ST.

Johnstown
Peoria-Pekin
Duluth-Superior
Davenport-Moline
Rockford
Omaha
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre
Fort Wayne
Utica-Rome
Harrisburg-Lebanon

PA
IL
MN
IA
IL
NE
PA
IN
NY
PA

attaina

RELFRAGd

1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1

0.16
0.17
0.18
0.25
0.27
0.27
0.30
0.30
0.35
0.35

Highest ten in Class

187 MSA sample mean
187 MSA sample median

IL
MA
PA
MO
PA
TX
MN
MO
CO
NY

attaina

JDCNTb

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0

1103
747
692
653
643
522
434
396
384
311

'MSA NAME

'ST.

Boston-Brockton
Chicago
St. Louis
Pittsburgh
Philadelphia
Minneapolis-St. Paul
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre
Harrisburg-Lebanon
Detroit
Riverside-San Bernardino

MA
IL
MO
PA
PA
MN
PA
PA
MI
CA

attaina

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0

121
77

a

17.62
15.72
14.98
14.18
12.24
10.65
10.65
9.48
9.06
8.78
5.2
4.67

attain= 0 if MSA failed to meet 1997 one-hour ozone standard

b

attain= 1 if MSA met 1997 one-hour ozone standard

c

all data for the year 1997

MPDIc

JDCNT= Jurisdcition count

MPDI= Meteropolitan Power Diffusion Index 2

d

RELFRAG= Relative Fragmentation

attaina

RELFRAGd

0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0

8.16
6.18
6.06
5.00
4.27
4.24
4.11
4.08
3.68
3.66
1.54
1.25
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Table C9
Summary Statistics for Two groups of MSAs

maxepa1997
Emarea1997
Empoint1997
Emttl1997
emm/cap

MSAs in non-attainment 1997
mean
min
max
0.13
0.09
0.22

MSAs in attainment 1997
mean
min
0.10
0.07

max
0.14

144,290
36,258
180,548
0.12

26,275
235
31,423

722,606
224,877
906,628

81,142
23,625
105,158
0.15

18,193
1,019
19,270

482,756
196,007
678,763

jdcnt1997
mpdisj1997
relfrag1997

175
6.39
1.66

15
2.20
0.17

1,103
17.62
8.16

87
4.50
1.48

10
1.70
0.16

434
10.65
6.18

msapop1997
emp1997
sqmiles
density

1,493,977
668,654
2,319
1,056

214,538
66,526
46
47

9,127,751
3,855,812
27,270
11,974

712,447
304,312
2,160
399

201,775
61,063
445
31

4,415,628
1,929,365
39,370
3,595
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Table C10
Total Emissions of NOX and VOC (in tons)
Attainment MSAs
MSA NAME
Bremerton
Santa Cruz
Yakima
Killeen-Temple
Lubbock
Ocala
Tallahassee
Fort Collins-Loveland
Fayetteville
Springfield
10 MSA mean

Total
Area
Point-source
ST emissions emissions emissions
WA
19,270
18,193
1,077
CA
20,256
18,823
1,432
WA
24,835
23,595
1,240
TX
28,437
27,418
1,019
TX
29,327
25,315
4,012
FL
29,919
28,650
1,269
FL
30,238
28,202
2,035
CO
32,108
25,301
6,807
NC
33,086
30,971
2,115
IL
33,832
22,074
11,758
28,131
24,854
3,276

NonAttainment MSAs
MSANAME
Dutchess County
Johnstown
Visalia-Tulare
Modesto
Salem
Hamilton-Middletown
Reno
Boulder-Longmont
Santa Barbara
Portland
10 MSA mean

Total
Area
Point-source
ST emissions emissions
emissions
NY
31,423
30,398
1,025
PA
32,324
31,189
1,135
CA
32,636
32,401
235
CA
33,318
32,040
1,279
OR
33,794
33,555
239
OH
34,954
26,275
8,679
NV
36,909
36,286
623
CO
37,040
31,076
5,964
CA
37,488
33,953
3,535
ME
38,513
33,117
5,397
34,840
32,029
2,811

Attainment MSAs
MSA NAME
Detroit
Minneapolis-St. Paul
New Orleans
Tampa-St Pete
Cleveland-Lorian
Greensboro-Win Sal
Kansas City
Seattle-Bellevue
Memphis
Indianapolis
10 MSA mean
all Data for 1997

Total
Area
Point-source
ST emissions emissions emissions
MI
678,763
482,756
196,007
MN
446,618
329,859
116,759
LA
323,744
186,371
137,373
FL
315,262
216,070
99,192
OH
302,493
244,878
57,615
NC
291,443
157,003
134,440
MO
290,178
236,195
53,983
WA
240,849
223,317
17,533
TN
229,042
168,333
60,709
IN
214,426
193,307
21,119
333,282
243,809
89,473

NonAttainment MSAs
MSANAME
Chicago
Boston-Brockton
Los Angeles-Long Beach
Houston
New York-Newark
Philadelphia
Atlanta
Washington
St. Louis
Cincinnati-Hamilton
10 MSA mean

Total
Area
Point-source
ST emissions emissions
emissions
IL
906,628
722,606
184,022
MA
682,536
601,253
81,283
CA
648,119
604,084
44,035
TX
612,848
387,970
224,877
NY
548,511
497,691
50,820
PA
528,010
412,099
115,912
GA
497,684
413,117
84,567
DC
486,112
407,958
78,154
MO
340,938
224,116
116,822
OH
335,769
191,245
144,523
558,715
446,214
112,502
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Table C11
Emissions Ratios
Attainment MSAs
MSA NAME
Bremerton
Santa Cruz
Yakima
Killeen-Temple
Lubbock
Ocala
Tallahassee
Fort Collins-Loveland
Fayetteville
Springfield
10 MSA mean
Attainment MSAs
MSANAME
Detroit
Minneapolis-St. Paul
New Orleans
Tampa-St Pete
Cleveland-Lorian
Greensboro-Win Sal
Kansas City
Seattle-Bellevue
Memphis
Indianapolis
10 MSA mean
all Data for 1997

ST
WA
CA
WA
TX
TX
FL
FL
CO
NC
IL

Area
Point-source
emissions emissions
94%
6%
93%
7%
95%
5%
96%
4%
86%
14%
96%
4%
93%
7%
79%
21%
94%
6%
65%
35%
89%
11%

NonAttainment MSAs
MSA NAME
Dutchess County
Johnstown
Visalia-Tulare
Modesto
Salem
Hamilton-Middletown
Reno
Boulder-Longmont
Santa Barbara
Portland
10 MSA mean

ST
NY
PA
CA
CA
OR
OH
NV
CO
CA
ME

Area
Point-source
emissions
emissions
97%
3%
96%
4%
99%
1%
96%
4%
99%
1%
75%
25%
98%
2%
84%
16%
91%
9%
86%
14%
92%
8%

ST
MI
MN
LA
FL
OH
NC
MO
WA
TN
IN

Area
Point source
emissions emissions
71%
29%
74%
26%
58%
42%
69%
31%
81%
19%
54%
46%
81%
19%
93%
7%
73%
27%
90%
10%
74%
26%

NonAttainment MSAs
MSANAME
Chicago
Boston-Brockton
Los Angeles-Long Beach
Houston
New York-Newark
Philadelphia
Atlanta
Washington
St. Louis
Cincinnati-Hamilton
10 MSA mean

ST
IL
MA
CA
TX
NY
PA
GA
DC
MO
OH

Area
Point source
emissions
emissions
80%
20%
88%
12%
93%
7%
63%
37%
91%
9%
78%
22%
83%
17%
84%
16%
66%
34%
57%
43%
78%
22%

190
Table C12
Outliers
21 Nonattainment MSAs
Boston-Brockton
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre
Harrisburg-Lebanon
Denver
Johnstown
Albany-Schenectady-Troy
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton
York
Providence-Fall River-Warwick
Erie
Saginaw Bay City-Midland
Buffalo-Niagra Falls
Newburgh
Evansville-Henderson
Salem
Dutchess County
Stockton-Lodi
Norfolk-Va Bch-Newpt Ns
Flint
Boulder-Longmont
Reno

ST.
MA
PA
PA
CO
PA
NY
PA
PA
RI
PA
MI
NY
NY
IN
OR
NY
CA
VA
MI
CO
NV

14 Attaining MSAs
Indianapolis
Knoxville
San Antonio
Tulsa
Huntington-Ashland
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock
Detroit
Nashville
Kansas City
San Jose
Memphis
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Hlnd
Oakland
Longview-Marshall

IN
TN
TX
OK
WV
NC
MI
TN
MO
CA
TN
MI
CA
TX

14 MSA mean
21 MSA mean
All data from 1997

MAXEPA Emissions
JD
Metro power Relative
ozone
Total
Count
Diff. Index2
frag.
0.113
682,536
747
17.62
1.40
0.11
84,393
258
10.65
4.11
0.113
86,940
225
9.48
3.66
0.107
263,942
384
8.32
2.06
0.102
32,324
195
8.32
8.16
0.105
119,203
246
8.30
2.57
0.114
86,285
158
7.97
2.57
0.109
67,461
119
6.82
3.23
0.117
88,346
106
6.23
1.17
0.105
52,586
78
5.39
2.78
0.092
76,815
91
5.36
2.26
0.103
170,431
102
4.95
0.80
0.115
53,405
99
4.84
2.31
0.115
102,690
76
4.61
3.54
0.11
33,794
71
4.45
2.22
0.113
31,423
60
4.40
2.15
0.119
47,238
110
4.33
2.06
0.109
219,377
41
4.06
0.27
0.098
58,465
40
3.73
0.92
0.094
37,040
59
3.70
2.28
0.094
36,909
20
2.47
0.67
0.12
0.12
0.121
0.121
0.122
0.123
0.124
0.124
0.128
0.129
0.131
0.137
0.138
0.139

214,426
123,650
181,036
148,651
79,682
203,390
678,763
195,292
290,178
114,288
229,042
184,485
187,262
57,664

307
68
68
117
95
83
260
104
396
58
72
141
164
33

7.69
4.64
3.30
4.56
6.52
4.72
9.06
4.63
8.65
3.83
3.25
7.09
7.04
3.60

1.37
1.05
0.46
1.55
3.00
0.63
0.59
0.95
2.34
0.36
0.67
1.39
0.74
1.60

0.127
0.107

206,272
115,791

140
156

5.61
6.48

1.19
2.44
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Table C13
Panel Year Means
Area total emissions
maxepa ozone

1992
122,388
0.116

MSA population
MSA GMP* (in millions)

943,485
27,642

Metro Power diffusion index2
Jurisdiction count
Central city dominance
Special District dominance
County Primacy
Relative Fragmentation
Employment
MFG. employment
Point-source total emissions
July Rain
Total Ozone season rain
July Temperature
*ADJ TO 1997 DOLLARS

4.75
121.3
0.39
1.74
3.92
1.64
394,109
64,454
33,028
3.86
17.28
75.53

1997
105,455
0.114
1,013,275
32,665
5.23
120.9
0.39
1.77
4.81
1.54
444,593
61,177
28,362
3.84
17.62
75.86

2002
93,305
0.111
1,079,685
37,319
4.61
128.0
0.40
1.85
5.09
1.55
508,651
51,722
22,330
3.20
16.89
75.73

% chg 92-02
-24%
-4%
14%
35%
-3%
6%
2%
7%
30%
-5%
29%
-20%
-32%
-17%
-2%
0.3%
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Table C14
Panel Group Means
Area total emissions
maxepa ozone

Never in
Attainment
153,472
0.13

MSA population
MSA GMP* (in millions)
Metro Power diffusion index2
Jurisdiction count
Central city dominance
Special District dominance
County Primacy
Relative Fragmentation
Employment
MFG. employment
Point-source total emissions
July Rain
Total Ozone season rain
July Temperature
* All values adjusted to 1997 dollars

1,597,370
54,405
5.99
179.8
0.376
2.34
6.99
1.68
712,240
90,482
36,196
3.08
15.63
75.06

Change in
Always in
Attainment
Attainment
121,287
59,612
0.11
0.10
1,094,880
34,498
5.06
127.3
0.407
1.45
1.44
1.39
485,029
67,947
34,117
3.61
18.27
73.85

479,911
13,406
3.81
74.9
0.404
1.57
4.82
1.63
210,692
27,604
16,942
4.10
17.91
77.49
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Table C15
Correlations Sensitivity

maxepa1997
areattl1997
maxepa1997

outliers
attain1997
-0.58
-0.28
areattl1997
0.45

w/o outliers
attain1997
-0.77
-0.41
areattl1997
0.49
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Table C16
Variable Definitions
Variable Name
Dependent Variables
attain1997
maxepa
areattl

Variable Definition
Dummy variable =1 if Ozone standard met,
=0 otherwise
Third Highest Ozone Monitor Reading
as averaged across MSA monitors
Area total emissions for NOX & VOC
in an MSA in 1997

MSA Income Demographic and Taste Variables
pi
MSA Per capita personal income, 1992,1 997, 2002

MSAGMP

Gross metropolitan product 1992, 1997, 2002

msapop

MSA population 1992, 1997, 2002

perdem

Percent of votes in the MSA congressional elections
between 1997 and 1999 cast for a democratic candidate
or against a republican candidate

age
less25
btw2564
over65

Percent of MSA population less than 25 1992, 1997, 2002
Percent of MSA population between 25 and 64 1992, 1997, 2002
Percent of MSA population 65 and over 1992, 1997, 2002

MSA Income Demographic and Taste Variables
white
Percent of MSA population that is white 1992, 1997, 2002
balck
Percent of MSA population that is black 1992, 1997, 2002
hispanic
Percent of MSA population that is hispanic 1992, 1997, 2002
asian
Percent of MSA population that is asain 1992, 1997, 2002
college
Fragmentation Variables
jdcnt1997
relfrag1997
ccd1997
sdd1997
cp1997
ccg
mpdi1 1997
mpdi2 1997

Percent of MSA population that
graduated college 1992, 1997, 2002
See Ch 3 for detailed description
See Ch 3 for detailed description
See eq 3-3 in Ch 3 for detailed description
See eq 3-1 in Ch 3 for detailed description
See eq 3-4 in Ch 3 for detailed description
See eq 4-4 in Ch 4 for detailed description
See eq 3-5 in Ch 3 for detailed description
See eq 3-5 in Ch 3 for detailed description
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Table C16
Variable Definitions
Variable Name
Price of Public Good
Urban Form
prcnt1family

Variable Definition

dvmt1997

MSA Daily Vehicle Miles Traveled 1992, 1997, 2002
(in thousands of miles)

comtime

MSA average commute time to work in minutes

trackmi
tranrte
sumfares

Total public transit train track miles
Total public transit train and bus route miles
Total Fares received from public transit
in 1997 (in thousands)
Dummy variable =1 if MSA in CMSA,
=0 otherwise
Presence of Regional Government
Dummy variable =1 if Regional gov. in MSA
=0 otherwise
MSA population density (population 1997
divided by total MSA land area)

CMSA
reggov

density

Economic Activity
emp

Percent of single family homes

MSA Total Employment 1992, 1997, 2002

mfgavgt

MSA Employment in only
the Manufacturing sector 1992, 1997, 2002

ptscttl

MSA point-source total emissions 1992, 1997, 2002

dirtyind

Dummy variable=1 if there are
Chemical, Nonmetallic mineral product,
Petroleum & coal products, Plastics & rubber products, or
Primary metal manufacturing plants
within the MSA, =0 otherwise

utlity

Dummy variable=1 if there is a
Fossil fuel power generation facility
within the MSA, =0 otherwise

Weather
ttlrain
jrain
jtemp
julymaxtemp
julymnwind
Geography
south
midwest
west
north
Coastal

MSA total rainfall from May 1st - Sept 30th 1992, 1997, 2002
Total rainfall in just July 1992, 1997, 2002
July mean temperature 1992, 1997, 2002
July Maximum temperature 1997
July mean wind speed in 1997
Dummy variable =1 if MSA in region,
=0 otherwise
see table 4-2 for a list of states and regions
Dummy variable =1 if If MSA is located
on a great lake or ocean, =0 otherwise
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Table C17: Results of Probit Regression
Model

Frag Var.
college
less25

(1) mpdi
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.285**
(0.02)
-19.60***
(0.00)
-19.58**
(0.01)

(2) jdcnt
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.00390** (0.05)
-16.92***
(0.00)
-14.94**
(0.03)

(3) ccd
(4) sdd
(5) cp
(6) ccg
expected sign (+)
expected sign (-)
expected sign (+)
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
Coef.
p(z)
Coef.
p(z)
Coef.
p(z)
0.352
(0.75) 0.0252
(0.83) -0.00785
(0.18) 0.177***
(0.00)
-17.52***
(0.00) -17.46***
(0.00) -18.12***
(0.00) -17.07***
(0.00)
-14.36**
(0.03) -14.21**
(0.04) -15.75**
(0.03) -18.57**
(0.05)

msagdpkk
perdem
white
cmsa1y
comtime

0.0000530*
-0.00729
-1.440
-2.008***
0.102

(0.08)
(0.41)
(0.41)
(0.00)
(0.18)

0.0000417
-0.00699
-1.698
-1.700***
0.0646

(0.12)
(0.42)
(0.36)
(0.01)
(0.39)

0.0000339
-0.00820
-1.553
-1.425**
0.0669

(0.18)
(0.36)
(0.38)
(0.01)
(0.37)

densityk

0.000393

(0.34)

0.000127

(0.78)

0.000313

(0.50) 0.000344

(0.46) 0.000230

(0.64) 0.000177

(0.76)

-0.0710**

(0.04)

-0.0528

(0.10)

-0.0574*

(0.06) -0.0547*

(0.08) -0.0579*

(0.07) -0.0741**

(0.02)

farepermi
prcnt1family
empgrowth

-0.0343*
0.440
11.00***

(0.07)
(0.89)
(0.00)

-0.0240
-0.179
9.704***

(0.20)
(0.96)
(0.00)

-0.0305
-0.428
9.666***

(0.11) -0.0299
(0.90) -0.723
(0.00) 9.705***

(0.12) -0.0308
(0.83) -1.186
(0.00) 10.31***

(0.11) -0.0195
(0.73) 0.797
(0.00) 10.76***

(0.27)
(0.83)
(0.00)

mfgavgtk

0.00494

(0.49)

0.00482

(0.49)

0.00277

(0.69) 0.00263

(0.70) 0.00181

(0.79) -0.00276

(0.70)

(0.07)
(0.27)
(0.06)
(0.03)
(0.22)
(0.94)
(0.02)
(0.05)
(0.19)
(0.00)
(0.00)

-0.0253**
9.64e-08
1.082*
-0.113**
0.125
0.0108
2.402***
1.464**
-0.436
-118.0***
29.21***
187

(0.04)
(0.20)
(0.08)
(0.04)
(0.29)
(0.78)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.50)
(0.00)
(0.00)

-0.0270**
(0.03) -0.0262**
1.21e-07
(0.11) 1.16e-07
1.198**
(0.05) 1.180*
-0.107**
(0.04) -0.105**
0.127
(0.30) 0.130
-0.00992
(0.79) -0.00924
2.808***
(0.00) 2.885***
1.568**
(0.03) 1.621**
-0.474
(0.52) -0.459
-115.8***
(0.00) -116.7***
28.39***
(0.00) 28.88***
187
187
k- Coeffecients scaled by 1,000
kk- Coeffecient scaled by 1,000,000

(0.03)
(0.12)
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.29)
(0.81)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.55)
(0.00)
(0.00)

(0.02)
(0.09)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.33)
(0.71)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.72)
(0.00)
(0.00)

(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.55)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.00)

k

dvmt

k

k

ptscttl
-0.0243*
ptscttlsq
8.80e-08
coastal
1.102*
jtemp
-0.121**
julymnwind
0.146
ttlrain
-0.00287
south
2.223**
midwest
1.383*
west
-0.923
maxepa92
-119.8***
_cons
31.98***
N
187
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10
** p<0.05

*** p<0.01

0.0000336
-0.00775
-1.638
-1.407**
0.0486

(0.20)
(0.38)
(0.34)
(0.02)
(0.54)

0.0000374
-0.00888
-1.934
-1.470**
0.0378

-0.0287**
1.32e-07*
1.265**
-0.116**
0.121
-0.0151
3.031***
1.685**
-0.253
-118.0***
31.60***
187

(0.15)
(0.34)
(0.28)
(0.01)
(0.62)

0.0000487*
-0.0104
-1.576
-1.286**
0.0462

-0.0269**
1.63e-07**
1.300**
-0.201***
0.338**
0.0238
3.030***
1.565**
-2.006**
-108.3***
32.96***
187

(0.07)
(0.28)
(0.46)
(0.02)
(0.54)
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Table C18: Marginal Effects from Probit Regression for Models 1,2 and 6
Models

Frag Var.
college
less25

(1)
mpdi
dy/dx
-0.1032 **
-7.0953 ***
-7.0884 **

msagdpkk
perdem
white
cmsa1y
comtime

0.000019 *
-0.0026
-0.5215
-0.6845 ***
0.0370

densityk
k

dvmt

k

farepermi
prcnt1family
empgrowth
mfgavgtk
k

ptscttl
ptscttlsq
coastal
jtemp
julymnwind
ttlrain
south
midwest
west
maxepa92

p(z)
0.02
0.00
0.01

(2)
jdcnt
dy/dx
-0.0014 **
-6.2415 ***
-5.5111 **

p(z)
0.05
0.00
0.02

(6)
ccg
dy/dx
0.0578 ***
-5.5657 ***
-6.0563 **

p(z)
0.00
0.00
0.04

0.07
0.40
0.41
0.00
0.18

0.00002
-0.0026
-0.6262
-0.6044 ***
0.0238

0.11
0.41
0.36
0.00
0.40

0.00002 *
-0.0034
-0.5140
-0.4540 **
0.0151

0.07
0.28
0.47
0.01
0.54

0.00014

0.33

0.00005

0.78

-0.0257 **

0.04

-0.0195

0.11

-0.0242 **

0.02

-0.0124 *
0.1595
3.9826 ***

0.07
0.90
0.00

-0.0089
-0.0662
3.5789 ***

0.20
0.96
0.00

-0.0063
0.2599
3.5088 ***

0.27
0.83
0.00

0.50

-0.0009

0.70

0.04
0.19
0.03
0.04
0.30
0.78
0.00
0.00
0.51
0.00

-0.0088
0.0000001
0.3288
-0.0654
0.1103
0.0078
0.7221
0.3484
-0.6833
-35.3219

0.0018
-0.0088
0.00000003
0.3346
-0.0437
0.0530
-0.0010
0.6422
0.3772
-0.3532
-43.3742

*
*
**

**
*
***

0.49

0.0018

0.06
0.27
0.02
0.03
0.22
0.94
0.00
0.00
0.18
0.00

-0.0093
0.00000004
0.3391
-0.0416
0.0460
0.0040
0.6881
0.4038
-0.1677
-43.5056

p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10
** p<0.05
*** p<0.01
k- Coeffecients scaled by 1,000
kk- Coeffecient scaled by 1,000,000

**
*
**

***
**
***

0.0001

0.76

**
**
**
***
**
***
**
**
***

0.03
0.03
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.55
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Table C19: Results of Revised Probit Regression

Frag Var.
college
less25

(1)
mpdi
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.144
(0.24)
11.49
(0.12)
-27.56
(0.10)

(2)
jdcnt
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.00168
(0.50)
12.83
(0.11)
-25.46
(0.14)

(6)
ccg
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
0.154*
(0.06)
19.49*
(0.05)
-42.15*
(0.06)

msagdpkk
perdem
white
cmsa1y
comtime

-0.0000123
0.0241*
-1.593
-0.849
0.0568

(0.76)
(0.07)
(0.60)
(0.42)
(0.64)

-0.00000995
0.0213
-1.618
-0.663
0.0329

(0.80)
(0.10)
(0.60)
(0.52)
(0.78)

-0.00000525
0.0179
-4.802
-0.495
0.0410

(0.90)
(0.20)
(0.20)
(0.62)
(0.75)

densityk

-0.00257***

(0.00)

-0.00248***

(0.00)

-0.00310***

(0.00)

-0.0457

(0.37)

-0.0474

(0.35)

-0.0898

(0.16)

farepermi
prcnt1family
empgrowth

-0.0800**
-16.40**
-6.978

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.12)

-0.0751**
-15.58**
-6.743

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.14)

-0.0959**
-16.85**
-10.83**

(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.04)

mfgavgtk

0.0210*

(0.07)

0.0193*

(0.08)

0.0208*

(0.09)

(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.16)
(0.19)
(0.33)
(0.75)
(0.30)
(0.00)
(0.00)

-0.0835***
0.000000455***
4.021***
-0.183***
-0.260
0.0617
1.169
0.857
0.216
-300.3***
77.63***
187

(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.22)
(0.17)
(0.27)
(0.43)
(0.86)
(0.00)
(0.00)

k

dvmt

k

k

ptscttl
-0.0761***
(0.00) -0.0722***
ptscttlsq
0.000000361*** (0.00) 0.000000346***
coastal
3.181***
(0.00) 3.014***
jtemp
-0.145**
(0.02) -0.152**
julymnwind
-0.264
(0.16) -0.270
ttlrain
0.0495
(0.26) 0.0572
south
0.988
(0.42) 1.276
midwest
0.219
(0.84) 0.351
west
0.795
(0.52) 1.325
maxepa92
-261.9***
(0.00) -262.3***
_cons
64.02***
(0.00) 62.71***
N
187
187
p-values in parentheses
="* p<0.10
** p<0.05
*** p<0.01"
k- Coeffecients scaled by 1,000
kk- Coeffecient scaled by 1,000,000
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Table C20: Results of Probit Regression with Two IV's
Model

Frag Var.
college
less25

(1) mpdi
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.725
(0.18)
-29.14**
(0.03)
-17.02
(0.23)

(2) jdcnt
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.00829 (0.24)
-28.60*
(0.06)
-10.04
(0.49)

(3) ccd
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
0.104
(0.61)
-28.28*
(0.09)
-9.464
(0.49)

(4) sdd
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
0.743
(0.75)
-28.24*
(0.08)
-10.86
(0.42)

(5) cp
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.0104
(0.61)
-24.70*
(0.08)
-11.96
(0.33)

(6) ccg
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
0.225*
(0.10)
-46.26
(0.19)
-8.724
(0.77)

msagdpkk
perdem
white
cmsa1y
comtime

0.000280
-0.00842
-5.824
-2.499*
0.121

(0.35)
(0.61)
(0.36)
(0.05)
(0.39)

0.000317
-0.0115
-6.996
-2.071*
0.0424

(0.40)
(0.53)
(0.37)
(0.09)
(0.77)

0.000204
-0.0114
-4.944
-1.481
-0.0223

(0.62)
(0.47)
(0.56)
(0.13)
(0.89)

0.000252
-0.0121
-6.358
-1.632
0.0160

(0.54)
(0.48)
(0.47)
(0.13)
(0.91)

0.000115
-0.0123
-3.584
-1.415*
-0.00232

(0.74)
(0.41)
(0.62)
(0.10)
(0.99)

0.000882
-0.0202
-17.78
-2.222
-0.0960

(0.30)
(0.61)
(0.32)
(0.32)
(0.77)

densityk

0.000775

(0.35)

0.000902

(0.38)

0.000921

(0.43)

0.000862

(0.43)

0.000475

(0.63)

0.00224

(0.30)

-0.353

(0.39)

-0.389

(0.45)

-0.235

(0.67)

-0.308

(0.58)

-0.119

(0.80)

-1.167

(0.31)

farepermi
-0.144
prcnt1family -3.580
empgrowth 5.983

(0.25)
(0.59)
(0.36)

-0.163
-5.286
4.010

(0.30)
(0.50)
(0.60)

-0.110
-4.109
5.276

(0.51)
(0.59)
(0.54)

-0.135
-4.498
4.183

(0.42)
(0.56)
(0.64)

-0.0728
-2.781
7.382

(0.60)
(0.70)
(0.32)

-0.368
-11.73
-3.532

(0.28)
(0.46)
(0.83)

mfgavgtk

(0.97)

-0.00525

(0.73)

-0.00855

(0.65)

-0.00878

(0.64)

-0.00583

(0.74)

-0.0332

(0.41)

(0.96)
(0.79)
(0.95)
(0.17)
(0.88)
(0.49)
(0.14)
(0.24)
(0.65)
(0.00)
(0.05)

-0.0130
-2.74e-08
0.288
-0.146
0.0520
0.0499
3.236
1.934
0.449
-128.6***
39.74
187

(0.78)
(0.93)
(0.87)
(0.29)
(0.84)
(0.53)
(0.21)
(0.37)
(0.85)
(0.00)
(0.11)

-0.00914
-5.49e-08
0.239
-0.174
0.0115
0.0483
3.549
2.182
0.954
-127.5***
42.88*
187

(0.84)
(0.87)
(0.89)
(0.24)
(0.97)
(0.55)
(0.17)
(0.31)
(0.68)
(0.00)
(0.09)

-0.0235
5.92e-08
0.779
-0.129
0.0773
0.0266
2.766
1.489
0.324
-122.6***
36.31
187

(0.56)
(0.83)
(0.61)
(0.27)
(0.74)
(0.69)
(0.22)
(0.41)
(0.88)
(0.00)
(0.10)

0.0479
-4.42e-07
-1.811
-0.498
0.0109
0.146
8.175
5.463
2.284
-149.3***
84.26
187

(0.61)
(0.50)
(0.60)
(0.12)
(0.98)
(0.38)
(0.14)
(0.23)
(0.66)
(0.00)
(0.11)

k

dvmt

k

k

0.000405

ptscttl
0.0104
(0.83) 0.00235
ptscttlsq
-1.29e-08
(0.66) -7.96e-08
coastal
0.0183
(0.99) -0.108
jtemp
-0.192
(0.12) -0.192
julymnwind 0.113
(0.60) 0.0383
ttlrain
0.0393
(0.59) 0.0553
south
2.094
(0.17) 3.255
midwest
1.951
(0.22) 2.495
west
-0.376
(0.79) 0.961
maxepa92
-125.6*** (0.00) -132.4***
_cons
46.24**
(0.03) 45.36**
N
187
187
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10
** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
k- Coeffecients scaled by 1,000
kk- Coeffecient scaled by 1,000,000
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Table C21: Results of OLS Regression
Model

Frag Var.
college
less25

(1) mpdi
(2) jdcnt
(3) ccd
(4) sdd
(5) cp
(6) ccg
expected sign (+)
expected sign (+)
expected sign (-)
expected sign (+)
expected sign (-)
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
Coef.
p(z)
Coef.
p(z)
Coef.
p(z)
Coef.
p(z)
Coef.
p(z)
0.000793
(0.16) 0.0000141* (0.08) -0.00290
(0.62) 0.000169
(0.71) -0.0000314 (0.45) -0.000180
(0.18)
-0.0113
(0.57) -0.0143
(0.45) -0.0151
(0.43) -0.0153
(0.43) -0.0147
(0.45) -0.0164
(0.39)
-0.00122
(0.97) -0.00606
(0.85) -0.00166
(0.96) -0.00581
(0.85) -0.00676
(0.83) 0.00512
(0.87)

msagdpkk
perdem
white
cmsa1y
comtime

1.17e-07
2.95e-06
0.00600
0.00543*
0.000396

densityk

-0.00000117 (0.20) -0.00000120 (0.21) -0.00000125

(0.15) -0.00000135 (0.13) -0.00000137 (0.13) -0.00000124 (0.17)

-0.000133

(0.34) -0.000152

(0.28) -0.000156

(0.25) -0.000162

(0.24) -0.000170

(0.22) -0.000161

(0.24)

farepermi
prcnt1family
empgrowth

-0.0000115
0.0180
0.00888

(0.80) -0.0000172
(0.19) 0.0185
(0.37) 0.00894

(0.71) -0.0000338
(0.18) 0.0186
(0.37) 0.00971

(0.47) -0.0000338
(0.18) 0.0179
(0.36) 0.00889

(0.47) -0.0000356
(0.21) 0.0171
(0.38) 0.00945

(0.44) -0.0000333
(0.22) 0.0160
(0.36) 0.00819

(0.47)
(0.26)
(0.44)

mfgavgtk

-0.0000519** (0.03) -0.0000502** (0.03) -0.0000507** (0.04) -0.0000474* (0.06) -0.0000496** (0.04) -0.0000443* (0.06)

k

dvmt

k

k

(0.31)
(0.94)
(0.54)
(0.05)
(0.29)

1.17e-07
3.89e-06
0.00564
0.00532*
0.000449

ptscttl
0.000171*** (0.00) 0.000183***
ptscttlsq
-5.71e-10*
(0.05) -6.63e-10**
coastal
0.000145
(0.94) 0.000169
jtemp
0.000290
(0.15) 0.000281
julymnwind
0.00166*** (0.01) 0.00171***
ttlrain
-0.000228** (0.04) -0.000241**
south
0.00450
(0.22) 0.00385
midwest
0.000501
(0.86) 0.000145
west
-0.00307
(0.36) -0.00394
maxepa92
0.653***
(0.00) 0.662***
_cons
-0.0245
(0.37) -0.0208
N
187
187
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10
** p<0.05
*** p<0.01
k- Coeffecients scaled by 1,000
kk- Coeffecient scaled by 1,000,000

(0.30)
(0.92)
(0.56)
(0.05)
(0.21)

(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.94)
(0.17)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.27)
(0.96)
(0.25)
(0.00)
(0.45)

1.59e-07
5.84e-06
0.00588
0.00500*
0.000429

0.000200***
-6.73e-10**
-0.000168
0.000297
0.00182***
-0.000229*
0.00236
-0.0000899
-0.00427
0.654***
-0.0211
187

(0.18)
(0.89)
(0.54)
(0.07)
(0.31)

(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.94)
(0.16)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.49)
(0.98)
(0.16)
(0.00)
(0.45)

1.52e-07
7.33e-06
0.00596
0.00492*
0.000482

0.000205***
-7.01e-10**
-0.000385
0.000288
0.00177***
-0.000224*
0.00214
-0.000185
-0.00533
0.656***
-0.0207
187

(0.18)
(0.86)
(0.53)
(0.07)
(0.19)

(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.86)
(0.16)
(0.00)
(0.06)
(0.53)
(0.95)
(0.17)
(0.00)
(0.46)

1.59e-07
9.77e-06
0.00583
0.00494*
0.000479

0.000202***
-6.74e-10**
-0.000368
0.000287
0.00175***
-0.000240**
0.00219
-0.000260
-0.00476
0.656***
-0.0187
187

(0.16)
(0.98)
(0.54)
(0.07)
(0.19)

(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.86)
(0.16)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.53)
(0.93)
(0.15)
(0.00)
(0.49)

1.48e-07
6.18e-06
0.00836
0.00447*
0.000524

0.000188***
-6.26e-10**
-0.000445
0.000361*
0.00164***
-0.000237**
0.00275
-0.000159
-0.00283
0.646***
-0.0281
187

(0.19)
(0.88)
(0.37)
(0.10)
(0.13)

(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.83)
(0.08)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.42)
(0.96)
(0.40)
(0.00)
(0.30)
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Table C22: Results of OLS Regression with Two IV's
Model

Frag Var.
college
less25

(1) mpdi
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
0.000141
(0.92)
-0.0230
(0.52)
-0.00708
(0.84)

(2) jdcnt
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
0.00000749 (0.72)
-0.0292
(0.43)
-0.00629
(0.86)

(3) ccd
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
0.000224
(0.66)
-0.0246
(0.59)
-0.00878
(0.81)

(4) sdd
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.000141 (0.99)
-0.0231
(0.59)
-0.00787
(0.83)

(5) cp
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.0000557 (0.36)
-0.0204
(0.63)
-0.0118
(0.74)

(6) ccg
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.000180
(0.17)
-0.0180
(0.67)
0.000611
(0.99)

msagdpkk
perdem
white
cmsa1y
comtime

6.40e-07
-6.67e-06
-0.00443
0.00427
0.000505

(0.48)
(0.89)
(0.83)
(0.22)
(0.26)

7.67e-07
-9.73e-06
-0.00729
0.00438
0.000469

(0.50)
(0.86)
(0.77)
(0.23)
(0.29)

6.58e-07
-4.18e-06
-0.00476
0.00419
0.000501

(0.57)
(0.94)
(0.86)
(0.20)
(0.29)

6.37e-07
-6.03e-06
-0.00426
0.00417
0.000524

(0.57)
(0.91)
(0.87)
(0.20)
(0.28)

5.77e-07
-1.28e-06
-0.00319
0.00428
0.000501

(0.56)
(0.82)
(0.90)
(0.17)
(0.26)

4.31e-07
-1.31e-06
0.00208
0.00387
0.000575

(0.67)
(0.98)
(0.93)
(0.18)
(0.15)

densityk

-8.04e-07

(0.65)

-3.76e-07

(0.88)

-7.84e-07

(0.79)

-8.71e-07

(0.75)

-1.03e-07

(0.69)

-1.16e-06

(0.66)

-0.000995

(0.41)

-0.00116

(0.45)

-0.00102

(0.51)

-0.000991

(0.52)

-0.000913

(0.50)

-0.000714

(0.59)

farepermi
prcnt1family
empgrowth

-0.000177
0.0124
0.00318

(0.62)
(0.54)
(0.86)

-0.000232
0.0108
0.000592

(0.60)
(0.66)
(0.98)

-0.000184
0.0112
0.00274

(0.69)
(0.65)
(0.91)

-0.000175
0.0126
0.00347

(0.70)
(0.59)
(0.88)

-0.000150
0.0105
0.00520

(0.71)
(0.65)
(0.79)

-0.0000971
0.0122
0.00575

(0.81)
(0.55)
(0.77)

mfgavgtk

-0.0000356

(0.57)

-0.0000339 (0.52)

-0.0000322

(0.54)

-0.0000228

(0.64)

0.000243**
-9.61e-10
-0.00202
0.000125
0.00155*
-0.000209
0.00663
0.00313
-0.00143
0.678***
0.00404
187

(0.05)
(0.24)
(0.67)
(0.76)
(0.06)
(0.19)
(0.38)
(0.63)
(0.82)
(0.00)
(0.96)

0.000215*
-8.19e-10
-0.00153
0.000236
0.00153**
-0.000209
0.00631
0.00257
-0.000228
0.670***
-0.0146
187

(0.07)
(0.31)
(0.73)
(0.56)
(0.04)
(0.19)
(0.38)
(0.67)
(0.97)
(0.00)
(0.83)

k

dvmt

k

0.000242
ptscttlk
ptscttlsq
-9.93e-10
coastal
-0.00202
jtemp
0.000104
julymnwind
0.00155**
ttlrain
-0.000175
south
0.00715
midwest
0.00350
west
-0.000776
maxepa92
0.674***
_cons
0.00256
N
187
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10
** p<0.05

(0.31)

-0.0000446 (0.31)

-0.0000330

(0.12)
(0.28)
(0.66)
(0.78)
(0.02)
(0.24)
(0.17)
(0.52)
(0.84)
(0.00)
(0.97)

0.000251
-1.10e-09
-0.00236
0.0000672
0.00148*
-0.000167
0.00816
0.00402
-0.0000648
0.672***
0.0110
187

0.000254* (0.07) 0.000247*
-1.06e-09
(0.28) -1.00e-09
-0.00232
(0.67) -0.00205
0.000101
(0.82) 0.000105
0.00156*
(0.07) 0.00158*
-0.000172
(0.33) -0.000176
0.00694
(0.42) 0.00674
0.00359
(0.63) 0.00337
-0.00175
(0.81) -0.00107
0.675***
(0.00) 0.676***
0.00493
(0.95) 0.00254
187
187
k- Coeffecients scaled by 1,000
kk- Coeffecient scaled by 1,000,000

*** p<0.01

(0.11)
(0.26)
(0.67)
(0.88)
(0.06)
(0.33)
(0.28)
(0.59)
(0.99)
(0.00)
(0.88)

(0.07)
(0.28)
(0.69)
(0.82)
(0.07)
(0.31)
(0.40)
(0.63)
(0.86)
(0.00)
(0.97)
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Table C23: Results of Random Effects Probit Regression
Model

Frag
white
less25
college
density
dvmt
lnemp
gmpi
mfgavgt
ptsttl
ptsttlsq
ttlrain
jtemp

(1)
mpdi
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.729***
(0.00)
1.740
(0.17)
-14.64***
(0.01)
0.373***
(0.00)
-0.00286***
(0.00)
0.000000962
(0.98)
-1.682***
(0.00)
3.73e-08
(0.26)
0.00000583
(0.24)
-0.0000649*** (0.00)
1.97e-10**
(0.01)
0.114***
(0.00)
0.150***
(0.01)

(2)
jdcnt
expected sign (-)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.0107***
(0.00)
1.402
(0.29)
-18.85***
(0.00)
0.451***
(0.00)
-0.00406***
(0.00)
0.0000712**
(0.02)
-1.406***
(0.00)
4.85e-09
(0.79)
-0.00000106
(0.80)
-0.0000543*** (0.00)
1.43e-10*
(0.06)
0.113***
(0.00)
0.147***
(0.00)

_cons
lnsig2u
_cons
N

8.357

(0.12)

3.585

(0.50)

3.178***
561

(0.00)

3.171***
561

(0.00)

p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10

** p<0.05

*** p<0.01
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Table C24: Results of Random Effects and Fixed Effects OLS Regression

Frag
white
less25
college
density
dvmt
lnemp
gmpi
mfgavgt
ptsttl
ptsttlsq
ttlrain
jtemp

(1) Random Effects
mpdi
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
0.000849
(0.22)
-0.00929
(0.41)
0.0896**
(0.03)
-0.000124
(0.52)
0.00000315**
(0.02)
2.42e-08
(0.86)
0.00315
(0.20)
-7.22e-11
(0.30)
5.82e-08**
(0.02)
0.000000208*** (0.00)
-5.08e-13
(0.14)
-0.000136
(0.31)
0.000256
(0.30)

(2) Random Effects
jdcnt
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
-0.00000134
(0.92)
-0.00636
(0.57)
0.0894**
(0.03)
-0.000108
(0.58)
0.00000285**
(0.03)
6.15e-10
(1.00)
0.00374
(0.13)
-5.86e-11
(0.41)
6.79e-08***
(0.01)
0.000000219*** (0.00)
-5.31e-13
(0.12)
-0.000128
(0.34)
0.000209
(0.40)

(1) Fixed Effects
mpdi
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
0.000707
(0.55)
0.0309
(0.25)
0.0932
(0.18)
0.000320
(0.27)
-0.0000162*
(0.05)
-0.000000671*** (0.01)
0.00523
(0.39)
-8.83e-11
(0.48)
-7.33e-08
(0.14)
0.000000280*** (0.00)
-8.54e-13**
(0.04)
0.0000595
(0.79)
-0.000524
(0.31)

(2) Fixed Effects
jdcnt
expected sign (+)
Coef.
p(z)
0.0000110
(0.79)
0.0294
(0.28)
0.0879
(0.20)
0.000333
(0.25)
-0.0000162**
(0.05)
-0.000000670*** (0.01)
0.00415
(0.49)
-7.76e-11
(0.53)
-6.27e-08
(0.19)
0.000000277*** (0.00)
-8.28e-13*
(0.05)
0.0000768
(0.73)
-0.000492
(0.34)

_cons
N

0.0229
561

0.0201
561

0.0433
561

0.0580
561

Model

p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10
** p<0.05

(0.60)

*** p<0.01

(0.65)

(0.65)

(0.54)
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Table C25: The effects of Changes in MPDI, JDCNT, CCG on the Likelihood of Ozone attainment
Percent Change in likelihood of attainment due
to increase/decrease in the variable of:c
MSA NAME
Atlanta, GA
Louisville, KY
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ
Salt Lake City, UT
Columbus, OH
Greensboro-Win Sal, NC
Jacksonville, FL
New Orleans, LA
Oklahoma City, OK
Raleigh-Durham, NC
Tampa-St Petersburg, FL

attaina
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

MSAPOPb
3,541,230
991,765
2,746,703
1,217,842
1,447,646
1,141,238
967,286
1,632,175
1,026,657
1,025,253
2,199,231

JDCNT
233
251
128
135
206
77
41
29
101
64
90

MPDI
8.57
6.00
4.63
6.82
6.66
4.84
2.80
3.25
4.95
4.68
5.16

CCG
2.83
0.25
38.14
0.85
5.23
6.76
26.60
-0.24
12.03
12.62
6.33

∆% JDCNT ∆% MPDI
∆% CCG
4.47%
6.89%
4.59%
5.73%
3.08%
5.40%
3.12%
6.08%
-3.44%
-2.32%
-1.33%
-2.55%
-0.83%
-2.15%
-0.38%
-0.63%
-1.72%
-3.66%
-1.29%
-3.00%
-1.92%
-3.09%

all data for the year 1997
a

attain= 0 if MSA failed to meet 1997 one-hour ozone standard
attain= 1 if MSA met 1997 one-hour ozone standard

b
c

MSAPOP = MSA population

If an MSA is in nonattaiment of the ozone standard, the standard consolidation is used which decreases the number of cities and towns by
10% and the numbe of special districst by 20%.
if an MSA is in attaiment of the ozone the standard, the standard expansion is used which increases the number of cities and towns by
10% and the numbe of special districst by 20%.

0.75%
0.42%
7.42%
0.50%
-1.14%
-1.81%
-2.16%
-0.51%
-1.25%
-2.52%
-1.46%

205

References

The environmental resource handbook. 2002. Grey House publishing.
Baltagi, Badi H. 1999. Econometrics: Springer.
Bauer, Paul W. and Yoonsoo Lee. 2006. Estimating GSP and labor productivity by state.
Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Baumol, William J. and Wallace E. Oates. 1988. The theory of environmental policy:
Cambridge University Press.
Bento, Antonio M., Maureen L. Cropper, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, and Katja Vinha.
2005. The impact of urban spatial structure on travel demand in the United States.
The Review of Economics and Statistics 87, no. 3.
Blair, John P., Samuel R. Staley, and Zhongcai Zhang. 1996. The central city elasticity
hypothesis: A critical appraisal of Rusk's theory of urban development. Journal of
the American Planning Association 62: 345-353.
Break, George F. 1967. Intergovernmental fiscal relations in the United States.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan. 1980. The power to tax: Analytical
foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Buckley, Edward and Rachel Croson. 2006. Income and wealth heterogeneity in the
voluntary provision of linear public goods. Journal of Public Economics 90, no.
4-5: 935-955.
Carruthers, John I. and Gudmundur F. Ulfarsson. 2002. Fragmentation and sprawl:
Evidence from interregional analysis. Growth and Change 33, no. 3: 312-40.
Census of Governments American Housing Survey, AHS. 1997. American housing
survey Accessed April 21, 2003. Available from
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/access.html.
Cervero, Robert. 1994. Transit-based housing in California: Evidence on ridership
impacts. Transport Policy 3: 174-183.
Chamberlin, John. 1974. Provision of collective goods as a function of group size.
American Political Science Review 68: 707-716.

206
Cieslewicz, David, ed. 2001. The impacts of sprawl in urban sprawl: Causes,
consequence and policy responses. Edited by Gregory Squires: Urban Institute
Press.
Cornes, Richard and Todd Sandler. 1986. The theory of externalities, public goods and
club goods. New York: Cambridge Press.
Cumberland, John H. 1979. Interregional pollution spillovers and consistency of
environmental policy. In Regional environmental policy: The economic issues ed.
Horst Siebert, Ingo Walter and Klaus Zimmerman: 255-281. New York: New
York University Press.
________. 1981. Efficiency and equity in interregional environmental management,.
Review of Regional Studies 2: 1-9.
D'Agostino, Ralph B. and David Savageau. 1999. Places rated almanac Foster City:
Hungry Minds, Inc.
Davidson, Russell and James G. MacKinnon. 1993. Estimation and inference in
economics: Oxford University Press.
Dawkins, Casey J. Tiebout choice and residential segregation by race in us metropolitan
areas, 1980-2000. Regional Science and Urban Economics In Press, Corrected
Proof.
EPA. EPA's national emissions inventory. Accessed April 12, 2006. Available from
ftp://ftp.epa.gov/pub/EmisInventory/nei_criteria_summaries/
________. 2000. Greenbook on non-attainment areas. Accessed November 30 2001.
Available from http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/
________. 2000. National air quality and emissions trends report 1999 data tables
appendix a Accessed November 30, 2001. Available from
http://www.epa.gov/air/oarpubs.html
________. 2001. The plain English guide to the Clean Air Act 1998. Accessed November
30, 2001. Available from http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/peg_caa/pegcaain.html.
________. 2003. Nonpoint source pollution: The nation's largest water quality problem
2003. Accessed September 4, 2003. Available from
http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/facts/point1.htm
________. 2006. EPA's national emissions inventory.
________. 2006. Greenbook on non-attainment areas. Accessed March 21, 2007.
Available from http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/oindex.html.

207

________. 2007. Air quality monitoring, modeling, and related data. Accessed. Available
from http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/ozone/areas/aqdata.htm.
Ewing, Reid, Rolf Pendall, and Don Chen. 2002. Measuring sprawl and its impact. Smart
Growth America.
FHWA. 1993. Roadway, extent, characteristics and performance. Accessed November 7,
2006. Available from http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hs92/roads.pdf.
________. 2000. Highway statistics. U.S. Department of Transportation Accessed
November 30, 2001. Available from http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/ohimstat.htm.
________. 2000. Highway statistics. U.S. Department of Transportation Accessed March
5, 2007. Available from http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/summary95/dl201.pdf.
________. 2003. State motor fuel tax. Federal Highway Administration. Accessed March
5, 2007. Available from
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs03/htm/mf205.htm.
________. 2006. Vehicle miles traveled. Federal Highway Administration. Accessed June
27, 2006. Available from http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohpi/hss/index.htm.
Foster, Charles Henry Wheelwright. 2002. Conference summary. In ENREG Eastern
Regionalism Conference. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Foster, Kathryn A. 2001. Regionalism on purpose Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy
Friedman, Michael S., Kenneth E. Powell, Lori Hutwagner, LeRoy M. Graham, and W.
Gerald Teague. 1996. Impact of changes in transportation and commuting
behavior during the summer Olympic games in Atlanta on air quality and child
hood asthma. JAMA 285 no. 7: 897-905.
Garrett, Mark and Martin Wachs. 1996. Transportation planning on trial : The clean air
act and travel forecasting. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.
Glazer, Amihai. 1999. Local regulation may be excessively stringent. Regional Science
and Urban Economics, 29: 533-558.
Gould, William 2001. What is the between estimator? StataCorp. Accessed February 25,
2006. Available from http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/xt.html
Green, William. 1993. Econometric analysis: Prentice Hall.
Hanley, Nick, Jason Shogren, and Ben White. 1997. Environmental economics in theory
and practice. New York: Oxford University Press.

208

Hawkins, Brett W. and Thomas R. Dye, eds. 1971. Metropolitan fragmentation: A
research note. Edited by Brett W. Hawkins and Thomas R. Dye. Politics in the
metropolis a reader in conflict and cooperation. Columbus OH: Charles E.
Merrill.
Henderson, Vernon 1996. Effects of air quality regulation. The American Economic
Review 86, no. 4: 789-813.
Hoyt, William 1991. Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power. Journal of
Urban Economics Letters 30: 123-131.
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. 2006. Census of
governments the inter-university consortium for political and social research
Accessed March 23, 2004. Available from
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/index.html.
Jean-Michel Guldmann, (with H.Y. Kim). 2001 Modeling air quality in urban areas: A
cell-based statistical approach,. Geographical Analysis 33, no. 2: pp. 156-180
Jensen, Gary. 2003. Air quality and transportation. Accessed March 15, 2004. Available
from http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/03jul/10.htm.
Kahn, Matthew E. 2001. The beneficiaries of Clean Air Act regulation. Regulation
Spring 34-38.
Kunce, Mitch and Jason F. Shogren. 2002. On environmental federalism and direct
emission control. Journal of Urban Economics 51, no. 2: 238-45.
Levinson, Arik. 1997. A note on environmental federalism: Interpreting some
contradictory results. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 33:
359-366.
McGuire, Martin. 1974. Group size, group homogeneity, and the aggregate provision of a
pure public good under Cournot behavior. Public Choice 18: 107-126.
McKinney, Matthew, Craig Fitch, and Will Harmon. 2002. Regionalism in the west: An
inventory and assessment. Public Land and Resources Law Review 23: 101-191.
Miller, David Young. 2002. The regional governing of metropolitan America: Boulder,
Colo. : Westview, 2002.
Mueller, Dennis C. 1989. Public choice II. New York: Cambridge University Press.
National Climatic Data Center, NCDC. 2006. The 1971-2000 monthly and daily normals.

209

National Safety Council. 2006. What you can do about car emissions. Accessed April
8th, 2007. Available from http://www.nsc.org/ehc/mobile/mse_fs.htm.
National transit database. 2006. Data for the public transportation measures are from the
national transit database Accessed July 26, 2005. Available from
http://www.ntdprogram.com/ntdprogram/data.htm.
Nelson, Arthur C. and Kathryn A. Foster. 1999. Metropolitan governance structures and
income growth. Journal of Urban Affairs 21: 309-324.
Oates, Wallace E. and Robert M. Schwab. 1988. Economic competition among
jurisdictions: Efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing. Journal of Public
Economics 35: 333-354.
O'Connor, Robert E., Richard J Bord, Brent Yarnal, and Nancy Wiefek. 2002. Who
wants to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? Social Science Quarterly 83, no. 1: 117.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
O'Sullivan, Arthur. 2000. Urban economics: McGraw Hill.
Highway Statistics Publications. 1993. Roadway, extent, characteristics and performance.
Razin, Eran and Mark Rosentraub. 2000. Are fragmentation and sprawl interlinked?
Urban Affairs Review 35, no. 6: 824-836.
Rusk, David. 1995. Cities without suburbs. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press.
________. 1999. Inside game, 0utside game. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press.
________, ed. 2000. Growth management: The core regional issue. Edited by Bruce
Katz. Reflections on regionalism 2000. Washington, DC: Brookings.
Samuelson, Paul. 1954. The pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and
Statistics 36: 387-389.
Sandler, Todd. 1992. Collective action: Theory and applications. Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press.
Sandler, Todd and Simon Vicary. 2002. Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or
transferring money. European Economic Review 46: 1501-1520.

210

Scorecard. 2007. Environmental racism. Accessed May 15, 2007. Available from
http://www.scorecard.org/env-releases/def/ej_measures.html.
SELC. 2001. Southern environmental law center Accessed November 15, 2001.
Available from
http://www.selcva.org/originals/atlanta_air/atlanta_air_background.shtml
Sillman, Sanford. 2006. Key findings in science of ozone pollutions. What science has
learned that policy makers should know? : NARSTO.
Southworth, Frank. 2001. On the potential impacts of land use change policies on
automobile vehicle miles of travel. Energy Policy 29, no. 14.
Stansel, Dean. 2005. Local decentralization and local economic growth: A cross-sectional
examination of us metropolitan areas. Journal of Urban Economics 57: 55-72.
StataCorp. Stata statistical software Release 8.0. Stata Corporation, College Station, TX.
Tiebout, Charles. 1956. Pure theory of local public expenditures. Journal of Political
Economy 64: 416-424.
U.S. Census. 1990. 1990 Census of population: Educational attainment by state. U.S.
Census Bureau. Accessed March 5, 2007. Available from
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/educ-attn.html.
________. 1990. State data county level by age, sex, race & hispanic origin 1990-1999.
U.S. Census. Accessed March 9, 2007. Available from
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/CO-99-12.html.
________. 1997. U.S. Census of Governments,1998 U.S. Census population and
metropolitan statistical area square mileage. Accessed 2001 November 30,.
Available from http://www.census.gov.
________. 2003. Population estimates, county population datasets, . U.S. Census Bureau.
Accessed March 9, 2007. Available from
http://www.census.gov/popest/estimates.php.
U.S. National climate data service. 2006. Heating & cooling degree day data. Accessed
September 22, 2006. Available from
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/documentlibrary/hcs/hcs.html.
Weyrich, Paul M. 2003. White house off track on 'bus rapid transit'. Houston Chronicle,
August 29.

211
Wildasin, David E. 1988. Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition. Journal of
Pubic Economics 35, no. 2: 229-40.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey. 2000. Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. Cincinnati,
OH: South-Western College Publishing.
________. 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Zeigler, Donald J. and Stanley D. Brunn. Geopolitical fragmentation and the pattern of
growth and need: Defining the cleavage between sunbelt and frostbelt
metropolicies. In The American metropolitan system: Present and future, ed.
Stanley D. Brunn and James O. Wheeler:77-92. New York: V.H. Winston &
Sons.

212
VITA
Peter Stuart Bluestone was born on October 18, 1964, in Rochester, New York.
The family moved to Brighton, New York, a suburb of Rochester, in 1968. Peter
graduated from Brighton high school in 1983. He completed his college education at
Georgia Institute of Technology where he graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in Industrial
Engineering in 1987.
In the fall of 1988, Peter enrolled at Georgia State University Law School. He
graduated in 1991 and successfully set for the Georgia state bar exam. He practiced in
several areas of law including, public interest environmental litigation and commodities
and securities law. In the fall of 2000 he entered the doctoral program in Economics at
Georgia State University. His areas of concentration were Environmental and Natural
Resource Economics, Urban Economics, and State and Local Public Finance.
As a graduate research assistant, Peter worked on a variety of projects such as:
The economic and legal consequences of Georgia school districts being declared unitary
under current federal court guidelines. He conducted an economic and spatial analysis of
local option sales taxes in Georgia counties and updated state level economic data for the
Governor’s office. In October 2004, Peter became a Research Associate at the Fiscal
Research Center, at the Andrew Young Scholl of Policy Studies, Georgia State
University. His responsibilities include, preparing fiscal notes for the Georgia State
Legislature and writing policy reports on state and local fiscal policy. He graduated with
a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Economics in December 2007.

